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Abstract
Specifying and Targeting Cognitive-Affective Dysfunctions in Antisocial Individuals
Allison M. Stuppy-Sullivan
2021
Antisocial behavior includes a wide range of behaviors that violate social norms,
from criminal acts to substance misuse. The adverse consequences of antisocial behavior
produce a great physical and emotional burden on perpetrators, victims, and family
members. This burden is not addressed adequately, with incarceration being the most
common intervention for antisocial behavior. When individuals who chronically engage
in antisocial behavior are offered therapeutic treatments, the majority neither complete
nor benefit from them. One reason existing treatments do not fully address antisocial
behavior is because they do not consider or target cognitive-affective dysfunctions
driving such behavior, and mechanistic research, to date, does not adequately characterize
these cognitive-affective dysfunctions. The present dissertation consists of three studies
that refine accounts of cognitive-affective dysfunctions contributing to antisocial
behavior and demonstrate how targeting identified dysfunctions can improve cognition
and behavior in chronically antisocial individuals. More specifically, Study 1 examines
how reward features impact perception, executive functioning, and risk-based decisionmaking in antisocial individuals. Study 2 examines how reward information is integrated
during effort-based decision-making in antisocial individuals, and how negative affect
impacts this integration. Finally, Study 3 tests a novel cognitive remediation training
package designed to address cognitive-affective dysfunctions in antisocial individuals.
Across the three studies in this dissertation, findings highlight that cognitive-affective

dysfunctions related to antisocial behavior reflect difficulty integrating information in
specific affectively charged circumstances, and call for a less pessimistic view about
treatment for antisocial behavior, and the burden it produces, when these dysfunctions are
considered.
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Chapter 1: General Introduction
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Antisocial behavior is a heterogeneous construct that includes a wide range of
behaviors from criminal acts to substance misuse. The adverse consequences of antisocial
behavior produce a great physical and emotional burden on perpetrators, victims, and
family members. Moreover, the economic burden of antisocial behavior is immense, with
estimated annual costs of over $3 trillion in the United States alone (Baskin-Sommers,
Curtin, & Newman, 2015; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016; National Institute on
Drug Abuse, 2017). The enormous financial and psychological toll associated with
antisocial behavior highlights the importance of conducting programmatic research
related to its etiology and translating findings into targeted treatments.
Broadly speaking, antisocial individuals that engage in chronic and severe
behavior can be classified clinically based on distinct psychopathologies using the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
One such diagnosis is Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD), which reflects repeated
violations of social norms, impulsivity, aggression, and irresponsibility. APD is
represented in approximately 2-4% of the general population (Compton, Conway,
Stinson, Colliver, & Grant, 2005; Fisher & Hany, 2019; Glenn, Johnson, & Raine, 2013),
but over 50% of incarcerated individuals (Black, 2015). Another diagnostic category
reflective of antisociality is Substance Use Disorders (SUDs), which are characterized by
cognitive, behavioral, and physiological symptoms reflecting continued substance use
despite significant substance-related problems. Twelve-month prevalence for SUDs is
7.4% in the general population (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration, 2019) but 65% in the US prison population (National Institute on Drug
Abuse, 2020). APD and SUDs frequently co-occur: 40 to 50% of males with SUDs have
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APD, and 90% of individuals diagnosed with APD have SUDs (Forrest, 1994; Gerstley,
Alterman, McLellan, & Woody, 1990; Messina, Wish, & Nemes, 1999; Tims, De Leon,
& Jainchill, 1994). The systematic co-occurrence of SUDs and APD, and their shared
common cognitive-affective profiles, suggest these traits reflect an underlying
externalizing spectrum (Krueger et al., 2005).
Most previous research on individuals with antisocial psychopathology highlights
diminished executive functioning and aberrant decision-making as core cognitive
dysfunctions contributing to their problematic behavior (Blair, 2001; the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex executive functioning in APD model; Dolan & Park, 2002; the
cognitive–neurobehaivoral model of alcoholism; Giancola & Moss, 1998; the impaired
response inhibition and salience attribution model; iRISA; Goldstein & Volkow, 2002;
Goldstein & Volkow, 2011; the P3 amplitude reduction in externalizing model; Iacono,
Malone, & McGue, 2003; the prefrontal–amygdala–striatal model of APD; Raine, 2018;
the 3-pathway model; Verheul, 2001). Additionally, motivational and affective
sensitivities are apparent, with evidence that individuals with APD or who are high on
externalizing are prone to excessive reward seeking across a variety of reward-related
cues (e.g., monetary, substance; Baskin-Sommers & Newman, 2013; Volkow & Li,
2004). These motivational and affective sensitivities undermine cognitive processes even
further (Bechara, 2005; Bickel, Jarmolowicz, Mueller, Gatchalian, & McClure, 2012;
Bickel et al., 2007; Jentsch & Taylor, 1999; McClure & Bickel, 2014). According to
dual-systems models, antisocial individuals fail to self-regulate because they have not
only a diminished ability to exercise control (i.e., they have difficulty applying
metaphorical “brakes”), but also have abnormally strong appetitive urges (i.e., they have
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a heavy foot on a metaphorical “gas pedal;" Bell & McBride, 2010; Buckholtz, 2015;
Casey & Caudle, 2013) that further undermine control. Following these models, there is
strong evidence that antisocial individuals have decreased capacities to employ executive
functions and make cost-benefit decisions, particularly in rewarding contexts (Buckholtz,
2015; Buckholtz, Karmarkar, Ye, Brennan, & Baskin-Sommers, 2017; Dolan, 2012;
Garcia-Villamisar, Dattilo, & Garcia-Martinez, 2017; Mazas, Finn, & Steinmetz, 2000;
Morgan & Lilienfeld, 2000; Ogilvie, Stewart, Chan, & Shum, 2011; Patrick, Durbin, &
Moser, 2012; Petry, 2002; Rowe, 1997). While there is substantial evidence that
antisocial individuals display executive dysfunctions, abnormal decision-making, and
aberrant reward sensitivies, extant research is limited in numerous ways.
First, while several studies indicate executive dysfunction, abnormal decisionmaking, and reward sensitivity among antisocial individuals, several other studies
provide counterevidence of these abnormalities. For example, many studies report no
overall declines in executive functions (e.g., Baskin-Sommers et al., 2014; Maes &
Brazil, 2013; Smith, Mattick, Jamadar, & Iredale, 2014; Stevens, Kaplan, & Hesselbrock,
2003), and report instances of intact cost-benefit decision-making by antisocial
individuals (e.g., De Brito, Viding, Kumari, Blackwood, & Hodgins, 2013; Gregory et
al., 2015; Swogger, Walsh, Lejuez, & Kosson, 2010), challenging the idea that such
deficits are at the core of antisocial behavior. Further, several studies indicate antisocial
individuals can perform complex cognitive tasks in the presence of rewards (e.g.,
Charles-Walsh, Upton, & Hester, 2016; Swogger et al., 2010), undermining the notion
that reward sensitivity affects their executive functioning and decision-making. In light of
the inconsistent findings across studies, it is possible that the links between antisociality,
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executive functioning deficits, abnormal cost-benefit decision-making, and reward
sensitivity, while intuitive, are overstated.
Second, previous research also is limited in that most studies lack specificity
regarding discrete executive functioning and decision-making processes (Ogilvie et al.,
2011; Raine & Scerbo, 1991). Executive functioning refers to a diverse range of
interdependent cognitive processes that control and coordinate subprocesses of cognition,
guiding complex tasks and goal-directed behavior (Miyake et al., 2000), including
working memory, future planning, set shifting, and response inhibition (Burgess, 1997;
Jurado & Rosselli, 2007; Maes & Brazil, 2013; Miyake et al., 2000; Ogilvie et al., 2011;
Royall et al., 2002; Salthouse, 2005; Smith & Jonides, 1999; Stuss & Knight, 2002).
Similarly, cost-benefit decision-making can be parsed based on the distinct type of cost
associated with a given choice option (e.g. risk, delay, ambiguity; effort; Rudebeck,
Walton, Smyth, Bannerman, & Rushworth, 2006). Many previous studies do not
differentiate among these component processes, and may thus oversimplify cognitive
dysfunctions, and the role of reward in exacerbating such dysfunctions, among antisocial
individuals. Understanding how cognitive and reward processes interact is important and,
ultimately, mapping interactions among these processes may best determine the specific
processes underlying antisocial behavior. The current literature, though, falls short in its
specification and integration of the vast cognitive and reward-related processes that affect
antisocial individuals.
Finally, reward sensitivity is not the only affective abnormality among antisocial
individuals (Baskin-Sommers & Newman, 2013). Evidence suggests that abnormal
cognitive performance in distressing contexts also is common for individuals with
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antisocial psychopathology (e.g., Daughters et al., 2005; Daughters, Sargeant,
Bornovalova, Gratz, & Lejuez, 2008), and some models of antisociality propose negative
emotionality as a core feature (in the prefrontal–amygdala–striatal model of APD; Raine,
2018; the 3-pathway model; Verheul, 2001). Further research is necessary to characterize
how a wider range of affective states impact cognition in antisocial individuals.
Overall, a more thorough examination of the specific cognitive-affective
dysfunctions in antisocial individuals may lead to a better understanding of the
mechanisms underlying and maintaining their behavior. Moreover, greater specificity in
accounting for the cognitive-affective dysfunctions present among antisocial individuals
is likely to inform better treatment approaches for individuals who are largely considered
to be treatment resistant and prone to relapse and recidivism (National Institute on Drug
Abuse, 2018; Raine, 2018). Across three studies, this dissertation incorporates
methodologies from experimental science to refine cognitive-affective conceptualizations
of antisocial behavior for a prevalent, chronic, and severe subset of antisocial individuals
and to illustrate how leveraging such conceptualizations can improve treatment efficacy
in this population.
Study 1 utilizes a well-established reward priming paradigm across three
cognitive tasks to identify specific circumstances in which cognition and reward interact
to disrupt behavior in a sample of incarcerated individuals diagnosed with APD. Study 2
utilizes a well-established decision-making task to characterize how individuals with
APD symptoms in the community incorporate cost-benefit information when choosing to
expend effort, and how this information integration is impacted by negative affect.
Finally, Study 3 is a pilot randomized controlled trial testing a novel cognitive
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remediation training package designed to address antisociality-linked cognitive-affective
dysfunctions in a sample of antisocial individuals enrolled in outpatient substance use
treatment. Taken together, this set of studies aims to elucidate the cognitive-affective
dysfunctions that contribute to antisocial behavior and demonstrate how targeting such
dysfunctions can meaningfully improve cognition and behavior.
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Abstract
Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD) is a costly clinical condition. Previous
studies identify executive dysfunction and reward sensitivity as factors contributing to
APD. However, empirical evidence supporting the role of these factors in APD is mixed.
The present study aimed to identify and specify APD-related dysfunction in cognitive and
reward factors. In a sample of incarcerated males (N=116), we administered three tasks
targeting distinct cognitive (perception, executive functioning, and probabilistic decisionmaking) and reward (magnitude and consciousness) factors. APD was associated with
impaired perception when high magnitude rewards were at stake, regardless of reward
consciousness. APD was associated with worse executive functioning during conscious
high rewards, as well as worse inhibition during high rewards when working memory
demands were high. There was no APD-related performance difference during
probabilistic decision-making. These findings expose the multifaceted nature of
cognitive-affective dysfunction in APD, highlighting the importance of systematic
research and providing insight into treatment targets.

Keywords: antisocial personality disorder; cognition; reward; perception; executive
functioning
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Antisocial personality disorder (APD) is a costly clinical condition associated
with a persistent pattern of social, legal, and moral norm violations (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). The prevalence of APD is markedly elevated in incarcerated
offenders, with evidence that rates of APD are approximately 13 times higher in prisoners
compared with the general population (Compton, Conway, Stinson, Colliver, & Grant,
2005; Fazel & Danesh, 2002). Individuals with APD represent a particularly high-risk
subtype of offenders, committing higher rates of violent and nonviolent crimes, obtaining
diagnoses of severe forms of substance use disorders (Brennan, Stuppy-Sullivan, Brazil,
& Baskin-Sommers, 2017), and having increased mortality rates (National Institute for
Health Clinical Excellence, 2009) compared with individuals without APD. Despite the
significance of APD as a driver of costly behavior, we still know relatively little about the
cognitive and affective factors underlying the disorder. This is due, in part, to the failure
of previous research to systematically specify factors of cognition and affect that are
disrupted in APD.
Based on existing research, executive dysfunction and reward hypersensitivity
emerge as possible candidate factors implicated in the pathogenesis of APD. Across
studies and meta-analyses, individuals with APD show deficits in many components of
executive functioning (Dolan, 2012; Garcia-Villamisar, Dattilo, & GarciaMartinez, 2017;
Morgan & Lilienfeld, 2000; Ogilvie, Stewart, Chan, & Shum, 2011; Patrick, Durbin, &
Moser, 2012; Rowe, 1997) including inhibition (Barkataki et al., 2008; Chamberlain,
Derbyshire, Leppink, & Grant, 2016; De Brito, Viding, Kumari, Blackwood, & Hodgins,
2013; Dolan & Park, 2002; Rubio et al., 2007; Swann, Lijffijt, Lane, Steinberg, &
Moeller, 2009; Zeier, Baskin-Sommers, Hiatt Racer, & Newman, 2012), planning (Dolan
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& Park, 2002), working memory (Dolan & Park, 2002), and set shifting (Dolan & Park,
2002). Moreover, the extant literature describes individuals with APD as exemplars of a
dominant reward-based system (Quay, 1993). Empirical evidence indicates that
individuals with APD are hypersensitive to rewards (Raine, 2018; Völlm et al., 2010),
resulting in their strong desire for immediate rewards (Petry, 2002), even when their
reward-driven behavior is accompanied by negative consequences (Mazas, Finn, &
Steinmetz, 2000). Together, research provides strong support for the purported
relationships among APD, executive dysfunction, and reward hypersensitivity. Moreover,
the nature of these relationships seems intuitive, given that individuals with APD
repeatedly display behaviors reflecting a failure to inhibit urges (e.g., fighting and crime),
and they often do so in pursuit of rewards (e.g., to obtain other’s property in the case of
theft or to achieve a “high” from substance use).
Although the work noted earlier suggests diminished executive functioning and
heightened reward sensitivity among individuals with APD, the exact cognitive-affective
factors at issue remain somewhat underspecified. First, take cognition. It is clear from
decades of research that cognition contains multiple separable factors, including
perception (supporting encoding and early attention), executive functioning (discrete
functions supporting complex tasks and goal-directed behavior [e.g., monitoring,
updating, suppressing competing memory representations in working memory, planning,
set shifting, and inhibition]) and decision-making (supporting the evaluation of and
choices between alternative actions; Burgess, 1997; Jurado & Rosselli, 2007; Maes &
Brazil, 2013; Miyake et al., 2000; Ogilvie et al., 2011; Purves et al., 2008; Royall et al.,
2002; Salthouse, 2005; Smith & Jonides, 1999; Stuss & Knight, 2002). In general,
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cognition can be impacted in a variety of ways based on these factors, and dysfunction
associated with any one of these factors may disrupt processing associated with other
factors. With these cognitive factors in mind, close examination of the existing research
on APD and executive functioning actually highlights that some tasks used to tap
executive functioning also manipulate perception (e.g., Cambridge gambling task [CGT])
or decision-making (e.g., Iowa gambling task [IGT]; Snyder, Miyake, & Hankin, 2015).
For example, some research of executive dysfunction in APD reports poor
performance among individuals with APD during tasks like the IGT (Bechara, Damasio,
Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; Gansler, Jerram, Vannorsdall, & Schretlen, 2011; Mazas et
al., 2000) and the CGT (De Brito et al., 2013; Rogers et al., 1999). The IGT, though,
examines several cognitive factors within executive functions (e.g., set shifting, planning,
and working memory) and decision-making (e.g., value-based learning, reversal learning,
and risk-aversion; De Brito & Hodgins, 2009). Likewise, on the CGT, performance
“quality” depends not only on executive functions and decision-making but also the
perceptual capability of an individual to discern among various visual stimuli. With
multiple cognitive factors assessed during tasks like the IGT and CGT, it is unclear
whether poor performance for those with APD reflects executive dysfunction or whether
abnormal perception, decision-making, or an interaction among these cognitive factors
promotes dysfunction in these individuals. Moreover, even studies using purportedly
“purer” measures of executive function, such as set-shifting or planning tasks, do not
support the claim that individuals with APD show fundamental deficits in executive
functions (Chamberlain et al., 2016; Crowell, Kieffer, Kugeares, & Vanderploeg, 2003;
De Brito et al., 2013; Maes & Brazil, 2013; Stevens, Kaplan, & Hesselbrock, 2003).
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Across multiple types of executive functioning tasks, individuals with APD tend to show
dysfunction under high cognitive load (e.g., when planning several steps and maintaining
complex stimuli over long periods of time; De Brito et al., 2013; Dolan & Park, 2002)
and during inhibition of prepotent responses (De Brito et al., 2013; Dolan & Park, 2002).
At this point, extant literature in APD has not provided a clear picture of dysfunction,
either in terms of specific executive functions or with regard to cognitive dysfunction
more broadly.
Second, reward also can be subdivided into multiple separable factors. Common
factors include reward magnitude (the amount of reward available; Beilock, 2007;
Berridge, 2004; Knutson, Adams, Fong, & Hommer, 2001; Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman,
Peterson, & Glover, 2005; Mobbs et al., 2009; Robbins & Everitt, 1996; Schultz, 2006)
and reward consciousness (the degree to which awareness of reward information can bias
behavior; Berridge, Robinson, & Aldridge, 2009; Berridge & Winkielman, 2003;
Bijleveld, Custers, & Aarts, 2009; Pessiglione et al., 2008; van Gaal & Lamme, 2012;
Zedelius et al., 2014). Each of these alone or combined can contribute to an individual’s
reward sensitivity. Different laboratory paradigms use controlled manipulations of these
factors to quantify their common and unique impact on an individual’s behavior. This
approach allows researchers to clarify and contextualize cognitive and reward
abnormalities. Unfortunately, many tasks selected for research on reward sensitivity in
APD conflate multiple reward factors or subtly assess components of reward without
fully manipulating those components, making it difficult to know which components of
reward processing, if any, are affected in APD.
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As an example, risky decision-making tasks conflate reward magnitude and
reward probability by exclusively pairing low magnitude rewards with high probabilities
and high magnitude rewards with low probabilities, such that the influence of magnitude
or probability cannot be disentangled (e.g., IGT and balloon analogue risk task; Lejuez et
al., 2002). Unfortunately, because many decision-making tasks do not use systematic
reward magnitude manipulations, it is unclear whether the observed reward sensitivity in
individuals with APD reflects sensitivity to reward magnitude, reward probability, or a
combination of these reward features (Dolan & Park, 2002; Mazas et al., 2000; Swogger,
Walsh, Lejuez, & Kosson, 2010). Another example relates to how reward consciousness
has been a factor of reward noted in research on APD, but not examined systematically.
Individuals with APD appear reward hypersensitive when they are not consciously aware
of reward information (e.g., they display a “decision bias” during early trials of the IGT
when they are unaware of reward contingencies, Mazas et al., 2000; they show abnormal
neural responding during a rewarded color discrimination task in which they are not
aware of when or how much rewards are available, Völlm et al., 2010). By contrast,
individuals with APD do not show reward hypersensitivity when contingencies are more
explicit (e.g., during later trials of the IGT when they are more aware of reward outcomes
and probabilities associated with each option, Mazas et al., 2000; during the balloon
analogue risk task when they are aware of the gains and losses at stake for taking risks,
Swogger et al., 2010). These findings suggest that for individuals with APD, an
unconscious bias toward reward information may disrupt behavior, but also that
conscious awareness (i.e., explicit presentation) of reward may regulate their behavior.
However, the tasks used in these studies do not implement validated reward
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consciousness manipulations and only examine unconscious reward processing indirectly
(i.e., after rewards are obtained). Thus, across studies, the common tasks used to assess
reward sensitivity in APD do not systematically manipulate reward magnitude or reward
consciousness. The observed reward sensitivity in individuals with APD may reflect
sensitivity to rewards of specific magnitudes, an unconscious bias to rewards, or
sensitivity to rewards more broadly.
Although a substantial body of research highlights abnormalities in cognition and
reward in APD, a closer examination of a largely equivocal literature highlights a need
for more systematic research isolating specific factors. The goal of the present study is to
systematically assess factors of cognition and reward to identify specific dysfunction(s)
in individuals with APD. In a sample of incarcerated offenders, we administer three
cognitive tasks and simultaneously manipulate reward using well-established
manipulations. Given the strong association between APD and executive functions
documented in previous research, one task selected is a modified n-back task. This is an
executive function task that combines elements from the most widely used tasks for
assessing the cognitive factors that are most robustly associated with APD: inhibition
(e.g., go/no-go and stop-signal tasks; Congdon et al., 2012) and working memory (Owen,
McMillan, Laird, & Bullmore, 2005). Another task is a visual search task to assess
individual ability to identify target stimuli among distractors (Wolfe, 1998) because
successful performance on many go/no-go and working memory tasks, including the nback task, involves discerning among visual stimuli. Finally, a probabilistic gambling
task is used because a multitude of studies purported to assess executive functioning in
APD often target decision-making processes, with the most equivocal decision-making
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findings in APD related to decision-making under risk (Buckholtz, Karmarkar, Ye,
Brennan, & Baskin-Sommers, 2017; De Brito et al., 2013; Mazas et al., 2000). The
selected decision-making task includes two-choice decisions with explicit outcome
values and probabilities, removing any need for reward learning or contingency updating,
which are often conflated in tasks intended to measure decision-making under risk (De
Brito et al., 2013; Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 2006). All participants complete the
perceptual visual search task first, followed by the executive function n-back task and the
decision-making probabilistic gambling task. 1

During each of these tasks, reward magnitude (low vs. high) and awareness of
reward information (conscious vs. unconscious) is manipulated. 2 First, reward magnitude
is selected because decades of research across disciplines document its importance as a
modulator of behavior among healthy individuals (Beilock, 2007; Berridge, 2004; Mobbs
et al., 2009; Pessiglione et al., 2007; Robbins & Everitt, 1996; Schultz, 2006; Zedelius,
Veling, & Aarts, 2011; Zedelius et al., 2014), and some studies suggest individuals with

1

Cognition is a multidimensional construct that can be divided into separable but interrelated factors. The
selected tasks follow examples in existing literature that manipulate only one aspect of cognition at a time.
For example, the perceptual visual search task only taxes encoding; in the executive function n-back task,
inhibition and working memory are manipulated, and perceptual load is held constant across trials; and,
probabilistic decision-making varies across the decision-making probability gambling task, whereas
perceptual load and working memory are constant. Thus, although it is expected that several cognitive
factors are represented in some of the tasks, each task manipulates only one cognitive factor at a time. This
represents a departure from the tasks previously used to examine cognitive functioning in APD, which
often manipulate multiple cognitive factors simultaneously.
2

As noted earlier, reward sensitivity can be multifaceted (Berridge et al., 2009), with reward magnitude
and consciousness being just two of several established reward factors (see also reward probability and
reward delay; Schultz, 2006). For the present study, reward magnitude and consciousness are selected
because across studies of reward sensitivity in APD, different levels of reward magnitude and reward
consciousness appear to be associated with divergent findings, and well-established methods manipulating
these factors are available to examine the impact of these factors directly and simultaneously.
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APD respond strongly to reward magnitude manipulations (Mazas et al., 2000). Second,
reward consciousness is selected based on recent cognitive neuroscience evidence
suggesting individual variability in sensitivity to conscious and unconscious rewards
(Bustin, Quoidbach, Hansenne, & Capa, 2012; Zedelius et al., 2014) that also may impact
the quality of executive functioning (Capa & Bouquet, 2018; Capa, Bustin, Cleeremans,
& Hansenne, 2011), a factor of cognition purportedly important in the pathogenesis of
APD. Although there are hints that reward magnitude and consciousness influence
reward sensitivity across APD studies, neither reward magnitude nor reward
consciousness is varied systematically within any current study of reward sensitivity in
APD. Thus, in the present study, reward magnitude and consciousness are manipulated
systematically and simultaneously (i.e., fully crossed across all trials of the three
cognitive tasks) to isolate the impact of these factors on individuals with APD.

Together, this design allows us to examine components of cognition and reward
processing, and how they interact, to identify vulnerabilities related to APD. Current
conceptualizations of APD cite a vastly mixed literature concerning cognitive and reward
processes, and it is essential that we refine our understanding of these processes to
identify the most likely circumstances in which cognition and reward result in antisocial
behavior.

Method
Participants
Participants were 116 men from a maximum-security correctional facility,
between the ages of 18 and 75; with an IQ greater than 70, a reading level of at least
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fourth grade, no clinical diagnoses of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or psychosis; who
were not currently using psychotropic medications; and who did not have medical
problems that could impact comprehension. 3 Participants completed a diagnostic
interview to assess criteria for APD on one visit and the three laboratory tasks on a
second visit (see Table 1 for sample characteristics and Methods in the Supplemental
Material for full details). All participants were provided written informed consent
according to the procedures set forth by the Yale University Institutional Review Board.
Tasks
Masked reward cues 4. Before each trial in the three tasks, the point value at
stake for the trial was displayed using a modified reward-masking paradigm (Figure 1;
Bijleveld et al.,
2009). Point values were low (1 point) or high (10 points), noted by blocked digits (01
and 10, respectively). These reward cues were displayed either consciously (i.e., for a
duration that is consciously perceivable, 300 ms) or unconsciously (i.e., 30ms; see
Methods in the Supplementary Materials for full details).

3

A priori power analyses based on previous studies on related topics (e.g., individual differences in
perception, n-back, cost-benefit decision-making) were conducted using G*Power statistical software
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Power analyses indicated that a sample size of 98-128
participants would result in sufficient (80%) power to detect a moderate effect for the omnibus interactions
between repeated measures within-subjects task conditions and a between-subjects variable.
4

To ensure that participants were unable to consciously perceive the 30-ms unconscious reward cues,
subliminality was tested in a random subset of the participants after completion of the three main tasks. A
total of 25 participants were presented with 20 masked reward cues, in the same manner as in the
unconscious (30 ms) reward cue used throughout the study. Participants indicated the value of each
presented reward cue (01 or 10). Performance for discriminating between the unconscious reward cues was
no better than chance, Maccuracy = .52, SD = .09, t(24) = 1.28, p = .212, 95% CIdiff [-0.01, 0.06].
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low / high
magnitude
reward cue
pre-mask
post -mask

or
100 or
235 ms

100 or
235 ms

30 or 300 ms
1200 - 1700 ms
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Figure 1. Reward mask procedure. Each masked reward cue lasted 500ms and was preceded and
followed by fixation (total procedure lasts 1200-1700ms, 1450ms on average). Reward cues were either
“01” for low rewards or “10” for high rewards, with blocked edges. Before and after each reward cue, a
mask consisting of overlapping 0’s and 1’s with blocked edges was presented. For unconscious cues, masks
were presented for 235ms before and after cues, with reward cues presented for 30ms. For conscious cues,
masks were presented for 100ms before and after cues, with reward cues presented for 300ms. Participants
were told that reward information will be presented to inform them of the reward value at stake for each
trial, and that this information might be difficult to see at times.

Visual search task. For the perception task, a modified version of a visual search
task was used (Kristjánsson, Sigurjónsdóttir, & Driver, 2010; Figure 2A). During the
task, participants viewed a series of displays with three colored diamonds. Participants
were instructed to search for the oddly colored diamond, either a red target among two
green distractors or vice versa. Participants indicated (by button press) whether the oddly
colored diamond had a notch missing at the top or the bottom of the shape. Because
performance for this task may include changes in speed or accuracy, an inverse efficiency
score (IES; mean response time for correct responses divided by percentage of correct
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responses) was calculated for each participant (see Methods in the Supplemental Material
for full details).
n-back task. For the executive functioning task, we used a modified version of
the n-back task (Figure 2B; Baskin-Sommers et al., 2014; Pochon et al., 2002). During
the task, participants viewed a series of letters. Participants were instructed to monitor the
letters and respond with a button press if the preceding letter in the n-back position was
different from the current letter (e.g., a mismatch trial). Participants were instructed to
withhold their response when the preceding letter matched the current stimulus (e.g., a
match trial). The majority of trials were mismatch trials (80%), whereas match trials were
infrequent (occurring 20% of the time). The task also included a manipulation of working
memory load. In the low-load (1-back) condition, participants were instructed to
determine whether the currently presented letter matched the immediately preceding
letter in the sequence. In the high-load (2-back) condition, participants were required to
monitor and maintain the stimulus information in working memory to determine whether
the letter stimulus two positions earlier matched the current letter. For each participant,
accuracy on the task was calculated (see Methods in the Supplemental Material for full
details).
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Figure 2. Example of a trial in each of the three tasks. (a). For the perception task, each trial began with a masked reward cue presented between fixation
crosses (1450ms on average). Participants were presented with a visual search display and asked to respond by indicating via button press whether a colored
diamond had a notch missing from the top or bottom of it (1000ms). Participants were then provided with feedback (1000ms) about whether they responded
correctly within the time limit and how many points they earned for doing so. (b). For the executive functioning task, each trial began with a masked reward cue
presented between fixation crosses. Participants were presented with a series of letters (500ms/each, with a 2000ms delay between letters). Participants were
asked to press a button for each letter, unless the letter matched the letter immediately before it in a 1-back trial (first row in middle) or the letter two before it in
a 2-back trial (second row in middle). Following a run of 12 letters (i.e., trial), participants were provided with feedback (2000ms) about the percentage of correct
responses and how many points they earned for the run. (c). For the probabilistic decision-making task, each trial began with a masked reward cue presented
between fixation crosses. Participants were presented with two circles showing a choice between a small certain reward and a larger probabilistic reward
(4500ms). Participants chose one of the two options via button press and were informed how many points they earned (1000ms).

Gambling task. To assess probabilistic decision-making, a gambling task was
used to examine risk-taking behavior (modified gain conditions from Voon et al., 2006;
Figure 2C). During the task, participants viewed a series of two circles (i.e., gamble
options). Participants were instructed to make a choice between one of two gamble
options: a “sure” and a “risky” option. Participants were to press the right button for the
option on the right of the screen and left button for the option on the left of the screen.
For each participant, the percentage of “risky” choices was calculated (see Methods in the
Supplemental Material for full details).

Results
Visual Search Task
First, we analyzed IES in a General Linear Model (GLM) with reward magnitude
(low vs. high) and reward consciousness (conscious vs. unconscious) as within-subjects
categorical factors and IQ (z-scored) as a continuous covariate5. Consistent with previous
research, there was a significant main effect for reward consciousness, F(1, 114) = 30.68,
p < .001, η2 = .21, 95% CI: [.11, .31], indicating higher IES (worse speed-accuracy) for
unconscious compared to conscious reward cues (Bijleveld et al., 2009; Bijleveld,
Custers, & Aarts, 2010; Pessiglione et al., 2007; Zedelius et al., 2011). There was no

5

IQ was included as a covariate in analyses for all task variables (visual search, n-back, and gambling), as
IQ was related to both task performance and APD. Moreover, in additional analyses we examined the
specificity of the effects reported in the text by including related disinhibitory psychopathologies (i.e.,
substance use disorders or psychopathy). The visual search and n-back by APD effects remain the same.
The only exception is when controlling for substance use disorders the n-back reward magnitude by reward
consciousness by APD effect becomes non-significant. Finally, we examined whether the number of
symptoms of APD (i.e., continuous count of CD and adult antisocial symptoms) predicted the same effects
reported in the text. When using a continuous count of APD symptoms, the visual search and n-back by
APD effects remain the same. Therefore, the APD-related effects reported for the visual search and n-back
tasks hold up for a continuous measure of antisocial behavior and are specific to APD.
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main effect for reward magnitude (p = .425) or an interaction between reward magnitude
and consciousness (p = .129)
Second, the association between encoding and APD was examined by including
APD (present vs. absent) in the GLM as a between-subjects categorical factor. There was
a significant interaction between reward magnitude and APD, F(1, 113) = 7.11, p = .009,
η2 = .06, 95% CI: [.01, .14] (see Figure 3). For individuals with APD, there was a
significant effect of reward magnitude, such that individuals with APD showed higher
IES (worse speed-accuracy) for high compared to low reward cues during visual search
(p = .015, η2 = .05, 95% CI: [.01, .13). For individuals without APD, there was no effect
of reward magnitude (p = .195). Neither the main effect for APD nor any other APD by
task interaction was significant (all p’s > .25).
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Figure 3. Perception and APD Effects. There was a significant interaction between reward magnitude and
APD. Individuals with APD showed higher IES (worse speed-accuracy) for high compared to low reward
cues during visual search, whereas individuals without APD were unaffected by reward magnitude. Error
bars represent 1 within-subjects standard error.

n-back Task
First, accuracy on the n-back task was examined using a GLM with reward
magnitude (low vs. high), consciousness (conscious vs. unconscious), trial type
(mismatch vs. match), and working memory load (low load vs. high load) as withinsubjects categorical factors, and IQ (z-scored) as a continuous covariate. Consistent with
previous research (Baskin-Sommers, et al., 2014), there was a significant main effect of
trial type, F(1, 107) = 356.89, p < .001, η2 = .77, 95% CI: [.71, .81], indicating higher
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accuracy for mismatch versus match trials. Additionally, a significant main effect of
working memory load, F(1, 107) = 128.33, p <.001 , η2 = .55, 95% CI: [.44, .62],
indicated higher overall accuracy for low versus high load trials. There was also a
significant two-way interaction for trial type and working memory load, F(1,107) =
56.18, p < .001, η2 = .34, 95% CI: [.23, .44], indicating that the effect of trial type
(mismatch versus match trials) was greater in the high load condition. No other task
effects were significant (all p’s > .334).
Second, the association between executive functioning and APD was examined
by including APD (present vs. absent) in the GLM as a between-subjects categorical
factor. There was a significant three-way reward magnitude by reward consciousness by
APD interaction effect, F(1, 106) = 4.00, p =.048, η2 = .04, 95% CI: [.00, .11]. For
individuals with APD, performance was relatively better for conscious low magnitude
reward trials; however, during unconscious rewards or conscious high-value rewards,
individuals with APD showed relatively worse performance. Individuals without APD
showed less variable performance across conditions (see also Bijleveld, Custers, & Aarts,
2011 for examples in other populations; Moors & De Houwer, 2006; Zedelius et al.,
2011).
Additionally, there was a significant four-way interaction among reward
magnitude, trial type, working memory load, and APD, F(1, 106) = 5.83, p =.017 , η2 =
.05, 95% CI: [.00, .13] (see Figure 4). In order to unpack this interaction, we examined
the effects of the APD, reward magnitude, and working memory load on accuracy in each
trial type, respectively. For match trials, there was a significant three-way interaction for
APD, reward magnitude, and working memory load, F(1, 106) = 7.30, p = .008, η2= .06,
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95% CI: [.01, .15]. Within match trials, individuals with APD were more accurate in
response to high-value reward cues under low working memory load, but less accurate in
response to high reward cues under high working memory load condition. By contrast,
individuals without APD were less accurate in response to high reward cues in the low
load condition, but more accurate in response to high reward cues in the high load
condition (consistent with previous studies of healthy adults; Bijleveld et al., 2009).
For mismatch trials, neither the main effect of APD nor the three-way interaction for
reward magnitude, working memory load, and trial type, were significant, p’s > .16.
Finally, neither the main effect for APD (p = .632) nor the five-way interaction between
reward magnitude, reward consciousness, trial type, working memory load, and APD
were significant (p = .889).
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Figure 4. Executive Functioning and APD Effects. There was a significant four-way interaction for
reward magnitude, trial type, working memory load, and APD. The effects were present in the match trials.
Individuals with APD showed better performance for high versus low rewards at low load, and worse
performance for high versus low rewards at high load, whereas individuals without APD showed worse
performance for high versus low rewards at low load and better performance for high versus low rewards at
high load. Error bars represent 1 within-subjects standard error.

Gambling Task
First, risky choice behavior during the probabilistic decision-making task was
examined in a GLM with reward magnitude (low vs. high), reward consciousness
(conscious vs. unconscious), and probability (low vs. medium vs. high) as within-subjects
categorical factors and IQ (z-scored) as a continuous covariate. Consistent with previous
research (Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, & Camerer, 2005), there was a significant main
effect for reward consciousness, F(1, 114) = 31.97, p < .001, η2= .22, 95% CI: [.12, .32],
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suggesting individuals chose risky options more often when reward information (i.e.,
reward magnitude) was presented
consciously. Consistent with previous research (Estle et al., 2006), there was a significant
main effect for probability, F(1.49, 169.36)6 = 67.75, p < .001, η2= .37, 95% CI: [.28,
.45], suggesting individuals chose risky options when the probability of winning was
higher, with percentage of risky choices highest on high probability, followed by medium
probability and low probability trials. There also was a significant two-way interaction
between reward magnitude and probability, F(2, 228) = 5.53, p = .005, η2= .05, 95% CI:
[.01, .09], indicating a greater percentage of risky choices for low vs. high rewards at
low and medium probabilities, but for high probability gambles, the risky option was
chosen more often for high vs. low rewards. Lastly, the two-way interaction between
probability and reward consciousness approached significance, F(2, 228) = 3.00, p =
.052, η2= .03, 95% CI: [.00, .06], indicating a trend toward greater effects of reward
consciousness when reward probability was low.
Second, the association between decision-making and APD was examined by
including APD (present vs. absent) in the GLM as a between-subjects categorical factor.
There was no significant main effect for APD diagnosis (p = .925) and no significant
interactions including APD (all p’s > .20).
Discussion
Previous research highlights executive dysfunction and reward hypersensitivity as
core factors contributing to the behavioral dysfunction apparent in individuals with APD.

Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for this effect, χ 2(2) = 48.03,
therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .74).
6
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Although these indeed are important factors to consider for APD, the present results
suggest that this broad conceptualization is underspecified. Here, we identify complex
interactions containing multiple factors within cognition and reward that are important
for precisely understanding dysfunction in APD. Specifically, in individuals with APD,
high-value rewards were disruptive during both perception and inhibition under high
cognitive load. In addition, in these individuals, conscious awareness of high-value
rewards was associated with reduced overall executive functioning performance.
However, individuals with APD did not show abnormal probabilistic decision-making.
Together, these results highlight several important patterns to consider when studying
APD and the cognitive and reward abnormalities associated with the disorder.
Although perceptual processes are not often studied in APD, a growing body of
literature suggests that individuals with APD actually do have difficulty detecting basic
features of their environments. Individuals with APD display problems initially
perceiving information, whether they are estimating the passage of time (i.e., perceiving
temporal durations; Bauer, 2001) or engaging in preattentional auditory filtering (i.e.,
perceiving redundancy in auditory stimuli; Lijffijt et al., 2009, 2012). The present study
indicates that perceptual difficulty also is apparent when anticipating high-value rewards,
regardless of the conscious awareness of reward magnitude, revealing a particular
maladaptive perceptual sensitivity. Dysfunction in perceptual efficiency fundamentally
changes what information is seen, attended to, and, potentially acted upon. In APD, this
dysfunction may precede any abnormality during executive functioning and, in some
circumstances, actually lead to failures in effectively engaging adaptive behavior.
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Individuals with APD display reliable dysfunction when there are demands on
inhibition (Chamberlain et al., 2016; Dolan & Park, 2002; Rubio et al., 2007; Swann et
al., 2009; Zeier et al., 2012) and working memory (De Brito et al., 2013; Dolan & Park,
2002). Results from the present study suggest these dysfunctions are particularly apparent
in response to high-value rewards. In one context, high-value rewards disrupt inhibition
during high-load at both conscious and unconscious levels. In another context, conscious
awareness of high-value rewards results in poor executive functioning more broadly. It
appears that individuals with APD are less able to override maladaptive response
inclinations in anticipation of high-value rewards to maintain more appropriate and
personally beneficial behavior.
Taken together, APD-related reward magnitude-based dysfunction in perception
and executive functioning underscores a specific cognitive profile. It appears that when
anticipating a high payoff, individuals with APD struggle to manage the information in
their environment accurately and efficiently, resulting in maladaptive behavior (see also
Results in the Supplemental Material for a comparison of performance across tasks). It
may be that both the value of the reward and awareness of high-value rewards create
additional cognitive load, undermining adaptive behavior for individuals with APD.
Therefore, it is inaccurate to simply say that these individuals are hypersensitive to
rewards or are deficient in executive functions; rather the value of the reward is an
important factor undermining their ability to notice and use information in the
environment.
Beyond identifying the specific factors that contribute to dysfunction in APD, the
design of the present study also affords an opportunity to reveal instances of intact
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cognitive and reward functioning in these individuals. During probabilistic decisionmaking, individuals with and without APD similarly adjust risk-taking behavior in
response to reward probability, reward magnitude, and reward consciousness (Buckholtz
et al., 2017; De Brito et al., 2013; Swogger et al., 2010). Moreover, during executive
functioning, individuals with APD display their best inhibition while pursuing high-value
rewards under low load (see Figure 4, right panel, for inhibition accuracy in the high
reward/low load condition). Across experimental contexts, individuals with APD appear
able to manage their reward sensitivity and engage in adaptive behavior when under
markedly less pressure, as a function of generous time allotments (e.g., 4,500 ms during
decision-making compared with 1,000 ms and 2,500 ms in the perception and executive
function tasks, respectively; De Brito et al., 2013; Dolan & Park, 2002; Newman, 1987;
Swann et al., 2009) or reduced cognitive load (e.g., 1-back inhibition, providing explicit
information about outcome values during decision-making, rather than simultaneously
tapping reward learning and contingency updating; De Brito et al., 2013; Dunn et al.,
2006; Mazas et al., 2000). Therefore, individuals with APD do not appear to have
widespread cognitive dysfunction or reward sensitivity. Leveraging knowledge about the
circumstances in which individuals with APD show typical versus aberrant behavior may
be important for considering why certain interventions are more effective with these
individuals than others.
Several treatment approaches are used for individuals with APD. One treatment
method that seems to have positive effects in APD with comorbid substance use disorders
is contingency management (CM; see Brazil, van Dongen, Maes, Mars, &
BaskinSommers, 2018 for review). In CM, reinforcement contingencies are assigned to
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positive behaviors (e.g., abiding by the law and maintaining abstinence from drugs) to
increase their frequency based on predetermined therapeutic goals (Budney, Sigmon, &
Higgins, 2001). This approach may be effective because it leverages the use of explicit,
unambiguous, reward contingencies for behavior, factors that are functional in
individuals with APD. However, based on the present study, it is essential to be mindful
of the amount of reward being offered, as rewards above a certain threshold, in certain
contexts, may inadvertently disrupt adaptive behavior in APD. Beyond CM, other
intervention strategies may be worth implementing among individuals with APD to
bolster processes that appear deficient. Previous studies in populations with diminished
inhibitory control and working memory capacities indicate that training individuals to
inhibit responses to rewarding stimuli (e.g., alcohol and high-calorie foods; Houben,
Havermans, Nederkoorn, & Jansen, 2012; Houben & Jansen, 2011) or maintain and
update progressively larger cognitive sets in working memory (Bickel, Yi, Landes, Hill,
& Baxter, 2011; Houben, Wiers, & Jansen, 2011) can lead to reductions in maladaptive
behavior. Therefore, by working to remediate processes identified as suboptimal in APD,
an alternative or complementary intervention strategy may be to directly target their
deficits.
Several methodological and conceptual limitations should be noted. First, in an
effort to study how differences in reward magnitude and consciousness affect behavior
for individuals with APD, we compared responses to high versus low rewards, rather than
comparing responses to rewards versus no rewards. Although our method allowed for an
investigation of how individuals respond to rewards of various sizes, we cannot make
conclusions about reward sensitivity among individuals with APD in the presence versus
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the absence of rewards. Previous research established that APD was associated with
differential responses to reward (vs. no reward) but had not specified particular
dimensions of reward; therefore, we focused on reward magnitude and reward
consciousness. Second, the present sample consisted of adult male offenders only, which
may limit the generalizability of these findings to other populations. Future research is
needed to examine specific factors of cognition and reward in other samples with APD,
such as individuals who are at-risk for the disorder and female offenders. Third, it is
worth considering whether the nonmonetary rewards (i.e., points and leader board
rankings) used in the present study were adequate sources of reinforcement compared to
real monetary rewards. Evidence suggests that points and leader boards do enhance
motivation and affect psychological and behavioral outcomes (Hamari, Koivisto, &
Sarsa, 2014). Nevertheless, future work should attempt to replicate the present findings
using monetary rewards, while also considering ethical guidelines concerning payment
for incarcerated samples. Finally, it is important to note that results from the separate
tasks in the current study accounted for only a modest proportion of variance (4%–6%) in
behavior. However, when estimating behavior across experimental tasks, the proportion
of variance explained was slightly larger (7%). Thus, in isolation, dysfunction within
specific cognitive-affective factors are unlikely to be necessary or sufficient to generate
psychiatric illness (Holmes & Patrick, 2018); however, considering mechanisms as
multifactorial increases the potential of more fully capturing the risk associated with
specific behaviors and illness (Zalta & Shankman, 2016).
In sum, the present study indicates that complex interactions among cognitive and
reward factors contribute to the behavior of individuals with APD. Hypersensitivity to
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high-value rewards during perceptual and executive function efforts confer a risk factor
that may contribute to chronic engagement in antisocial behaviors despite their
consequences (e.g., incarceration or overdosing) in individuals with APD. Specifying the
factors that account for the maladaptive behavior in APD is crucial for advancing our
conceptualization of the disorder and identifying effective and targeted intervention
strategies.
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Table: Study 1
Table 1
Sample characteristics and task statistics
N
116
116

Age
Sex (Male)
Race
White
Black
American Indian
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
Biracial
Ethnicity
Hispanic
Not Hispanic
Highest Level of Education
Grade 8 and below
Some High School
High School Diploma
Some College
College Degree
Graduate Degree
IQ
CD Symptom Count
Adult Antisocial Symptom Count
APD Diagnosis
Absent
Present
Visual Search Task IES by condition
Unconscious Low Reward
Unconscious High Reward
Conscious Low Reward
Conscious Reward High Reward
n-back Task Accuracy
Match (Infrequent) Trials
Low Load Unconscious Low
Reward
Low Load Unconscious High
Reward
Low Load Conscious Low
Reward
Low Load Conscious High
Reward
High Load Unconscious Low
Reward

M
34.52

SD
9.75

11
62
35
5
2
1
116 106.11
116
3.86
116
3.92

9.92
3.22
1.61

Min
20

Max
58

52
60
1
2
1
20
96

83
128
0 12.00
0 7.00

58
58
116
0.60
0.60
0.59
0.59

0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07

0.46
0.47
0.44
0.46

0.87
0.90
0.83
0.82

0.80

0.18

0.25

1.00

0.81

0.17

0.38

1.00

0.81

0.17

0.29

1.00

0.82

0.18

0.25

1.00

0.67

0.22

0.10

1.00

109

52

High Load Unconscious High
Reward
High Load Conscious Low
Reward
High Load Conscious High
Reward
Mismatch (Frequent) Trials
Low Load Unconscious Low
Reward
Low Load Unconscious High
Reward
Low Load Conscious Low
Reward
Low Load Conscious High
Reward
High Load Unconscious Low
Reward
High Load Unconscious High
Reward
High Load Conscious Low
Reward
High Load Conscious High
Reward
Gambling Task Percent Risky
Choices
Low Probability Gambles
Unconscious Low Reward
Unconscious High Reward
Conscious Low Reward
Conscious Reward High Reward
Medium Probability Gambles
Unconscious Low Reward
Unconscious High Reward
Conscious Low Reward
Conscious Reward High Reward
High Probability Gambles
Unconscious Low Reward
Unconscious High Reward
Conscious Low Reward
Conscious Reward High Reward

0.67

0.23

0.10

1.00

0.66

0.22

0.00

1.00

0.66

0.22

0.13

1.00

0.98

0.03

0.83

1.00

0.98

0.03

0.80

1.00

0.99

0.02

0.90

1.00

0.99

0.04

0.73

1.00

0.94

0.07

0.62

1.00

0.94

0.06

0.73

1.00

0.94

0.06

0.67

1.00

0.94

0.07

0.70

1.00

0.25
0.22
0.30
0.30

0.23
0.22
0.25
0.25

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.92
1.00
0.92
0.92

0.32
0.30
0.36
0.32

0.24
0.22
0.25
0.25

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

1.00
0.92
1.00
0.92

0.40
0.42
0.45
0.49

0.26
0.27
0.25
0.27

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

116
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Chapter 3: Study 2
Aberrant cost-benefit integration during effort-based decision-making relates to
antisocial personality disorder symptoms
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Abstract
Aberrant cost-benefit decision-making is often implicated in antisocial behavior.
Previous research highlights how delay and ambiguity sensitivity are associated with
chronic antisocial behavior; however, other forms of cost-benefit decision-making—
effort-based choice—have received less attention. We administered the Effort
Expenditure for Rewards Task in a community sample enriched for antisocial behavior
(N=80). Individuals with more antisocial personality disorder symptoms were less likely
to use information about expected value when deciding between high effort/high reward
and low effort/low reward options. Additionally, their behavior was better explained by a
simple computational model of effort-based decision making that did not incorporate
information about reward and probability compared to more complex models that
integrated this information. Further, individuals with more antisocial personality disorder
symptoms who were experiencing high levels of negative affect during the experimental
session and individuals with heightened sensitivity to delay costs during inter-temporal
decision-making were the least sensitive to expected value signals when making
decisions to engage in effortful behavior. Together, these findings suggest that
antisociality is related to difficulty integrating multiple decision variables to guide
behavior during effort-based decision-making.
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Individuals with antisocial personality disorder (APD) engage in a lifelong pattern
of impulsive and antisocial behavior. Their irresponsible, aggressive, and reckless actions
frequently result in significant consequences—from poor physical and mental health
outcomes (Black, Gunter, Loveless, Allen, & Sieleni, 2010; Goldstein et al., 2008) to
high rates of unemployment and incarceration (Knapp, King, Healey, & Thomas, 2011).
Moreover, individuals with APD are resistant to treatment and prone to recidivism
(Raine, 2018). Their apparent inability to weigh the costs of continuing antisocial acts
against the potential benefits of desisting suggests that they suffer from fundamental
decision-making abnormalities (Gregory et al., 2015). Indeed, empirical evidence
indicates that impaired cost-benefit decision-making may be a key factor influencing
behavior among antisocial individuals (Buckholtz, 2015).
Broadly speaking, one can differentiate distinct facets of cost-benefit decisionmaking according to the specific costs that an individual must integrate in order to make
optimal decisions (e.g. risk, delay, ambiguity; effort; Rudebeck, Walton, Smyth,
Bannerman, & Rushworth, 2006). More specifically related to antisocial behavior,
abnormal decision making in the presence of delay and ambiguity costs are documented
among youth with Conduct Disorder (CD; a precursor to APD) and adults with APD
(Buckholtz, Karmarkar, Ye, Brennan, & Baskin-Sommers, 2017; Petry, 2002; White et
al., 2014). In youth and adulthood, individuals with APD are hypersensitive to delays in
reward receipt and consequently choose smaller immediate reward options over larger
delayed reward options when making decisions (Petry, 2002; White et al., 2014). They
also are relatively insensitive to ambiguity surrounding choice options and are less
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deterred by options where outcome probabilities are unknown or undiscoverable
(Buckholtz et al., 2017; Hobson, Scott, & Rubia, 2011; Mazas, Finn, & Steinmetz, 2000).
While previous research sheds important light on how delay and ambiguity
sensitivity relate to antisocial behavior, other forms of cost-benefit decision-making –
especially those involving effort-based choice – have received less attention. Effort-based
decision-making describes the process of choosing how much effort to invest in order to
obtain a valued outcome and may involve choosing between options with varying work
requirements (Chong, Bonnelle, & Husain, 2016; Salamone, Correa, Farrar, & Mingote,
2007). Within the framework of cost-benefit decision-making, effort can be considered a
cost (c.f., Inzlicht, Shenhav, & Olivola, 2018). Consistent with the notion that adjusting
effort expenditure based on expected value is an essential, evolutionarily conserved,
component of adaptive choice behavior (Salamone et al., 2007), effort-cost discounting of
subjective value has been demonstrated across multiple species (Chong et al., 2016;
Kurniawan, Guitart-Masip, & Dolan, 2011; Phillips, Walton, & Jhou, 2007; Walton,
Rudebeck, Bannerman, & Rushworth, 2007).
Recent work using effort-based decision-making tasks points to aberrant effortbased computations as a proximal cognitive mechanism underlying motivation-related
symptoms in diverse forms of clinical disorders (Salamone et al., 2016; Treadway,
Bossaller, Shelton, & Zald, 2012a; Treadway & Zald, 2013). For example, individuals
with schizophrenia demonstrate a relative insensitivity to information about reward
magnitude and probability during effort-based decision-making. Moreover, this
insensitivity is associated with more severe negative symptoms and functional outcomes,
suggesting effort-based computations may be related to variability in the expression of
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schizophrenia (see Culbreth, Moran, & Barch, 2018, for review). Additionally, patients
with major depressive disorder show similar deficits in effort-based decision-making,
with the magnitude of these deficits tracking severity of anhedonia and duration of
depressive episodes (Treadway et al., 2012a). Together, this work suggests that effortbased decision-making deficits may represent a transdiagnostic factor important for the
expression and course of clinical disorders. However, despite evidence for cost-benefit
decision-making deficits in those who chronically engage in antisocial behavior, effortbased decision-making remains relatively unexplored.
The goal of the present study was to examine the association between effort-based
decision-making and antisociality. Separate lines of research suggest that individuals with
disorders associated with antisociality (e.g., borderline personality disorder, Daughters,
Sargeant, Bornovalova, Gratz, & Lejuez, 2008; substance use disorders, Krueger,
Markon, Patrick, & Iacono, 2005) have difficulty persisting in rewarded tasks when
physical or cognitive effort costs are high (Bornovalova, Gratz, Daughters, Hunt, &
Lejuez, 2012; Brandon et al., 2003; Goldstein & Volkow, 2011). Adding to the likelihood
that effort-based decision-making is compromised in antisocial individuals, there is a
striking overlap between the neural circuitry involved in effort-based decision-making
(e.g., the anterior cingulate cortex; ACC; Croxson, Walton, O'Reilly, Behrens, &
Rushworth, 2009; the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; DLPFC; Goldstein & Volkow, 2011;
the mesolimbic dopamine system; Treadway et al., 2012b) and circuit-level abnormalities
associated with chronic antisociality (i.e., DA system dysfunction; Buckholtz et al., 2010;
Ponce et al., 2003; reductions in ACC and DLPFC gray matter and activity; Raine,
Buchsbaum, & LaCasse, 1997; Rosenbloom, Schmahmann, & Price, 2012; Yang &
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Raine, 2009). Together, this research provides a premise for the hypothesis that the
integration of cost and benefit signals during effort-based decision-making may be
disrupted in chronically antisocial individuals.
To investigate the association between antisociality and effort-based decisionmaking, we administered the Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task (EEfRT) in a
community sample enriched for antisocial behavior. We focused on examining the
number of antisocial personality disorder symptoms, based on previous work in other
clinical populations linking variability in cumulative symptom expression and
dysfunction in effort-based decision-making (e.g., Culbreth et al., 2018; Treadway et al.,
2012a; Yang et al., 2014). We explored the relationship between antisociality and effortbased choice using multiple modeling techniques to examine how individuals with higher
levels of antisociality incorporate cost-benefit information when choosing whether to
exert effort. In addition, we used a self-report measure of positive and negative affect to
determine the relevance of state-level variation in affect for antisocial individuals during
effort-based decision-making, based on the link between negative affect and antisociality,
as well as previous studies indicating effects of negative affect on effort-based decisionmaking. Finally, given the known importance of delay-cost sensitivity for antisocial
individuals and the overlap between delay and effort-based decision-making, we
employed a self-report measure of delay discounting to identify potential moderating
effects of this related and well-documented decision-making facet.

Method
Participants
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Participants consisted of 92 adults ages 18 to 75 recruited from the community
through flyers soliciting risk-taking (e.g., substance use, crime, gambling, impulsive
behavior, bullying) individuals in New Haven County, Connecticut (see Table 1). A
prescreen phone interview and in-person assessment materials were used to exclude
individuals who: were younger than 18 or over 75, had performed below the fourth-grade
level on a standardized measure of reading (Wide Range Achievement Test-III;
Wilkinson, 1993), scored below 70 on a brief measure of IQ (Zachary, 1986), had
diagnoses of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or psychosis, not otherwise specified
(Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-5 Disorders; First, Williams, Karg, & Spitzer,
2015), or had a history of certain medical problems (e.g., uncorrectable auditory or visual
deficits; head injury with loss of consciousness greater than 30 minutes) that may impact
their comprehension of the materials or performance on the task. All participants
provided written informed consent according to the procedures set forth by the Yale
University Human Investigation Committee. Participants earned $10/hour for their
completion of the self-report measures and the experimental task. Participants also were
eligible to earn a cash bonus (range $2-$8) based on the sum of two randomly selected
trials from the experimental task, rounded to the nearest dollar.
We conducted an a priori power analysis based on previous studies of individual
differences in effort-based decision-making (Treadway et al., 2012a; Treadway,
Buckholtz, Schwartzman, Lambert, & Zald, 2009) using GLIMMPSE Statistical
Software (Kreidler et al., 2013). The power analysis indicated that a sample size of 48-80
participants would result in the desired (80%) power to detect an effect size comparable
to other studies (i.e., a 15-20% difference in hard task choices; Barch, Treadway, &
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Schoen, 2014; Treadway et al., 2012a; Treadway et al., 2009) finding three-way
interactions among key task variables (e.g., EV as a within-subjects repeated measure)
and individual difference measures (e.g., antisocial personality disorder symptoms and
moderator variables as between-subjects variables) in the EEfRT, controlling for
covariates.
Measures
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-5 Disorders (SCID-5; First et al.,
2015). The SCID-5 was used to determine whether individuals met criteria for the
symptoms of antisocial personality disorder (APD). Including conduct disorder (CD) and
adult antisocial symptoms, there are a total of 22 symptoms for the APD diagnosis. Total
APD symptom scores were formed by counting the number of items coded as “3 threshold” across CD and APD symptom criteria. The distribution of APD symptom
scores was positively skewed; as a result, the APD symptom score was normalized by
adding 1 and naturally log transforming the resulting sum.
Positive-Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).
Previous studies of effort-based decision-making in clinical samples indicate that
negative affect is associated with reduced effortful choices (e.g., Treadway et al., 2009).
Additionally, many models of antisociality highlight negative emotionality as a core
feature (Raine, 2018), and poor persistence and self-regulation under negative affect are
prominent risk factors for antisocial behavior (Daughters et al., 2008; Deater‐Deckard,
Petrill, & Thompson, 2007). To examine the role of negative affect and its moderating
role in effort-based choice among antisocial individuals, we administered the PANAS, a
self-report questionnaire, to tap both positive and negative affect at the time immediately
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preceding the behavioral task. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they
feel each item on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very slightly or not at all, 2 = a little, 3 =
moderately, 4 = quite a bit, 5 = extremely). The scores on the ten positive affect items
(e.g., interested, excited, strong) were added, with higher scores indicating higher
positive affect. The scores on the ten negative items (e.g., distressed, upset, nervous)
were added, with higher scores indicating higher negative affect. Positive and negative
affect scores were normalized using natural-log transformations.
Monetary Choice Questionnaire (MCQ; Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999).
Chronically antisocial youth and adults show elevated delay discounting behavior during
inter-temporal choice (Petry, 2002; White et al., 2014). Previous studies identify both
shared and cost-selective neurobiological mechanisms underlying delay discounting and
effort-based decision-making (Peters & Buchel, 2011; Prévost, Pessiglione, Météreau,
Cléry-Melin, & Dreher, 2010), raising the possibility that variation in delay-cost
sensitivity might influence effort-based computations. Of note, decisions about effort
allocation often involve an implicit consideration of delay. Tasks that require more effort
typically take longer to complete, and therefore, provide delayed payouts. Thus, we used
the MCQ, a 27-item questionnaire, to measure delay discounting.
For each binary choice item, participants indicated their preference between a
larger amount of money ($25-$85) available at a delay (7–186 days) and a smaller
amount of money ($11-$80) available immediately. Discount rates, k, were calculated
according to a hyperbolic discounting function (Mazur, 1987), Vd= r / (1 + kD), where Vd
was the subjective value of a delayed reward of magnitude r available at delay D.
Distributions of k estimations were positively skewed and thus were natural log-
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transformed. Higher lnk values reflect a greater tendency to value immediate rewards
over delayed rewards.
Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task (EEfRT; Treadway et al., 2009). The
EEfRT, a multi-trial computerized button-pressing game, measured the extent to which
individuals were willing to incur greater effort costs in order to obtain larger, more
probable rewards (see for examples Barch et al., 2014; Treadway et al., 2012a; Treadway
et al., 2012b). Participants made a series of choices between completing an easy task and
a hard task for variable amounts of reward. The hard task always required 100 button
presses to be made within 30s, with the non-dominant pinkie finger. The easy task always
required 30 button presses to be made within 7s, with the dominant index finger. Each
trial started with an information/decision screen indicating the reward magnitude that
could be earned for completing the easy task (always $1.00) and hard task (from $1.24 $4.30), as well as the probability that completing either task would result in earning the
reward (either a 12%, 50%, or 88% probability of being rewarded; see Figure 1). The
participant had five seconds to make a choice between the easy and hard task for each
trial. If the participant did not make a choice within five seconds, the computer randomly
selected a choice for the participant. After the choice period, a button press screen
appeared, and the participant completed button presses for the selected task. Individuals
received feedback about whether they successfully completed the selected task, and
whether they earned a reward on each trial. Participants completed four practice trials
prior to the task beginning and were monitored by research assistants via video camera to
ensure proper execution of button presses and engagement with the EEfRT.
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Figure 2. Sample of trial sequence for the EEfRT. Each trial began with (A) a fixation cross (1000ms)
followed by (B) a screen on which information about the probability of earning a reward and the reward
magnitude for completing each task was presented (up to 5000ms), and individuals were asked to make a
decision via button press. After either a choice was made or the allotted decision time was up, (C) a ready
screen was presented briefly (1000ms), followed by (D) a button press screen, which marked each button
press the participant made during the allotted task time (up to 7000ms or 21000ms). After the task was
completed or the allotted task time had passed, participants saw (E) a feedback screen indicating whether
they successfully completed the task (1000ms) and, if they completed the task, (F) a second feedback
screen indicating the reward amount, if any, they earned for completing the task (1000ms).

Following previous research (e.g., Treadway et al., 2012a; Treadway et al., 2009),
trial-by-trial modeling was conducted to account for time-varying parameters, only the
first 50 trials after practice were extracted for data analysis, and only trials where the
participant (not the computer) made a choice were included in analyses. Moreover,
participants were excluded completely if they had a physical feature that precluded
complete engagement with the task (e.g., broken finger, arthritis in wrist), technical
problems during their session (e.g., computer crash in the middle of the task), or behavior
that indicated they were not making decisions or were not completing the selected tasks
(i.e., timing out on over 10% of trials, failing to complete the selected task on over 20%
of trials). The final sample consisted of 80 participants. Excluded participants did not
differ significantly from included participants on the number of antisocial personality
disorder symptoms (p = .306).
The primary outcome from the EEfRT was choice (easy task versus hard task).
For each trial, we incorporated two key variables into analyses: the reward magnitude at
stake for the hard task and the probability of earning a reward for successfully completing
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either task. Additionally, we calculated the product of these two variables to represent the
expected value (EV) of the hard task for each trial. This third key variable, EV, thus
represented the combined impact of reward magnitude and probability.
Computational Modeling
In addition to mixed-effects logistic regression models including EV as a key
variable, we used a newly developed computational modeling approach to quantify the
extent to which individuals used available information about reward and probability
when deciding to allocate effort (Cooper et al., 2019). Using this approach, we fit and
compared three models that reflected different strategies for allocating effort to each
individual’s choice behavior on the EEfRT.
Full Subjective Value (SV) model
The first model, a full subjective value (SV) model, assumes participants
incorporate both reward magnitude and probability information when making decisions
to invest effort. The full SV model fits best for participants whose choices to allocate
effort are most consistently influenced by trial-wise reward and probability information.
According to the full SV model, the SV of a given trial is calculated by reducing the
objective reward, R ($1 to $4.30), by the probability of obtaining it, P, and the amount of
effort, E, required to obtain it (.3 for easy trials, 1 for hard trials; Eq 1). Individual
differences in the extent to which the reward is discounted by probability and effort are
captured by free parameters that weigh each of the components.
SV = R*Ph– kE
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Eq 1

Higher values of k reflect greater effort aversion (i.e., perceiving effort to be very costly).
Higher values of h reflect greater risk aversion, with greater weighting of probability on
subjective value.
Using the Softmax decision rule (Sutton & Barto, 1998), subjective values are
transformed into probabilities of selecting each option. Here, t is an inverse temperature
parameter that reflects a tendency to favor options with higher subjective values (Eq 2):
p(hard) =

eSVhard∙𝑡
eSVhard∙𝑡+ eSVeasy∙𝑡

Eq 2
Accordingly, the full SV model has three free parameters: k, h, and t. The k
parameter decreases subjective value based on the amount of required effort, the h
parameter reduces subjective value according to the probability of obtaining the reward,
and the t parameter influences the extent to which choice behavior coincided with options
with higher subjective values.
Following procedures described by Cooper and colleagues (2019), a fit of the full
SV model with h constrained to 1 also was fit to account for individuals who integrate
reward, effort, and probability without distorting probability (i.e., Eq 1 where free
parameter h is held constant at 1). This practice prevented overpenalizing model fit for
the additional free parameter h. Participants best fit by the SV model with either a
flexible h parameter or with h set to 1 were all included in the full SV model group, since
fit to either model represents the integration of reward, effort, and probability during
decision making.
Reward-Only Model
A reward-only SV model assumes that participants only incorporate trial-wise
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changes in reward-magnitude when allocating effort, since previous studies using the
EEfRT indicated that some participants allocate effort based only on rewards, ignoring
probability information (Cooper et al., 2019). For these participants, a simpler model that
does not incorporate a free parameter for scaling probability information captures choice
behavior more accurately. The reward-only SV model essentially represents the full SV
model when h assumes a value of zero (Eq 3).
SV=R–kE

Eq 3

Although both the reward-only SV model and the full SV model with h = 1 hold h
constant and have the same number of free parameters, they are interpreted very
differently. Whereas restricting h to 0 represents choice behavior that is unaffected by
probability information, holding h = 1 allows for probability information to influence
subjective value.
Bias Model
A bias model assumes that participants do not consider reward or probability
information when allocating effort. This model is the least complex model, containing
only 1 free parameter, b, which represents a bias towards the low-effort option. The
probability of selecting the high-effort option is simply 1- b. This model assumes a
consistent probability of choosing the low-effort option across trials, regardless of
probability or reward. This model provides a similar or better fit than the SV model for
participants who highly favor one option, respond randomly, or whose choice behavior is
inconsistent with the assumptions of the SV model (i.e. favoring effort allocation for low
reward).
Model Fitting
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Comparing the fit of these three computational models describes the extent to
which participants systematically allocate effort based on all available information (full
SV model), allocate effort primarily based on reward (reward only SV model), and make
choices that are not strongly or consistently influenced by trial-specific information (bias
model). All models were fit in MATLAB using maximum likelihood estimation with
optimization function fminsearch (MATLAB and Statistics Toolbox, 2016b). Models
were fit individually to each participants’ data. Parameters selected for each participant
optimized the likelihood of the behavioral data. For the subjective value models, k and h
parameters were constrained to be between 0 and 10, and t was constrained between 0
and 100. All three models were fit with 1000 random parameter initializations. The three
models varied in terms of their flexibility, since the SV models benefitted from the
flexibility of additional free parameters. To account for differences in flexibility, we used
Bayesian information criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978) to compare model fit for each
participant. BIC penalizes models that have additional flexibility (more free parameters),
and favors simpler models when log-likelihood is the same or similar. BIC incorporates
goodness of fit (likelihood, Li), number of free parameters (Vi), and the number of
observations (i.e., number of trials, n; Eq 4):
BIC𝑖 = −2ln(𝐿𝑖 ) + 𝑉𝑖 ln (n)
Eq 4
After calculating BIC for each of the models for each participant, we calculated BIC
difference measures (BIC) to quantify the improvement in goodness of fit that either the
full SV model or the reward-only SV model provided over the bias model for each
participant (Eq 5).

80

BIC = BICBIAS – BICSV
Eq 5
A positive BIC indicated that a participant was better fit by the respective SV model,
and that their choice behavior was better explained by incorporating trial-by-trial
variability in reward (and probability, for the Full SV model). A negative BIC indicated
that a participant’s behavior was better explained by the simpler model.
Results
Reward Magnitude, probability, and expected value (EV) influenced effort-based
choice
We ran a mixed-effects logistic regression model in STATA 14 (StataCorp, 2015)
to confirm that participants’ choices to select high vs. low effort options were guided by
EV. Choice was considered as a binary outcome variable (0 [Easy Task], 1 [Hard Task]),
and EV, participant age, and trial number as continuous fixed-effect predictors7.
Participant was treated as a random effect. Consistent with previous research, there was a
significant main effect for EV (B = 0.801, SE = 0.041, 95% CI = 0.720, 0.882, z = 19.44,
p < 0.001) on choice behavior, such that as the EV for the hard task increased, there was
a greater likelihood of selecting the hard task. Moreover, EV predicted choice behavior
(B = 0.484, SE = 0.144, 95% CI = 0.203, 0.765, z = 3.37, p = 0.001) even after
controlling for trial-wise variation in both reward magnitude (mean-centered; B = 0.562,

7

Consistent with prior studies using the EEfRT, age and trial number were included in all mixed
model analyses to account for potential confounding effects of fatigue, including those associated
with age (Treadway et al., 2012a; 2012b; Treadway et al., 2009; Wardle et al., 2011). For all
results, age was a significant predictor of fewer hard task choices (all ps < .01) and trial number
was either a significant predictor of fewer hard choices or predicted fewer hard choices at trend
levels (all ps < .07). However, all effects reported in the manuscript remained significant when
age and trial number were not included as covariates.
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SE = 0.045, 95% CI = 0.474, 0.51, z = 12.45, p < 0.001) and probability (mean-centered;
B = 2.04, SE = 0.128, 95% CI = 1.787, 2.287, z = 15.97, p < 0.001). These results
confirmed that decisions about effort expenditure relied on the integration of multiple
decision variables available at the time of choice to guide action value estimation and
drive action selection.

Individuals with more APD symptoms showed diminished cost-benefit integration
during effort-based choice
We used a mixed-effect logistic regression model and included EV, APD
symptoms, and the EV-by-APD symptoms interaction as continuous fixed-effect
predictors to determine whether the use of EV to guide choice behavior varied by
antisociality. Consistent with our hypothesis, individuals with more APD symptoms
appeared less likely to use EV to modulate effort expenditure (B = −0.174, SE = 0.043,
95% CI = -0.259, -0.089, z = −4.02, p < 0.001; Figure 2).
This pattern of behavior was not necessarily evidence of a deficit in integrating
effort costs and EV. It was possible that antisociality-linked differences in the use of EV
information during effort-based choice could reflect blunted sensitivity to one or both of
the decision variables used to calculate EV. It was, thus, important to identify any
significant two-way interactions between our measure of antisociality and reward
magnitude or probability. We examined reward magnitude, reward probability, and their
interactions with APD symptoms as continuous fixed effect predictors in a mixed-effect
logistic regression model. Indeed, sensitivity to both reward magnitude and probability
was blunted in individuals with more APD symptoms: reward magnitude and probability
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showed independent interactions with APD symptoms (reward magnitude-by-APD
symptoms: B = -0.199, SE = 0.048, 95% C.I. = -0.292, -0.106, z = -4.18, p < 0.001;
probability-by-APD symptoms: B = -0.404, SE = 0.135, 95% C.I. = -0.668, -0.140, z = 3.00, p = 0.003).

Figure 3. Expected value (EV) by level of APD symptoms. Individuals with more APD symptoms were
less likely to use EV to modulate effort expenditure. Lines represent ±1 SD from the mean. Shading around
lines represents 95% confidence intervals for point estimates.

To confirm that the EV-by-APD symptoms interaction (reflecting the integration
of two decision variables) accounted for variance in choice behavior over and above that
which could be explained by the interactions between APD symptoms and the two
“simple” decision variables (reward magnitude and probability), we included the threeway interaction between reward, probability, and APD symptoms as a continuous fixed-
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effect predictor. If the EV-by-APD symptom interaction truly signified an integration
deficit, rather than simply reflecting an insensitivity to reward magnitude and/or
probability that carried over into the EV term, the three-way interaction between reward,
probability, and APD symptoms should predict choice behavior even when two-way
interactions between the ‘simple’ decision variables and antisociality were modeled. A
significant three-way interaction between reward magnitude, probability, and APD
symptoms was observed (B = 0.273, SE = 0.112, 95% C.I. = 0.054, 0.493, z = 2.44, p =
0.015). This pattern of results was consistent with the notion that greater levels of
antisociality are associated with a relative deficit in the capacity to integrate available
decision variables – here, reward magnitude and probability of reward receipt – to
modulate action valuation and selection during cost-benefit decisions involving effort
allocation. With initial evidence of an integration deficit beyond the independent effects
of antisociality on the use of reward magnitude and probability information, we examined
whether highly antisocial individuals also would demonstrate integration deficits based
on computational models of effort-based decision-making.

Individuals with more APD symptoms used simpler decisional models of effort
compared to complex models to guide behavior
To examine whether antisociality was associated with the extent to which more
complex versus more simple computational models account for choice behavior, we
calculated partial correlations between APD symptoms and BIC scores comparing fit
for both the full SV model and the reward-only model to the bias model, controlling for
age. Partial correlations indicated that individuals with more APD symptoms displayed
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behavior that was better explained by the simple bias model over the full SV model, r(77)
= -.23, p = 0.040, and behavior that was better explained by the simple bias model over
the reward-only SV model, r(77) = -.28, p = 0.012. These results are consistent with
findings from the mixed-effects logistic regression models; greater levels of antisociality
were associated with less use of available information during effort-based decisionmaking, resulting in choice behavior that was best characterized by a model that does not
include reward or probability information. Having confirmed that APD symptoms were
associated with reduced integration of reward and probability information using multiple
modeling techniques, we used EV in subsequent mixed-effects logistic regression models
to analyze the impact of negative affect and delay discounting on integration deficits
during effort-based choice.

Negative affect predicted effort and blunted EV sensitivity during effort-based
decision-making among individuals with more APD symptoms
To explore the possibility that negative affect moderated the relationship between
antisociality and effort-based choice, we first examined the separate relationships among
positive and negative affect and effort-based decision-making using separate mixedeffects logistic regression models. We again considered choice as a binary outcome
variable (0 [Easy Task], 1 [Hard Task]), and included EV, participant age, trial number,
and affect (positive or negative) as continuous fixed-effect predictors. We found no
relationship between positive affect and effort-based choice (p = 0.631). However, we
found a significant relationship between negative affect scores and the probability of
making high effort/high reward choices (B = -0.896, SE = -0.452, 95% C.I. = -1.782, -
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0.009, z = -1.98, p = 0.048). This result was consistent with previous studies (e.g.,
Treadway et al., 2009) indicating that individuals with higher levels of negative affect
exhibit increased effort aversion during decision-making.
We then examined whether negative affect (NA) impacted the use of EV signals
during effort-based choice. The EV-by-NA interaction indicated a statistical trend (B = 0.255, SE = 0.140, 95% C.I. = -0.530, 0.19, z = -1.82, p = 0.068), such that greater levels
of negative affect were associated with diminished EV use during effort-based decisionmaking. Next, we sought to determine whether being in a negative affective state
modulated the relationship between EV sensitivity and antisociality. This model included
all first and second-order terms, and the three-way interaction term for negative affect,
EV, and APD symptoms. The EV-by-APD symptoms-by-NA interaction was significant
(B = -0.281, SE = 0.141, 95% C.I. = -.558, -0.004, z = -1.99, p = 0.047; see Figure 3).
This result indicated that EV sensitivity in the highest EV trials was weaker in individuals
with more APD symptoms who were experiencing greater levels of negative affect at the
time of the decision-making task. By contrast, individuals with more APD symptoms
who were not experiencing marked negative affect showed EV integration similar to that
of individuals with fewer APD symptoms during the trials with the highest EV.
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Figure 4. Expected Value (EV) by APD symptoms and negative affect (NA). During high EV trials,
individuals with more APD symptoms experiencing higher levels of NA were less likely to use EV
information during effort-based computations. Lines represent 1 SD above and below the mean for APD
symptoms and NA scores. Shading around lines represents 95% CI for point estimates.

Delay-cost sensitivity predicted effort and blunted EV sensitivity during effortbased decision-making, but did not interact with APD symptoms
We also explored the possibility that individuals who were sensitive to delay costs
would be sensitive to effort costs, and that this tendency might moderate the relationship
between antisociality and effort-based choice. In another mixed-effect logistic regression
model, we included lnk as a continuous fixed effect predictor of choice behavior. We
found a negative relationship between lnk values calculated from the MCQ and the
probability of making high effort/high reward choices (B = -0.225, SE = -0.099, 95% C.I.
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= -0.419, -0.031, z = -2.28, p = 0.023). This result indicated that participants with higher
levels of delay discounting exhibited increased effort aversion during decision-making.
We next examined whether the use of EV signals to make effort-based choices varied as
a function of delay discounting. A significant EV-by-lnk interaction was observed (B = 0.153, SE = 0.011, 95% C.I. = -0.221, -0.085, z = -4.42, p < 0.001), such that EV use
during effort-based decision-making diminished with greater levels of delay discounting.
Finally, modeling all first and second-order terms and the three-way interaction
term among EV, lnk, and APD symptoms, we did not observe significant interactions
between delay cost sensitivity and antisociality on effort allocation preferences (APD
symptoms-by-lnk: B = -0.046, SE = 0.145, 95% C.I. = -0.330, 0.239, z = -0.32, p =
0.752). The three-way interaction between EV, APD symptoms, and lnk likewise was not
significant (EV-by-APD symptoms-by-lnk: B = 0.053, SE = 0.038, 95% C.I. = -0.021,
0.126, z = 1.41, p = 0.158). On the whole, this pattern of results indicated that delay
discounting impacts effort-based computations by interfering with the use of expected
value information during effort-based decision-making. However, evidence supporting
the relevance of this relationship for antisociality was not compelling given that we did
not observe an interaction among EV, APD symptoms, and delay discounting.
Discussion
In the present study, we found evidence of aberrant cost-benefit computations
among individuals with increased antisociality. Specifically, individuals with more APD
symptoms displayed decreased sensitivity to expected value information during effortbased decision-making. Of note, the significant three-way interaction among reward
magnitude, probability, and antisociality reflected deficits in the integration of multiple
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decision variables during effort-based decision-making. Results from the computational
modeling estimates similarly showed that with increased levels of antisociality,
individuals displayed behavior that was better described by a simple computational
model that did not include information about reward and probability during effort-based
choice. Moreover, antisociality-linked integration deficits had affective specificity; in
particular, the individuals with increased levels of antisociality who were experiencing
negative affect exhibited the most pronounced cost-benefit decision-making integration
deficits during effort-based choice, opting to choose the easy task when the hard task had
its highest expected value. These results provide evidence that the capacity to integrate
information from multiple decision-making variables to estimate expected value and
guide action selection is compromised in individuals with more severe antisocial
behavior, and this pattern may be mood-dependent.
Our findings are especially interesting in light of the brain circuit mechanisms
underlying cost-benefit decision-making, broadly, and effort-based decision-making in
particular. Dopaminergic dysfunction is associated with a preference for low effort-low
cost choices during effort-based decision-making (Treadway et al., 2012b) and also is
reported in antisociality among youth (Matthys, Vanderschuren, & Schutter, 2013) and
adults (Buckholtz et al., 2010; Ponce et al., 2003). Specifically, greater dopaminergic
dysfunction is correlated with more CD symptoms, earlier onset of antisocial behaviors,
greater levels of aggression, and a greater number of criminal offenses (Caspi et al.,
2008; Matthys et al., 2013; Thapar et al., 2005). Dopaminergic dysfunction also is
associated with variability in the expression of other clinical disorders (e.g., Culbreth et
al., 2018; Treadway et al., 2012a; Yang et al., 2014), including substance use disorders
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(Martinez et al., 2011), which are highly comorbid and genetically linked with
antisociality (Krueger et al., 2005). Accordingly, our finding that individuals with more
APD behaviors show deficits in decision variable integration during effort-based choice
is consistent with the possibility that aberrant decision-making preferences may play a
role in the onset, maintenance, and modifiability of more severe antisociality.
Furthermore, the disruption of decision variable integration among individuals
with increased levels of antisociality appears to be mood-dependent, highlighting the
importance of considering negative affect as a determinant of the modulation of effort
expenditure. Research in rodents and humans documents that negative affect, from acute
stress to clinical levels of depression, impairs effort-based decision-making (Shafiei,
Gray, Viau, & Floresco, 2012; Treadway et al., 2012a). The relationship between
negative affect and antisociality also is well documented, with considerable evidence
supporting a positive association between negative affect, chronic distress, and chronic
antisocial behavior (Hyde, Byrd, Votruba-Drzal, Hariri, & Manuck, 2014; Lorber, 2004),
including aggression and delinquency in youth (Daughters et al., 2008; Deater‐Deckard et
al., 2007; Sontag, Graber, Brooks-Gunn, & Warren, 2008). In fact, difficulty tolerating
distress (i.e., difficulty persisting in goal-directed activity when experiencing distress) is
prominent among youth with conduct problems (Burt, McGue, Iacono, & Krueger, 2006)
and adults with APD (Brem, Florimbio, Elmquist, Shorey, & Stuart, 2018; Daughters et
al., 2008; Sargeant, Daughters, Curtin, Schuster, & Lejuez, 2011), and is believed to
prompt engagement in maladaptive behaviors (e.g., substance use, aggression) to relieve
negative affect (Daughters, Gorka, Magidson, MacPherson, & Seitz-Brown, 2013;
Daughters et al., 2008; Van Eck, Warren, & Flory, 2017). In the EEfRT, it is possible
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that individuals with high levels of antisociality who are experiencing high levels of
negative affect have less tolerance for the distress involved in completing effortful tasks,
and may thus be less willing to expend effort, regardless of the rewards at stake or their
probabilities. Taken together, these findings suggest that negative affect particularly
constrains integration of decision variables during effort-based choice among individuals
with more severe antisocial behavior.
Another important cost-benefit decision-making factor related to antisociality is
delay discounting. Delay-cost sensitivity is found in both youth and adults who engage in
antisocial behavior (Petry, 2002; White et al., 2014). Here, we found that participants
with steeper delay discounting during inter-temporal choice showed a consistent
preference for low effort and low reward options and were less sensitive to information
about expected value during effort-based choice. However, this relationship is perhaps
not surprising given the overlap in mechanisms held between effort and delay-based
discounting (Croxson et al., 2009; Peters & Buchel, 2011; Westbrook, Kester, & Braver,
2013). It is often the case that rewards that require more effort to obtain also are received
at greater temporal delays. This is the case in the present task, where the longer duration
of the hard task delays the delivery of feedback about reward earnings relative to the easy
task. It is possible that the shortsightedness about the future present in individuals who
discount delayed rewards more steeply prevents them from appropriately estimating the
value of exerting effort to obtain future rewards. In other words, steeper delay
discounting may reflect not only a bias towards the present, but also an intolerance or
aversion to delays that precede rewards requiring a high amount of effort (Pattij &
Vanderschuren, 2008). Although delay discounting was related to effort-based choice,
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and often is elevated among antisocial individuals, we did not find evidence that delay
discounting moderated the relationship between effort-based computations and
antisociality. Follow-up analyses on our EV findings indicated that individuals with more
APD symptoms showed reduced sensitivity to multiple decision variables (probability,
reward, and their combination, EV), suggestive of integration deficits. By contrast, delay
discounting was associated with intact sensitivity to reward magnitude and only
diminished sensitivity to probability (see Supplemental Results). This latter finding is
consistent with prior studies linking delay-cost sensitivity with abnormal probability-cost
sensitivity (Green & Myerson, 2013). More broadly, though, these independent
influences on effort-based decision-making reflect how multiple factors can result in the
same decision-making aberrations. Overall, these findings highlight the importance of not
only considering specific facets of cost-benefit decision-making, but also considering
component processes within types of decision costs and individual differences that relate
to them (Green & Myerson, 2013). Ultimately, delay- and effort-based preferences may
have unique relationships to antisociality and somewhat additively increase vulnerability
to diminished cost-benefit decision-making.
The present study is not without limitations. First, with our cross-sectional design,
it is unclear whether decreased use of expected value to modulate effort occurs as a
consequence of more severe antisocial behavior, rather than as a mechanism supporting
the development of more severe antisociality. Learned industriousness theory
(Eisenberger, 1992) suggests that individual differences in exerting effort depend upon
previous experiences of reinforcement for effortful behavior. It is possible that
individuals with greater levels of antisociality were less likely to integrate information
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about reward and probability due to learning from previous experiences being rewarded
for low-effort choices (e.g., getting away with not paying bills on time) or insufficiently
rewarded for high-effort choices (e.g., not being promoted at a job when they worked
hard). Although our effects were robust to various potential confounds (see Supplemental
Results), future studies using longitudinal designs are needed to clarify the directionality
of the association between effort-based decision-making and antisocial behavior. Second,
the goal of the present study was to examine the influence of decision variables on effortbased computations; however, we did not measure effort discounting (Botvinick,
Huffstetler, & McGuire, 2009). The EEfRT is designed to look at basic effort-based
decision-making, but it does not measure effort discounting, as there was no parametric
variation in the amount of effort required over trials. Future studies that sample from a
wider distribution of effort options would be useful for testing alterations in effort-based
decision-making among individuals who engage in antisocial behavior.
In sum, the present study indicates that individuals with greater levels of
antisociality show aberrations in the integration of multiple decision variables to guide
action selection during effort-based decision-making. Moreover, these integration deficits
appear to be closely linked to states of negative affect and separate from deficits related
to delay discounting. Decisions regarding effort define many choices individuals who
engage in antisocial behavior are confronted with in the real world. Whether they are
deciding to make an effort to get home by curfew, to find a sober driver, or to overcome
barriers to reentering the workforce (Visher, Debus-Sherrill, & Yahner, 2011), making
adaptive choices requires the integration of information regarding the probabilities of
certain outcomes and the potential benefits (e.g., the greater likelihood of getting home

93

safely, staying out of jail, earning a steady income). Failure to integrate this information
can result in choice behavior that yields problematic outcomes (e.g., physical harm, rearrest) for the individual and other members of society.
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Table: Study 2
Table 1
Sample characteristics and task statistics
N

Min

Age
Sex
Male
Female
Race
White
Black
Asian
Ethnicity
Hispanic
Not Hispanic
Education
Junior High/Middle School
Partial High School
High School Graduate
Partial College
College Education
Graduate Degree
Conduct Disorder Diagnosis
Absent
Present
Antisocial Personality Disorder
Diagnosis
Absent
Present
Total APD Symptoms
Ln (Total APD Symptoms + 1)
Positive Affect Score
Negative Affect Score
ln(Positive Affect Score + 1)
ln(Negative Affect Score + 1)
Discount rate (k)
ln(k)
EEfRT task – Number of trials
EEfRT task – Proportion of hard task
choices

80

Max
18

M
SD
62
37.59
12.88

51
29
33
45
2
5
75
2
16
23
21
11
7
54
26

60
20
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80

95

0
0
15.00
10.00
2.71
2.30
0.0003
-8.29
44.00
0.00

18
2.94
50.00
31.00
3.91
3.43
0.2500
-1.39
50.00
1.00

2.68
0.81
33.28
13.06
3.46
2.52
0.0530
-3.53
49.23
0.38

4.09
0.94
8.97
4.72
0.29
0.29
0.0562
1.30
1.42
0.19
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Chapter 4: Study 3
Cognitive remediation as a targeted treatment for cognitive-affective dysfunctions
among antisocial individuals
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Abstract
Numerous strategies for curtailing the maladaptive behaviors of antisocial
individuals have been proposed, but treatments to date are limited in their effectiveness
for behavior change. One limitation of many existing treatments is their failure to
consider the cognitive-affective dysfunctions that confer risk for and maintain
antisociality. Decades of research demonstrate that antisocial individuals tend to display
abnormal inhibition in the presence of rewards, aberrant decision-making amid
ambiguity, and deficient working memory under distress. The present study evaluated a
novel cognitive remediation package designed to address these cognitive-affective
dysfunctions in a sample of individuals enrolled in outpatient substance use treatment.
Participants (N = 46) were randomized to either the targeted cognitive remediation
training package (CogTrain) or an active control package. Both packages were
administered twice per week for 4 weeks in addition to treatment as usual (TAU).
Cognitive-affective functioning and real-world behavior were evaluated both pre- and
post-training. Results indicated that compared to individuals who completed control
training, individuals who completed CogTrain showed advances in working memory,
reductions in substance use frequency, and improvements in TAU session attendance
after four weeks of training. These improvements correlated with improvements in
inhibition efficiency and cognitive persistence amid distress on training tasks and were
not impacted by levels of externalizing traits or training dose. These findings suggest that
antisocial individuals can benefit from treatments that address the cognitive-affective
dysfunctions at the root of their behavior.
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Antisocial behavior poses a substantial burden to the healthcare system, the legal
system, and society at large, with annual costs in the United States exceeding three
trillion dollars when considering expenses related to crime, substance abuse, lost work
productivity, and health care (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016; Krueger, Markon,
Patrick, Benning, & Kramer, 2007; Miller, Cohen, Swedler, Ali, & Hendrie, 2020;
National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2017). In response to this enormous burden, many
treatments for chronically antisocial individuals have been proposed and tested (Brazil,
van Dongen, Maes, Mars, & Baskin-Sommers, 2018; Gibbon, Khalifa, Cheung, Völlm, &
McCarthy, 2020; Harris & Rice, 2006; Messina, Farabee, & Rawson, 2003). Despite the
vast number and variety of attempted treatments, however, there is limited evidence to
suggest that antisocial individuals benefit from treatment (Duggan, Huband, Smailagic,
Ferriter, & Adams, 2007; National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, 2010;
Salekin, 2002; Warren et al., 2003). Even Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT), known
as the most empirically-supported psychosocial treatment across mental health conditions
(Craske, 2010), generally yields null effects as a therapeutic intervention for antisocial
individuals (Davidson et al., 2009; Davidson & Tyrer, 1996). Upon further thought,
however, this failure of a “gold standard” treatment seems likely when considering the
specific and multifaceted cognitive-affective dysfunctions that characterize antisocial
individuals and the lack of accommodation for these dysfunctions in standard treatments
(Wölwer, Burtscheidt, Redner, Schwarz, & Gaebel, 2001).
Research underscores a significant role for cognitive dysfunction in the
presentation of antisocial traits and behaviors (Ogilvie, Stewart, Chan, & Shum, 2011;
Raine & Scerbo, 1991). In particular, antisocial individuals show diminished inhibition
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(Chamberlain, Derbyshire, Leppink, & Grant, 2016; Dolan & Park, 2002; Rubio,
Jiménez, et al., 2007; Swann, Lijffijt, Lane, Steinberg, & Moeller, 2009; Zeier, BaskinSommers, Hiatt Racer, & Newman, 2012), a cognitive function responsible for
deliberately overriding dominant, automatic, and pre-potent responses to achieve desired
goals (Miyake et al., 2000). Antisocial individuals also demonstrate abnormal costbenefit decision-making, which involves integrating multiple sources and types of
information about choice options and their potential outcomes to optimize behavior
(Buckholtz, 2015; Buckholtz, Karmarkar, Ye, Brennan, & Baskin-Sommers, 2017;
Mazas, Finn, & Steinmetz, 2000; Petry, 2002; White et al., 2014; see also Study 2).
Finally, antisocial individuals frequently show reduced working memory capacity (De
Brito, Viding, Kumari, Blackwood, & Hodgins, 2013; Gerst, Gunn, & Finn, 2017; Gunn,
Gerst, Lake, & Finn, 2018)), reflecting a reduced ability to maintain and update
information in an active state in order to achieve specific goals (Purves et al., 2008).
These cognitive dysfunctions are especially pronounced in affectively-charged situations
(Baskin-Sommers & Newman, 2013): those requiring inhibition in the presence of
reward, (Bjork & Pardini, 2015; Buckholtz, 2015; Byrd, Loeber, & Pardini, 2014; Dolan,
2012; Fonseca & Yule, 1995; Ogilvie et al., 2011; Patrick, Durbin, & Moser, 2012;
Rowe, 1997), cost-benefit decision-making under ambiguous circumstances (Buckholtz
et al., 2017; Mazas et al., 2000; Schönenberg & Jusyte, 2014), and working memory in
the context of distress (Brem, Florimbio, Elmquist, Shorey, & Stuart, 2018; Daughters,
Sargeant, Bornovalova, Gratz, & Lejuez, 2008; Prehn et al., 2013; Sargeant, Daughters,
Curtin, Schuster, & Lejuez, 2011). Importantly, these specific cognitive-affective
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dysfunctions can impede antisocial individuals from effectively engaging in therapeutic
interventions to change their disruptive behavior patterns (Kim et al., 2018).
In order to benefit from therapy, individuals must attend scheduled therapy
sessions and apply insights and skills acquired in treatment to their daily lives (Turner,
LaRowe, Horner, Herron, & Malcolm, 2009). Antisocial individuals have difficulty
inhibiting strong urges to pursue immediate rewards (e.g., drug cravings, desires to sleep
in), and these urges may overshadow any intentions they have to attend scheduled
therapy appointments or practice coping skills learned in treatment when faced with
temptations. Diminished working memory capability during times of distress also may
prevent antisocial individuals from remaining aware of appointment dates and times, their
assigned homework, their treatment goals, or the steps for practicing specific coping
skills when stressors command their attention. Similarly, a diminished ability to integrate
ambiguous cost-benefit information into decisions may make it difficult for antisocial
individuals to engage in therapeutic techniques like cognitive restructuring, a core CBT
skill that involves carefully considering numerous possible interpretations of ambiguous
situations before forming more balanced alternative thoughts and improving emotions
and behaviors (Beck, 1985; Clark, 2013). Decision-making abnormalities could lead
antisocial individuals to underestimate the unknown costs of continuing problem
behaviors (e.g., getting caught and going to jail) and the possible benefits of going to
therapy (e.g., passing drug tests for probation or potential jobs), leading them to opt out
of treatment altogether. Overall, cognitive-affective dysfunctions associated with
antisociality may serve as impediments to attending therapy and are contraindications for
many components of standard treatments, which may partly explain why antisocial
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individuals are less likely to present to treatment (National Collaborating Centre for
Mental Health, 2010), complete treatment (Daughters et al., 2008; Martínez-Raga,
Marshall, Keaney, Ball, & Strang, 2002), or benefit from treatment (Compton, Cottle,
Jacobs, Ben-Abdallah, & Spitznagel, 2003). Successfully altering the aberrant behavior
of antisocial individuals, then, likely depends on successfully targeting the core
cognitive-affective dysfunctions that contribute to maladaptive tendencies and poor
treatment efficacy for antisocial individuals.
Cognitive remediation is a therapeutic approach that may be well-suited to
address the cognitive-affective dysfunctions found among antisocial individuals. Already
gaining attention for its efficacy in a wide variety of psychiatric populations (e.g.,
individuals with schizophrenia, depression; Kim et al., 2018; Millan et al., 2012),
cognitive remediation utilizes learning principles derived from basic science to improve
upon functional outcomes through improved cognitive functioning (Medalia & Bowie,
2016; Wykes, Huddy, Cellard, McGurk, & Czobor, 2011) in one or more cognitive
domains (Kim et al., 2018). Compared to the plethora of research concerning the efficacy
of cognitive remediation in other psychiatric populations, studies of cognitive
remediation in antisocial individuals have been extremely limited.
In the only existing study of cognitive remediation specifically for antisocial
individuals to date, Baskin-Sommers, Curtin, and Newman (2015) developed two
computerized cognitive remediation training packages for incarcerated individuals who
were awaiting substance abuse treatment. The first was designed to address the cognitiveaffective dysfunctions present among individuals high on externalizing, the subtype of
antisocial individuals who make up the greatest percentage of incarcerated individuals
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and who display chronic antisocial traits, impulsivity, and substance misuse (Estrada,
Tillem, Stuppy-Sullivan, & Baskin-Sommers, 2019; Krueger et al., 2009). The second
cognitive remediation training package was designed to address the distinct cognitiveaffective dysfunctions present among individuals high on psychopathy, a subtype of
antisocial individual that also displays impulsive-antisocial behavior, but combined with
shallow affect, low prosocial emotions, and grandiosity and is less prevalent than
externalizing. For externalizing individuals, the training focused on affective cognitive
control, and was designed to provide individuals with practice inhibiting behavior (in a
neutral or rewarded context) and employing distress tolerance. For psychopathic
individuals, the training was focused on attention to context and assisted individuals in
attending to and integrating contextual cues (neutral or affective) present in the
environment. Half of the participants received 6 weeks of cognitive remediation training
(3 computerized tasks per once-weekly training) that matched their specific cognitiveaffective dysfunctions (i.e., these externalizing individuals received affective cognitive
control training, psychopathic individuals received attention to context training) and half
received the training that instead matched the dysfunctions of the other subtype of
antisocial individual (i.e., these externalizing individuals received attention to context
training, psychopathic individuals received affective cognitive control training). One
week after the end of the six-week training period, study participants completed a
posttreatment assessment battery that was identical to an assessment battery that was
administered pretreatment.
Results from Baskin-Sommers and colleagues (2015) support the hypothesis that
targeting the specific dysfunctions of externalizing and psychopathic antisocial subtypes
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leads to change in cognitive-affective functioning. For the purposes of the present study,
we will focus on externalizing effects. Externalizing individuals who received the
dysfunction-matched affective cognitive control training improved on trained tasks,
demonstrating an enhanced ability to act, rather than over-react, to affective and
motivationally salient information. Additionally, externalizing individuals who received
dysfunction-matched training demonstrated significant improvement on a separate group
of laboratory measures (pre-post tasks) relative to the performance for those who
received training that was not matched to their dysfunctions, indicating that matchedtraining lead to improved cognitive-affective performance more generally.
Though Baskin-Sommers and colleagues (2015) provided the first evidence that it
is possible to use cognitive remediation training to target and modify cognitive-affective
dysfunctions associated with antisociality, there were aspects of results that call to
question the training’s potential to ameliorate the cognitive-affective dysfunctions and
real-world behavior typical of the majority of antisocial individuals. Specifically, the
externalizing-related effect sizes for change on the pre-post tasks were quite small
relative to psychopathy-related effect sizes (ηp2 of .05 for externalizing individuals who
completed dysfunction-matched training, compared to ηp2 of .21 for psychopathic
individuals who completed dysfunction-matched training). Additionally, much of the
externalizing effects for matched relative to non-matched training were attributable to
deteriorations in pre-post task performance for those who completed the non-matched
(psychopathy-targeted) training, rather than improvements among those who completed
the dysfunction-matched training (Baskin-Sommers et al., 2015). Finally, although
improvement on cognitive remediation training tasks generalized to improved
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performance on separate cognitive-affective measures, changes in meaningful real-world
behavioral outcomes such as substance abuse, aggression, or criminal activity were not
reported. As such, while cognitive remediation training may be suited to address the
cognitive-affective dysfunctions found in antisocial individuals, it remains unclear
whether such training produces change that is robust, separable from iatrogenic effects of
alternative trainings, and that results in functional changes in real-world behavior.
The goal of the present study was to conduct a pilot randomized controlled trial
testing a novel cognitive remediation training package for antisocial individuals.
Improving upon the affective-cognitive control training developed by Baskin-Sommers
and colleagues (2015), which included training tasks involving cognitive control in the
presence of distraction, distress, and incentives, we selected training tasks that targeted a
more refined array of cognitive-affective functions related to antisocial (externalizing)
individuals: inhibition in the presence of reward, decision-making under ambiguity, and
working memory amid distress, based on more recent studies. We chose to test the
cognitive remediation package in a sample of individuals in outpatient substance use
treatment for two reasons. First, we sought to determine whether cognitive remediation
training led to changes in treatment engagement and real-world behavior, and thus
needed to study antisocial individuals engaged in treatment outside of a controlled
environment (e.g., not in prison or inpatient treatment). Second, while antisocial
individuals are unlikely to present in treatment settings more broadly (Glenn, Johnson, &
Raine, 2013), outpatient substance use treatment settings are recognized as a context
well-suited for reaching antisocial individuals (Gardiner, Tsukagoshi, Nur, & Tyrer,
2010; Thylstrup & Hesse, 2016; Tyrer, Mitchard, Methuen, & Ranger, 2003), and
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substance use treatment is linked to decreases in substance use and criminal activity (Ali,
Green, Daughters, & Lejuez, 2017). We compared effects of the targeted cognitive
remediation training to effects of an active control training that was unlikely to influence
antisocial-linked cognitive-affective dysfunctions positively or produce iatrogenic effects.
We hypothesized that completing targeted treatment in the new cognitive remediation
training package, but not an active control training, would be associated with
improvements in cognitive-affective functioning (on training tasks as well as measures of
working memory, distress tolerance, and delay discounting) and real-world behavior
(substance use frequency, treatment session attendance). We also hypothesized that
improvements on performance on the cognitive remediation training tasks themselves
would coincide with improvements on broad measures of cognitive functioning and realworld behavior.

Method
Participants
Participants were 56 treatment seeking individuals recruited at one of two
outpatient substance abuse treatment clinics in New Haven, Connecticut (see Table 1).
Both treatment sites provided case management, medication management, and
assessment, in addition to individual and group psychotherapy services to community
members, many of whom were court-referred to treatment. Individuals at each site were
informed by clinicians about ongoing research projects after completing intake
appointments and given the option to be contacted by research staff. Clinicians prescreened interested participants based on background information (i.e., age, diagnoses)
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collected at intake. Those who expressed interest in participating in research and
appeared eligible based on pre-screenings were invited to meet with study staff to
complete screening appointments, consisting of interviews and self-report measures
administered at their respective treatment clinics. Individuals were eligible if they: were
between the ages of 18 and 50; met the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) criteria for a
current alcohol, cocaine, cannabis, or opioid use disorder; were not currently physically
dependent on opioids or alcohol; had IQ scores estimated to be greater than or equal to 70
on a brief measure of IQ (Zachary, 1986); were estimated to have a fourth grade English
reading level or higher; did not meet criteria for schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or
psychosis, not otherwise specified (Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-5 Disorders;
First, Williams, Karg, & Spitzer, 2015); were sufficiently stable for 4 weeks of training;
had three or fewer head injuries with loss of consciousness for over 30 minutes or lasting
effects; had no history of chronic illness or neurological disorders (epilepsy or stroke)
that would complicate evaluation of effects of cognitive training; and had no history of
certain medical problems (e.g., uncorrectable auditory or visual deficits; head injury with
loss of consciousness greater than 30 minutes) that might impact their comprehension of
the materials or ability to perform training tasks as they were designed.
As shown in the consort diagram (Figure 1), 56 individuals were provided written
informed consent approved by the Yale University Human Investigation Committee and
completed screening. Forty-eight (48) of the individuals who completed screening were
determined to be eligible for the study and invited to attend future study appointments. Of
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these 48, 468 individuals presented at their first scheduled training session and were
randomly assigned to a training condition via a computerized urn randomization program
(Wei & Lachin, 1988) that has been used in multiple previous trials (Ball et al., 2007;
Carroll et al., 2008; Carroll et al., 2004; Carroll et al., 2016; Kiluk et al., 2016). The urn
randomization program was designed to balance training conditions with respect to
gender, age (18-35 vs. 36-50), primary drug (alcohol vs. illicit drugs), last use of primary
drug (yes vs. no in past 28 days), and length of time enrolled in outpatient treatment (0-29
days vs. 30+ days). Participants were randomized to complete the Cognitive Remediation
Training package plus Treatment as Usual 9 (CogTrain + TAU) or Active Control training
plus TAU (Control + TAU). Participants earned $35 gift cards 10 for their completion of
the screening interview, pretreatment assessments, and the cognitive-affective battery.
Participants were eligible to earn $10 in cash for completing each of 8 training session
appointments and additional $35 gift cards for attending the posttreatment session to
evaluate change in cognitive-affective functioning using the same cognitive-affective
assessment battery administered at pretreatment. To encourage attendance at

8

An a priori power analysis based on effect sizes and observed power in the cognitive remediation study
by Baskin-Sommers and colleagues (2015) suggested that a sample size of 100 individuals would allow us
to evaluate moderators of treatment response at 80% power. However, we recruited fewer participants than
originally planned due to the reduced number of outpatients at study sites who met basic eligibility criteria
(i.e., age 18-50, without a diagnosis of schizophrenia, bipolar, or psychosis), the need to share our eligible
study pool with another ongoing research project with overlapping eligibility criteria, and having to end
data collection early when the research center through which the study was funded closed.
9

Prior studies examining cognitive remediation in other psychiatric samples indicate that the effectiveness
of cognitive remediation is optimized when provided in addition to traditional psychosocial treatment (Kim
et al., 2018; Wykes et al., 2011).
10

All payments above $10 in value were granted in the form of gift cards to local grocery and department
stores, due to requests from clinic staff.
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computerized training sessions, participants were also eligible to earn an additional $50
gift card bonus for attendance at all 8 training sessions within the 28-day training period.
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Figure 5. CONSORT Diagram: Flow of Participants Through the Study Protocol.
*Note: Findings for the 1-month follow-up are presented in the Supplementary Material
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Training Conditions
Participants were randomized to one of two training conditions and completed
training sessions twice per week for four weeks. 11 All participants concurrently
participated in standard treatment, which consisted of a combination of weekly individual
counseling sessions and group meetings in addition to case management, medication
management, and toxicology screenings.
Cognitive Remediation Training (CogTrain)
Participants randomized into the experimental condition completed the targeted
cognitive remediation training package (CogTrain) at each training session. CogTrain
provided individuals with experience engaging executive control within affective
contexts and consisted of three tasks to address multiple cognitive-affective dysfunctions,
rather than any single process. Specifically, tasks tapped inhibition in the presence of
reward, working memory in the presence of distress, and cost-benefit decision-making in
the presence of uncertainty. We selected three well-validated tasks that reliably tap these
processes and that are amenable to repeated administration. Additionally, selected tasks
were designed to ensure a broad range of difficulty so that a variety of individuals could
find the tasks challenging (Hendershot et al., 2018; Herrera, Chambon, Michel, Paban, &
Alescio-Lautier, 2012). Accommodating a wide range of difficulty also decreased the

11

We selected a training period of 4-weeks, since studies examining cognitive remediation training in
populations previous studies suggest that over 50% of individuals in substance use treatment drop out
within the first month of treatment (Brorson, Arnevik, Rand-Hendriksen, & Duckert, 2013; Stark, 1992),
and we wanted a training period that would capture meaningful variability in treatment retention without
losing the majority of the sample. We selected 8 total training sessions based on previous studies of
cognitive remediation training among individuals in substance use treatment that included between 4 and
12 (Bickel, Yi, Landes, Hill, & Baxter, 2011; Rupp, Kemmler, Kurz, Hinterhuber, & Wolfgang
Fleischhacker, 2012) training sessions and produced meaningful cognitive change.
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likelihood of ceiling and floor effects, which occur frequently in studies of antisocial
individuals (e.g., Dolan & Fullam, 2004; Moody, Franck, & Bickel, 2016) and could have
limited our ability to produce and measure cognitive-affective change (Hardy et al.,
2015).
The Stop Signal Task (Lappin & Eriksen, 1966; Logan & Cowan, 1984;
Verbruggen, Logan, & Stevens, 2008; Vince, 1948). The Stop Signal Task was used to
train inhibition, in both neutral and rewarded contexts, since the task is a measure of
inhibition that can be administered without or with reward, and is influenced by
motivational context (Leotti & Wager, 2010). The Stop Signal Task began with two
neutral blocks of 64 trials each followed by two rewarded blocks of the same length.
Individuals viewed a series of stimuli (squares or circles) and were instructed to make
keyboard presses (“Go” responses) to indicate which stimulus they saw (the “f” key for
squares, the “j” key for circles) within a certain amount of time (see Figure 2). For a
subset (25%) of stimuli, a stop signal (tone) played soon after the onset of the stimulus.
On these stop signal trials, individuals were instructed not to press response keys (i.e.,
they needed to inhibit or cancel their button presses). On reward blocks, individuals
earned 5 reward points for each correct response on “Go” trials, and each nonresponse on
stop signal trials. A reward of a larger magnitude (5 points vs. 1 point) was included
based on results of Study 1, which indicated antisocial individuals have difficulties in
self-regulation in the presence of large rewards. For each block type, the first trial for the
session began with a stop signal delay of 250ms. A dual staircase tracking procedure was
used, such that the task incrementally adjusted the stop signal delay based on individual
performance on the stop signal trials. Successful stopping led to a 50ms increase in stop
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signal delay on the next trial (making inhibition more difficult), whereas unsuccessful
stopping led to a 50ms decrease in stop signal delay on the following trial (making
inhibition less difficult). Performance for this task was measured by calculating a stop
signal reaction time (SSRT) for each block type (neutral and rewarded) using the
established integration method (Logan & Cowan, 1984). According to the integration
method, all RTs on Go trials for a given participant’s session are arranged in ascending
order, and the RT corresponding to the proportion of Stop trials on which inhibition
failed is selected. This RT is subtracted from the SSD, providing an estimate of SSRT.
This method for calculating SSRT is considered to have less bias compared to other
common methods, which are sensitive to positive skew and gradual slowing of RTs, and
can increase the likelihood of spurious differences in stopping with and between subjects
(Verbruggen, Chambers, & Logan, 2013). In addition to calculating SSRT for neutral and
rewarded blocks, we examined scores (i.e., the number of points earned) for rewarded
trials at each session, since changes in motivational context can lead to strategic changes
in speed-accuracy trade-offs and lead to discrepancies between inhibition efficiency
(measured by SSRT) and overall accuracy (measured by total reward points (Herrera et
al., 2019; Leotti & Wager, 2010).
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Figure 6. The Stop Signal Task (rewarded condition). Participants are instructed to respond
indicating whether the presented shape is a circle or a square, unless the shape is presented with a
Stop Signal (tone) indicating that participants should withhold a response. In the rewarded
condition, participants earn 5 points for each correct trial.

Decision-Making during Risk and Ambiguity (adapted from; Konova et al.,
2020; Levy, Snell, Nelson, Rustichini, & Glimcher, 2010). This is a decision-making
task that aimed to measure and influence ambiguity and risk attitudes. Each trial (of 56
total) presented participants with a distinct virtual "lottery bag" of exactly 100
poker chips (see Figure 3). Within each bag of 100 chips, all chips were colored either
red or blue, with the exact number of each color varying from trial to trial. Participants
were asked to choose between taking 5 points for certain or playing the lottery (i.e.,
pulling a chip from the bag) for a chance to win additional points. On 42 “ambiguous”
trials, participants received only partial information about the number of red and blue
chips in the bag (ranging from having information on 24, 50, or 74 chips in the bag).
Participants were informed that the remaining chips, colored in gray, could be either red
or blue, and that they would not know the contents of the bag unless they chose to play
the lottery. The winning amount for playing the lottery ranged from 6 to 18 points on 39
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of the ambiguous trials. In line with previous research, three of the 42 ambiguous trials
were “catch” trials, such that the winning amount was equal to that of the certain option
(5 points). Catch trials previously have been used in this task to verify that participants
understand the task and are adequately attempting to maximize gains (Jia et al., 2020).
On the remaining 14 “risk” trials, individuals were given all information about the
contents of the lottery bag, and the probability of winning was always 50%, with win
amounts also ranging from 5 to 18 points.
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Figure 3. Ambiguity Decision-Making Task. Participants are instructed to choose between
winning a certain number of points (5) or entering to pull a chip from a lottery bag for a larger
number of points. The amount of points available for winning the lottery, the number of winning
chips, as well as the amount of information about the contents of the lottery bag, varies from trial
to trial. In this example, the lottery can earn a possible 12 points, and 25 of 100 chips in the lottery
are known to be winning (red) chips, 25 chips are known to be losing (blue) chips, and 50 chips
are unknown (gray) to be winning or losing chips.

Each of the 56 total trials began with a fixation cross, after which participants
viewed the available information about the bag's contents and were asked to choose
between playing the lottery or getting 5 points for certain. Participants did not have
time constraints for responding. Participants were told that they would receive 1 reward
point per choice selection, with an optional bonus based on actual choice and outcome
during a “randomly” selected trial. At the end of the 56-trial session, the computer
selected one ambiguous lottery trial and showed the participant what they chose and what
the outcome of the lottery was. To encourage individuals to reconsider unknown
information (and potentially behave differently than in future sessions), the computer
feedback was rigged for the first three training sessions for a given individual. For each
of the first three sessions, if the individual chose the lottery option on over half of the
ambiguous lottery trials, the computer selected an ambiguous lottery trial in which the
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participant chose the lottery. The computer revealed that the majority of the gray chips
for that lottery bag were for the losing color, selected a losing chip, and informed
participants that they earned 0 points for their bonus. The computer also noted that if the
participant had selected the certain option instead, they would have received a 5-point
bonus. By contrast, if the individual chose the certain option on over half of the
ambiguous lottery trials for that session, the computer randomly selected an ambiguous
lottery trial in which the participant chose the certain option. The computer revealed that
the majority of the gray chips for that lottery bag were for the winning color, and
informed participants that they would have earned X bonus points (always more than the
certain amount) had they selected the lottery instead of the certain 5 points. For sessions 4
through 8, one of the ambiguous lottery trials was selected at random, and the colors of
the gray chips were revealed to be a random mixture of red and blue chips, with the
winning chip being a random selection from the revealed probability distribution for that
lottery bag.
Multiple performance measures were calculated to quantify ambiguity and risk
preferences on this task. First, we calculated simple measures of choice behavior as the
percentage of trials in which the lottery option was selected for both ambiguous and risky
trials, since rigged feedback on performance was based on the percentage of ambiguous
choices during ambiguity trials. Second, we quantified ambiguity and known-risk attitude
using computational modeling methods previously used to examine choice behavior on
this task (Konova et al., 2020; Levy et al., 2010). The subjective value (SV) of each
option (certain or lottery) on each trial was defined by:
𝐴
SV(option) = [𝑝 − 𝛽 ( )] 𝑣 𝛼
2
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where v was the winning amount (5 points for the certain option, 5-18 points for the
lottery option on risk and ambiguity trials), p was the objective probability of winning (0
for the certain option, .50 for risk and ambiguity options), A was the fraction of p that was
unknown (0 for the certain and risk options, .26, .50, .76 for ambiguity options), and α
and β were subject-specific risk and ambiguity attitude parameters, respectively. A
participant with an  of 1 was risk-neutral, less than 1 was risk-averse, and greater than 1
was risk-seeking. A participant with a positive β was ambiguity-averse, behaving as if the
gray chips were mostly losing chips, while a participant with a negative β was ambiguityseeking, behaving as if the gray chips were mostly winning chips.
We estimated α and β by fitting a probabilistic choice function to the trial-by-trial
data using maximum-likelihood estimation in MATLAB version R2015a (MathWorks):
𝑃𝑣 =

1
1 + 𝑒 𝛾(𝑆𝑉𝐿−𝑆𝑉𝐶))

where Pv was the probability that the participant chose the lottery, SVL and SVC were the
SVs of the lottery and certain options, respectively, and γ was another subject-specific
parameter representing the slope of the logistic function.
Paced Auditory Serial Addition Task-Computerized (PASAT-C; Lejuez,
Kahler, & Brown, 2003). The PASAT-C is commonly used as a behavioral measure of
distress tolerance and requires individuals to maintain and update information in working
memory under distress. For this task, numbers were sequentially flashed on a computer
screen, and participants were asked to add each number to the number presented before it
before another number was presented (see Figure 4). For example, if the digits ‘3’, ‘6’
and ‘2’ were presented, the participant would need to respond with the correct sum of 3
and 6 (‘9’) followed by the correct sum of 6 and 2 (‘8’). Participants provided answers by
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using a computer mouse to click on a number pad displayed on the screen. Participants
were told that their score would increase by one point with each correct answer. Incorrect
answers or omissions would not affect their total score, but would result in the participant
hearing a loud noise blast presented at maximum volume over their headphones. The
task consisted of three levels with varying latencies between number
presentations. Specifically, the first level of the PASAT provided a 3-s
latency between number presentations (i.e., low difficulty) for 2 minutes, the second
level provided a 2-s latency for the first 2 minutes and a 1-s latency for the last minute
(i.e., medium difficulty), and the third level provided a 1-s latency (i.e., high difficulty)
until terminated, up to 7 minutes. Performance on this task is traditionally indexed as
latency in seconds to task termination. However, the present sample reached the
maximum latency to termination on 75% of completed sessions, which is consistent with
modal responses observed in prior studies (e.g., McHugh et al., 2011). With the majority
of participants being exposed to all 278 level three trials, we opted to measure the extent
to which individuals actively engaged in goal-directed behavior (by providing a response
on the number pad) during the third level, rather than measure the duration of time that
they passively viewed trials in level three. Thus, PASAT-C performance was measured as
a percentage of presented level three trials on which responses were attempted (i.e., in
which the participant made a selection on the keypad). This measure was normally
distributed across participants.
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Figure 4. The Paced Auditory Serial Addition Task - Computerized (PASAT-C). A screen capture
from the third round of the PASAT-C, which features a Quit button that allows participants to discontinue
the task. Throughout the task, participants are instructed to add the letter presented in the center of the
screen to the letter presented previously and enter the sum using the numbered buttons on the keypad
before the next letter is presented.

Active Control Training
Text Twist. Participants randomized to this condition completed a computerized
word game (Text Twist) at each training visit. Participants were presented with several
sets of seven letters and were instructed to make as many words as possible with the letter
combinations in the time allotted (see Figure 5). Participants received reward points for
every dictionary word identified. An active computer-based control was selected as it
provides a rigorous comparison to intervention (Bickel et al., 2011) and addresses
concerns that any game-style activities would produce improvements by controlling for
computer time and game experiences, as well as non-specific elements such as support,
attention, study contact, activation, and motivation. It is possible an active and engaging
control condition could produce modest neurocognitive change in some domains, but
available data indicate the control condition is not likely to influence the specific
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cognitive-affective processes identified in antisocial individuals (Gyurak, Gross, Chan, &
Etkin, 2013).

Figure 5. Active Control Training (Text Twist). For each trial, participants view 7 letters and are
instructed to form as many two to seven letter dictionary words as possible within 2 minutes.

Training Session Procedures
For the first two training sessions, participants in either training condition viewed
full computerized instructions for training tasks, with a research assistant reading
instructions out loud and being available to answer questions. For sessions 3 through 8,
participants were permitted to skip the full instructions and view abbreviated instructions
before beginning the tasks. For all 8 training sessions in each condition, participants wore
noise-cancelling headphones to reduce distractions and ensure they heard tones for tasks
with necessary audio components. At the end of each training task, participants learned
their most recent score and viewed the current session score on a graph with all their
previous scores for the task. Research assistants commented on whether their score had
increased, decreased, or stayed the same since the last session, and noted that they were
improving on (in the case of a score that increased) or practicing (in the case of scores
that decreased or stayed the same, or scores for session 1) the particular skill targeted by
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the training task. An explanation of the skill relative to real-world behavior was provided
to illustrate how cognitive training related to participants outside of the training task (e.g.,
for the PASAT: “Practicing [the PASAT] may help you keep going when things get
stressful, whether in the game itself or in real life. For example, your goal to remain
abstinent may become harder when you start to experience stress, withdrawal, or difficult
emotions. Practicing this skill during the Numbers game may help you continue
practicing abstinence under stress, or may help you get back on track after making
mistakes,” for the active control task, “In this game, you are working on paying attention
for a long period of time and improving your verbal skills. Both of these are skills we use
every day when we are reading directions or talking to people around us”).
Measures
Pretreatment Assessments
The Externalizing Spectrum Inventory (The ESI-Brief; Hall, Bernat, & Patrick,
2007). Antisociality is prevalent among individuals in substance use treatment (Thylstrup
& Hesse, 2016). Previous studies examining substance use treatment response indicate
poorer outcomes among antisocial individuals (Compton et al., 2003). To examine
whether training task performance or training response differed as a function of level of
trait antisociality, we included the ESI-Brief, a 100-item self-report questionnaire
developed to assess a broad range of behaviors and personality associated with
externalizing psychopathology (i.e., antisocial personality disorder, substance use
disorders, low constraint).
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Kendall, Finch, Auerbach, Hooke, &
Mikulka, 1976). Compared to other individuals with substance use disorders, antisocial
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individuals have higher anxiety severity (Ducci et al., 2007; Hatzitaskos, Soldatos,
Kokkevi, & Stefanis, 1999), which is associated with greater functional impairment and
negatively impacts both engagement in and recovery from treatment (Buckner & Carroll,
2010; Thevos, Thomas, & Randall, 1999; Thomas, Thevos, & Randall, 1999). To
examine the role of anxiety and its role in treatment engagement and response among
antisocial individuals in substance use treatment, we administered the STAI, a widely
used measure of consistent (trait) and transient (state) stress and anxiety.
The Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983).
Psychological stress occurs when an individual perceives that environmental demands tax
or exceed their adaptive capacity. The PSS provides a measure of how much an
individual appraises situations in their life as stressful and was administered to examine
the relationships among perceived stress, treatment attendance, and response. PSS scores
are believed to index a higher-order latent internalizing disposition, or a tendency to
experience negative symptoms that are focused inward (Krueger, McGue, & Iacono,
2001). Higher PSS scores are associated with elevated substance use and relapse
following substance use treatment (Berg et al., 2010; Lijffijt, Hu, & Swann, 2014; Roos,
Kiluk, McHugh, & Carroll, 2020; Tomlinson, Tegge, Athamneh, & Bickel, 2020).
The Circumstances, Motivation, and Readiness Scale (CMR; De Leon,
Melnick, Thomas, Kressel, & Wexler, 2000). Low motivation and low readiness to
change are associated with early dropout from substance abuse treatment, and are core
characteristics of antisocial individuals (Ball, Carroll, Canning-Ball, & Rounsaville,
2006). To examine the extent to which individuals’ motivation and willingness to enter
treatment influenced their responses to cognitive training, we administered the CMR for
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Substance Abuse Treatment, an 18-item self-report measure that assesses the
circumstances surrounding treatment attendance (e.g., pressure to enter and leave
treatment), individuals’ motivations for seeking treatment (e.g., their perceived need to
change), and individuals’ readiness to engage in treatment (e.g., the extent to which they
think treatment is necessary to change). Overall, CMR scores serve as an indication of
participants’ potential motivation and willingness to enter treatment.
Cognitive-Affective Assessments
To examine whether targeted cognitive remediation training resulted in changes to
cognitive-affective functioning outside of performance on training tasks, a cognitiveaffective battery was administered at pretreatment and posttreatment. This battery
consisted of three assessments that have been used previously to tap cognitive-affective
processes associated with antisociality.
Digit Span Backwards (Wechsler, 1945). Poor working memory performance is
common among antisocial individuals (De Brito et al., 2013; Dolan & Park, 2002). The
Digit Span Backwards test is a 7-item measure from the Wechsler Digit Span Test within
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. Individuals were presented with progressively
longer strings of numbers and were asked to repeat them in reverse order. Each item
consisted of two strings of digits, starting with two three-digit strings. To progress from
one item to the next, individuals needed to respond correctly on at least one of two strings
in an item. Individuals received one point for each correct digit string. The Digit Span
Backwards test measured each participant’s ability to examine, manipulate, and relay
information being held in short-term memory.
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The Breath Holding task (Daughters, Lejuez, Bornovalova, et al., 2005; Hajek,
Belcher, & Stapleton, 1987; Sutterlin et al., 2013; Zvolensky, Feldner, Eifert, & Brown,
2001). Antisocial individuals show reduced persistence in goal-directed behavior in the
face of emotional distress on both cognitive and behavioral measures of distress tolerance
(Brem et al., 2018; Daughters et al., 2008; Sargeant et al., 2011), and this tendency is
linked to a higher likelihood of treatment dropout (Daughters, Lejuez, Bornovalova, et
al., 2005; Daughters, Lejuez, Kahler, Strong, & Brown, 2005). The breath holding task
was administered to measure behavioral distress tolerance. On this task, participants were
instructed to hold their breath for as long as they could and to notify research assistants
(by hand raise) when they first began to feel uncomfortable. Research assistants recorded
each participant’s start time, the time at which they reported that they were feeling
uncomfortable, and the time at which participant exhaled. Persistence in the face of
discomfort (i.e., distress) was calculated as the difference between the ending time and
the time at which participants first reported feeling uncomfortable
The Five-Trial Adjusting-Delay Discounting Task (Koffarnus & Bickel, 2014).
Antisocial individuals are more likely to choose small immediate rewards over larger
rewards available at a delay, reflecting high levels of delay discounting (Petry, 2002).
The Five-Trial Adjusting-Delay Discounting Task is a 5-item behavioral assessment used
to measure delay discounting. Five questions asked whether the individual would prefer
to receive $50 today or $100 at a delay, with the delay duration adjusting based on
participant choices. The final delay (i.e., ED50) indicated the delay where the current
value of the delayed reward ($100) was equal to half of its value ($50) and was also equal
to 1/k, with k being the discount rate for the delayed reward calculated according to a
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hyperbolic discounting function (Mazur, 1987), Vd= r / (1 + kD), where Vd was the
subjective value of a delayed reward of magnitude r available at delay D. Distributions of
k estimations were natural log-transformed due to positive skew. Higher lnk values
reflected higher levels of delay discounting.
Real-World Behavior
To examine whether targeted cognitive remediation training resulted in changes in
real-world behavior, interviewers assessed substance use at each study visit and assessed
treatment session attendance at pretreatment and posttreatment.
Substance Use Calendar. Substance use for each participant’s primary drug of
choice (cocaine, alcohol, opioids, or marijuana) was documented at each contact via the
Substance Use Calendar. Similar to the Time Line Follow-Back (Robinson, Sobell,
Sobell, & Leo, 2012), the Substance Use Calendar is an interview assessment
administered by a research assistant. Substance use was documented on a daily basis
throughout the 28-day training period as well as for the 28-days before random
assignment. Substance use calendar data was corroborated using urine and breath
screenings at each contact. The urine samples showed excellent correspondence with
participants' self-reports of recent substance use with only 6 of 403 urine samples (1.4%),
indicating primary drug substance use when the participant denied recent use. Research
assistants confronted participants about discrepancies between self-reported substance
use and urine results. Participants corrected their responses to substance use calendar
questions on four out of the six occasions in which these discrepancies were identified.
None of the 146 breath samples indicated alcohol use when a participant with primary
alcohol use denied recent alcohol use. Total days of primary substance use (out of 28) for
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both the 28-day training period as well as the 28-day pre-training period were calculated
and cube-root transformed due to positive skew to provide a measure of primary drug use
frequency before and during the training period.
Treatment as Usual Session Attendance. Antisocial individuals are at high risk
of dropout in outpatient substance use treatment (Thylstrup & Hesse, 2016). One goal of
targeted treatment was to enhance engagement in TAU services. TAU at both treatment
sites consisted of individual treatment, group treatment, or a combination, based on
intake assessment of clinical need and existing mental health care treatment, with some
individuals being dually-treated by outside therapists. To examine the impact of cognitive
remediation training on treatment engagement, the number of attended individual and
group treatment sessions at both the enrolled outpatient treatment clinic and external
treatment sites was summed to provide a measure of treatment session attendance at
pretreatment and posttreatment for each participant.

Results
Sample Description
Table 1 presents baseline demographic characteristics, psychiatric diagnoses, and
other assessment measures for the 46 participants (Mean Age = 33.6 years, SD = 8.36)
who attended the first training session. Of these, 48% were women, 63% identified
themselves as White, 24% identified themselves as Black, 13% did not report their race,
and 26% identified their ethnicity as Hispanic. Most were single or divorced (80%), 46%
were unemployed, and 93% had completed high school or obtained a GED.
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Most participants reported alcohol use (33%) or opioid use (33%) as their primary
substance use problem, followed by marijuana (20%), and cocaine (15%). Participants
reported 13 years of use for their primary drug on average (SD = 8.0 years), and the
majority of participants (85%) experienced severe impairment in functioning based on
SUD symptom counts for their primary drug. Consistent with prior studies of antisocial
individuals (Brennan, Stuppy-Sullivan, Brazil, & Baskin-Sommers, 2017), problematic
use of multiple substances was common, with 85% of participants meeting criteria for
two or more substance use disorders in their lifetimes. While only one individual in each
training condition met criteria for antisocial personality disorder, levels of trait
externalizing (measured with the ESI-Brief) among individuals in our sample were
comparable to those found in previous studies examining incarcerated antisocial
individuals (e.g., Brennan et al., 2017).
Analysis of variance tests indicated significant differences in baseline distress
tolerance scores (as measured by the Breath Holding task) and TAU attendance by
treatment condition. Specifically, individuals in the CogTrain condition had lower
distress tolerance, lower baseline TAU attendance, attended fewer training sessions, and
were less likely to attend the posttreatment session compared to individuals in the control
condition. No other analyses examining differences in demographic and baseline
assessment measures indicated significant differences between training conditions (see
Table 1).
Study Session Attendance
Participants completed an average of 6.2 of 8 possible training sessions (SD = 2.3;
see Table 2). Of the 46 participants randomized into a training condition, 83% attended
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the posttreatment session. Analysis of variance and chi-square tests indicated significant
differences in number of training sessions attended and likelihood of returning for the
posttreatment assessment battery by training condition, with individuals in the CogTrain
condition showing reduced attendance at training and posttreatment sessions compared to
individuals in the control condition.
Training Effects
For the CogTrain condition, the 22 randomized participants provided data for a
total of 120 sessions of the Stop Signal and decision-making tasks, and for 114 sessions
of the PASAT-C (one participant refused to complete the PASAT-C due to discomfort
hearing the noise bursts, and provided 6 sessions each for the other two tasks in the
training package). For the control condition, the 24 randomized participants provided
data for 165 sessions of Text Twist. To ensure individuals understood training tasks and
met the necessary assumptions for calculating various performance metrics, we excluded
session data on a session-by-session basis based on recommendations from prior studies
using the training tasks (see Supplementary Material for details). We examined change in
performance over time for each training task to see if performance on cognitive training
tasks improved with repeated practice. We began by extracting key variables for each
task (SSRT for both trial types and total score for reward blocks for each session of the
Stop Signal Task; the percentage of risky and ambiguous lottery choices, as well as
estimates of α and β, for the decision-making task; the percentage of third level trials on
which participants provided a response during the PASAT-C; and the total number of
completed dictionary words for Text Twist; see Table 3 for descriptive statistics and
zero-order correlations of training task variables at the first training session for each
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task). We included data for each performance variable in a separate mixed effects linear
regression using IBM SPSS Statistics (version 26). For each model, the key variable in
question was considered as a continuous outcome variable, and session number was
included as a continuous fixed-effect predictor. Participant was treated as a random
effect.
CogTrain Training Effects
Consistent with prior research indicating improvement over time on the Stop
Signal Task (Berkman, Kahn, & Merchant, 2014; Manuel, Bernasconi, & Spierer, 2013),
there was a significant main effect of session number on SSRT for neutral trials (B = 7.74, SE = 2.86, 95% CI = -13.43, -2.05, , p =.008; see Figure 6A), such that participants
exhibited lower SSRT’s (i.e., more efficient inhibition) for neutral trials with repeated
sessions. The effect of session number on SSRT for reward trials indicated a trend (B = 2.84, SE = 1.62, 95% CI = -6.05, 0.38, p =.084; see Figure 6B) in the same direction.
Moreover, there was a significant session number effect on Stop Signal Task score for
reward blocks (B = 2.93, SE = 1.25, 95% CI = 0.45, 5.41, p = .021; see Figure 6C), such
that accuracy on reward trials improved over repeated sessions.
On the Decision-Making during Risk and Ambiguity task, there was a significant
main effect for session number (B = -0.011, SE = 0.006, 95% CI = -0.023, -0.001, p =
0.045; Figure 6D) on percentage of ambiguous choices, such that individuals made fewer
choices to play the lottery on ambiguity trials over time. The main effect for session
number on percentage of risky choices was not significant (B = -0.004, SE = 0.007, 95%
CI = -0.018, -0.009, p = 0.514), indicating choices to play the lottery on risk-only trials
did not systematically change across sessions. For parameters derived from
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computational models quantifying risk and ambiguity attitudes, the effects for session
number were not significant (α: B = 0.031, SE = 0.021, 95% CI = -0.010, 0.072, p =
0.136; β: B = 0.015, SE = 0.037, 95% CI = -0.058, 0.088, p = 0.687).
On the PASAT-C measure of distress tolerance, there was a significant effect for
session number (B = 0.043, SE = 0.006, 95% CI = 0.031, 0.054, p < 0.001; Figure 6E),
with individuals making active attempts to respond during the most difficult level on a
greater percentage of trials with repeated sessions.
Control Training Effect
There was a significant main effect for session number (B = 13.06, SE = 0.93,
95% CI = 11.22, 14.90, p < 0.001; Figure 6F) on number of completed dictionary words,
such that performance for the control training task improved across sessions.
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Figure 6. Training effects for each training task. On the cognitive remediation training tasks, and the
active control training task, there were significant changes in performance on key variables, suggesting
performance improved over the course of training. There was a significant effect of session number on
SSRT for neutral trials (A) such that inhibition improved across sessions. The effect of session number on
SSRT reward trials (B) indicated a trend (p = .084) for improvement in inhibition for rewarded trials. There
was a significant effect of session number on Stop Signal Task scores for rewarded trials (C), with higher
scores obtained on rewarded trials across sessions. On the decision-making task, there was a significant
effect of session number on percentage of ambiguous lottery choices (D), with fewer ambiguous choice
selections across sessions. On the PASAT-C, there was a significant effect of session number on
persistence in the final round (E). Finally, for participants in the active control condition, there was a
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significant effect of session number on words completed in the Text Twist task.
**p < 0.01, *p > .0.05

Comparing Change Between Conditions
To compare improvement across trained tasks by training condition, we
calculated change scores for each key variable that showed significant improvement
across sessions for each participant (SSRT for neutral trials and Total Score for reward
trials on the Stop Signal Task, percentage of ambiguous choices on the decision-making
task, persistence scores on the PASAT-C, and Total Word scores on Text Twist). Each of
the values for a given training task key variable was regressed on session number to
create a beta value to capture training change for a given participant’s performance on
that variable. Performance metrics were transformed such that higher beta values
represented greater improvement over training (i.e., lower SSRTs and higher scores on
rewarded trials of the Stop Signal Task), decreased ambiguous choices during decisionmaking, greater persistence during the PASAT-C, more completed words on Text Twist;
see Table 4).
For the three CogTrain tasks, we conducted a principal component analysis (PCA)
to determine whether improvement across the three tasks reflected improvement on a
single factor. We entered Beta values for the four key variables on which performance
improved across sessions and selected orthogonal rotation (varimax). The result was a
two-factor solution, with Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicating that correlations between
items were not sufficiently large for PCA, χ2 (6) = 1.39, p = .967. We, therefore, opted to
run separate analyses comparing effects for each of the three CogTrain tasks to effects for
the control (Text Twist) task.
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A one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted, with training
condition as a between-subjects factor. There was a significant effect of training
condition on Beta value when comparing improvement on SSRT for neutral trials to
improvement on Text Twist, F(1, 40) = 32.66, p < .001, η2 = .45, with less improvement
on inhibition on the Stop Signal Task neutral trials compared to improvement on word
scores for Text twist. The effect of training condition also was significant when
comparing Beta values for Stop Signal Task reward scores to Text Twist scores, F(1, 40)
= 18.82, p < .001, η2 = .32, with less improvement on Stop Signal Task reward trials
compared to improvement on word scores for Text Twist. The effect of training condition
was not significant when comparing Beta values between the decision-making task and
Text Twist, F(1, 41) = 2.18, p = .147, η2 = .05, with no difference in improvement on
ambiguous choices compared to improvement on control task performance. Finally, there
was a trend for a group effect when comparing Beta values between the PASAT-C
distress tolerance scores and Text Twist, F(1, 40) = 3.93, p = .054, η2 = .09, suggesting
more improvement on persistence on the PASAT-C compared to improvement on word
scores for Text Twist. Overall, there was significant training change for CogTrain and
control tasks, with relative change between conditions varying with the CogTrain task
variable in question.
Generalizability of Effects
Covariate Analyses
We next sought to examine whether completing CogTrain versus control training
led to generalizable change in cognitive-affective functioning and real-world behavior.
We first conducted a series of correlational analyses examining the relation between a
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variety of variables (i.e., demographic, baseline) and cognitive-affective and real-world
behavior variables to determine which variable(s) to include as covariates in subsequent
analyses. Higher IQ was associated with better working memory on the Digit Span
Backwards test, r(37) = .431, p = .006, higher distress tolerance scores during the breath
holding task, r(44) = .433, p = .003, and lower discount rates on the minute discounting
task, r(44) = -.382, p = .009. Additionally, older age was associated with decreased
primary drug substance use on the substance use calendar, r(44) = -.310, p = .036.
Therefore, we included full scale IQ in analyses of working memory, distress tolerance,
and delay discounting, and Age in analyses of primary drug substance use frequency.
Pre-post change by training condition
Next, we examined change in performance on the pre-post cognitive-affective and
real-world behavior measures over time as a function of training condition (CogTrain
versus control training).12 For each analysis, we conducted a repeated measures ANOVA
with timepoint (pretreatment vs. posttreatment) included as a within-subjects factor and
training condition (cognitive remediation vs. active control) included as a betweensubjects factor. For analyses of working memory, distress tolerance, and delay
discounting performance, full scale IQ (z-scored) was included as a continuous covariate,
and for the analysis of primary substance use, age (z-scored) was included as a
continuous covariate.
Cognitive-Affective Performance
Working Memory (Digit Backwards). There was a significant main effect of
timepoint on working memory, F(1, 29) = 5.62, p = .025, η2 = .16, with participants

12

We present complete-case analyses in the main text. For analyses using multiple imputation for missing
posttreatment values, see supplementary materials.
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showing better working memory performance on Digit Backwards at posttreatment
compared to pretreatment. The main effect of training condition was not significant (p =
.494). However, as predicted, a significant interaction between timepoint and training
condition occurred, F(1, 29) = 21.1, p = .007, η2 = .22 (see Figure 7A), such that
participants assigned to complete CogTrain training demonstrated improved working
memory ability from pretreatment to posttreatment (p = .002), while participants assigned
to complete Control training did not show change in their working memory ability (p =
.654).
Distress Tolerance. On the breath holding task, the main effect of timepoint on
distress tolerance was not significant (p = .883). The main effect of training condition
indicated a trend, F(1, 35) = 4.05, p = .052, η2 = .10, with individuals assigned to the
CogTrain training condition displaying lower levels of distress tolerance (consistent with
the one-way ANOVA showing a difference in distress tolerance between conditions). The
interaction between timepoint and training condition also indicated a trend in the
predicted direction, F(1, 35) = 3.31, p = .078, η2 = .09, suggesting that distress tolerance
tended to improve from pre- to posttreatment among participants in the CogTrain
condition but tended to decrease from pretreatment to posttreatment among participants
in the active control training condition.
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Figure 7. Generalizability of effects on measures of cognitive-affective functioning and real-world
behavior. There were significant timepoint by training condition effects for working memory, primary drug
substance use frequency, and TAU attendance. Specifically, participants who completed targeted cognitive
remediation training (CogTrain) showed (A) improvement in working memory ability on the digit
backwards task (B) reductions in primary drug substance use frequency, and (C) increased TAU session
attendance from pretreatment to posttreatment, whereas participants who completed active control training
showed no change in these variables over the same period.
**p < 0.01, *p > .0.05
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Delay Discounting. For delay discounting rates, neither the main effect for
timepoint (p = .104) nor the main effect of training condition (p = .412) was significant.
Similarly, the interaction between timepoint and training condition indicated no
significant change in delay discounting between training conditions (p = .395).
Real-World Behavior
Substance Use. For primary drug substance use frequency, neither the main effect
of timepoint (p = .778) nor the main effect of training condition (p = .270) was
significant. There was, however, a significant interaction between timepoint and training
condition, F(1, 31) = 7.17, p = .012, η2 = .19 in the predicted direction (see Figure 7B).
Among individuals in CogTrain training, there was a significant decrease in primary drug
substance use frequency (p = .030) after 4 weeks of training. By contrast, individuals in
control training did not show significant change in primary drug substance use from
pretreatment to posttreatment (p = .146).
TAU Session Attendance. The main effect of timepoint was not significant (p =
.497) for treatment session attendance. The main effect of training condition indicated a
nonsignificant trend, F(1, 36) = 3.52, p = .069, η2 = .09, such that individuals assigned to
CogTrain tended to attend fewer treatment sessions (consistent with the one-way
ANOVA showing a between-group difference in TAU session attendance between
groups at baseline). However, there was a significant interaction between timepoint and
training condition, F(1, 36) = 5.02, p = .031, η2 = .12, indicating that as predicted,
individuals who completed CogTrain attended more TAU sessions from pretreatment to
posttreatment, whereas individuals who completed Control training did not show change
in TAU session attendance after completing training (see Figure 7C).
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Differentiating training condition effects from effects of other variables.
We considered the possibility that the positive pre-post change in working
memory, primary drug substance use frequency, and TAU session attendance displayed
by participants in the CogTrain condition could reflect influences from variables outside
of training condition. We examined whether additional covariates were needed in
subsequent analyses based on individual differences in attendance at the posttreatment
session and baseline differences between participants assigned to different training
conditions. Attendance at the posttreatment session was related to pretreatment trait
anxiety (TAI), rs(44) = .346, p = .019, perceived stress (PSS), rs(44) = .295, p = .047, and
change and motivation readiness (CMR), rs(44) = -.302, p = .049, with individuals who
reported higher levels of trait anxiety, perceived stress, and levels of change and
motivation readiness being more likely to present at posttreatment. We included these
variables, as well as pretreatment distress tolerance, which differed between training
conditions, in the next series of analyses.
To examine whether targeted training resulted in improvements in these cognitive
and real-world variables when accounting for variables that differed between individuals
assigned to different training conditions (i.e., baseline distress tolerance) and participants
who did versus did not attend posttreatment (i.e., pretreatment trait anxiety, perceived
stress, change and motivation readiness), we re-ran repeated measures ANOVAs
including each of these variables as a continuous covariate in separate analyses.
For analyses of working memory and primary drug substance use frequency, the
timepoint by condition effect remained significant when controlling for the influence of
each of these potential confounding variables [distress tolerance on working memory:
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F(1, 28) = 6.12, p = .020, η2 = .18; trait anxiety on working memory: F(1, 28) = 8.31, p =
.007, η2 = .23; perceived stress on working memory: F(1, 28) = 8.06, p = .008, η2 = .22,
change and motivation readiness on working memory: F(1, 26) = 9.57, p = .005, η2 =
.27], distress tolerance on substance use: F(1, 30) = 7.99, p = .008, η2 = .21; trait anxiety
on substance use: F(1, 30) = 7.19, p = .012, η2 = .19; perceived stress on substance use:
F(1, 30) = 7.17, p = .012, η2 = .19; change and motivation readiness on substance use:
F(1, 28) = 5.55, p = .026, η2 = .17)]. The timepoint by condition effect also remained for
TAU session attendance when controlling for trait anxiety, F(1, 35) = 4.97, p = .032, η2 =
.12, perceived stress, F(1, 35) = 4.80, p = .035, η2 = .12; and change and motivation
readiness, F(1, 33) = 5.11, p = .030, η2 = .13. These results suggest between condition
differences in pre-post change are reflective of training condition effects, rather than
alternative variables that were not experimentally manipulated.
However, the timepoint by training condition interaction for TAU session
attendance was no longer significant when controlling for variability in distress tolerance
among participants, F(1, 35) = 2.00, p = .166, η2 = .05. Instead, when controlling for the
influence of distress tolerance, the main effect of timepoint on TAU session attendance
was significant, F(1, 35) = 4.34, p = .045, η2 = .11, such that individuals in both training
conditions attended more sessions at posttreatment compared to pretreatment. The
interaction between timepoint and distress tolerance indicated a trend, F(1, 35) = 3.85, p
= .058, η2 = .10, with a tendency for individuals with lower baseline distress tolerance to
display greater increases in TAU session attendance from pretreatment to posttreatment,
compared to individuals with higher baseline distress tolerance. This series of results
raised the possibility that the observed change in TAU attendance among individuals in
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the CogTrain condition might be accounted for by the low levels of distress tolerance
they exhibited at a group level, and the tendency for individuals with low distress
tolerance at pretreatment to show increases in session attendance between pretreatment
and posttreatment. However, results for this analysis using multiple imputation for
missing posttreatment values, suggest this finding is the result of reduced statistical
power, since the two-way interaction between timepoint and training condition remained
significant when controlling for the influence of pretreatment distress tolerance and
including imputed data, B = 1.05, SE = 0.486, 95% CI = 0.130, 1.977, t = 2.28, p =
0.028; see Supplementary Material for more detail).
Pre-post change as a function of externalizing traits
To examine whether pre-post change in working memory (Digit Backwards) and
real-world behavior (primary substance use frequency and TAU session attendance)
varied as a function of externalizing traits, we included ESI total score as a covariate in
each of the repeated measures ANOVAs. Controlling for externalizing, the interaction
between timepoint and condition remained significant for working memory, F(1, 28) =
7.84, p = .009, η2 = .22, primary drug substance use frequency, F(1, 30) = 10.52, p =
.003, η2 = .26, and TAU session attendance, F(1, 35) = 4.85, p = .034, η2 = .12.
Moreover, for the analyses of working memory and TAU session attendance, neither the
main effect of externalizing, nor the interaction between timepoint and externalizing,
were significant (all p’s > .338). However, for the analysis of primary drug substance use
frequency, there was a significant interaction between timepoint and level of trait
externalizing, F(1, 30) = 10.52, p = .003, η2 = .26, such that higher levels of externalizing
were associated with increases in primary drug substance use from pretreatment to
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posttreatment and lower levels of externalizing were associated with decreases in primary
drug substance use over the same period. This finding is consistent with previous studies
indicating poor treatment outcomes among antisocial individuals, particularly those high
on trait externalizing, in substance use treatment (Compton et al., 2003; Thylstrup &
Hesse, 2016).
To examine whether externalizing traits also moderated the interaction between
timepoint and training condition on substance use, we ran an additional repeated
measures ANOVA including the three-way interaction among timepoint, training
condition, and ESI-Brief total scores. In this model, the three-way interaction was not
significant, F(1, 29) = 2.82, p = .104, η2 = .09, while the two-way interaction between
timepoint and condition and the two-way interaction between timepoint and externalizing
remained significant (timepoint-by-condition: F(1, 29) = 10.45, p = .003, η2 = .27;
timepoint-by-externalizing: F(1, 29) = 11.08, p = .002, η2 = .28). On the whole, this
pattern of results indicated that externalizing was associated with diminished substance
use reductions over the course of treatment. However, despite the overall tendency for
externalizing to limit positive pre-post change, individuals who completed CogTrain, the
targeted cognitive remediation training, demonstrated greater reductions in substance use
frequency compared to those who completed control training, regardless of their level of
externalizing.
Pre-post change by training dose
Attendance at training sessions was variable, with individuals completing between
one and eight total training sessions. Of note, for individuals who attended the
posttreatment session, there was less variability in training session attendance, with 89%
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of those who presented at posttreatment attending five or more sessions. For those who
did not attend the posttreatment session, no participants attended more than four training
sessions. It is nonetheless possible that differential exposure to training (i.e., completing
all versus fewer training sessions) influenced the observed relationships among training
condition, timepoint, and changes in cognitive performance and real-world behavior. To
explore this possibility, we re-ran the initial repeated measures ANOVAs including the
main effect of the number of training sessions, and the two- and three-way interactions
with timepoint and condition as additional continuous fixed effect predictors of working
memory, primary drug substance use frequency, and TAU session attendance. Across
analyses examining training exposure, pre-post change associated with the CogTrain
condition did not appear to be influenced by training session dose, with none of the threeway interactions among training dose, timepoint, and condition being significant (all p’s
> .103). Thus, CogTrain appears to be effective, at minimum, for individuals who
attended five or more training sessions.
Pre-post change across measures by training condition
To determine whether participants who showed improvements with CogTrain
training improved across multiple domains, rather than on just one outcome measure
(e.g., working memory but not substance use frequency or TAU session attendance), we
examined whether the significant improvement observed across three outcome measures
reflected improvement on a single factor, and whether training condition influenced
overall change. We first computed difference scores quantifying improvement on each
measure (i.e., increased working memory capacity, decreased primary drug substance use
frequency, increased TAU session attendance) and entered them into a PCA with
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orthogonal rotation (varimax). This analysis indicated a one-factor solution, with the
single factor representing improvement across all three outcome measures (rworking
memory(26)

= 0.86, p < .001, rsubstance use(26) = 0.51, p = .006, rTAU attendance (26) = 0.77, p

<.001; see Table 4 for descriptive statistics).
Next, we entered the factor score into an ANOVA, with training condition (0 =
Active Control, 1 = CogTrain) as a categorical predictor of the pre-post improvement
factor score. Consistent with the results of the separate repeated measures ANOVAs,
there was a significant relationship between training condition and pre-post change across
measures, F(1, 26) = 10.66, p = .003, R2 = .54, with membership in the CogTrain
condition (compared to the control condition) predicting positive pre-post change across
outcome measures (B = 1.03, SE = 0.31, 95% CI = 0.38, 1.67, t = 3.27, p =.003). Results
of these analyses suggest that individuals who improved on working memory, primary
drug substance use frequency, and TAU session attendance did so across all three
measures, and that improvement across measures was indeed associated with completing
the targeted cognitive remediation training.
The impact of improvement on training on pre-post change
Finally, we examined whether improvement on any specific CogTrain task
predicted overall pre-post change in cognitive functioning and real-world behavior. We
analyzed the overall pre-post change factor score for each participant in a General Linear
Model (GLM) with Beta values for each CogTrain task variable (neutral and rewarded
SSRTs, Stop Signal Task reward scores, percentage of ambiguous choices, persistence; zscored) as continuous predictors (see Table 4 for descriptive statistics and zero-order
correlations among the factor associated with pre-post across outcome measures and
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training task Beta values). There was a significant relationship between training Beta’s
and pre-post change across measures (p = .030). Improvement on inhibition for both
neutral and rewarded trials (having lower SSRT’s across sessions) and on persistence
during the PASAT-C (higher persistence scores across sessions) was associated with
more positive pre-post change across outcome measures (SSRT for neutral trials: B =
0.57, SE = 0.19, 95% CI = 0.19, 0.95, p = .003; SSRT for reward trials: B = 0.50, SE =
0.16, 95% CI = 0.18, 0.81, p = .002; PASAT-C persistence: B = 0.55, SE = 0.16, 95% CI
= 0.23, 0.88, p = .001). Improvement on Stop Signal Task scores for rewarded trials
(higher scores across sessions) and improvement on ambiguous choices during decision
making (fewer ambiguous choices) were not significantly associated with pre-post
change across outcome measures (Stop Signal Task reward scores: B = -0.15, SE = 0.18,
95% CI = -0.50, 0.20, p = .402; ambiguous choices: B = -0.31, SE = 0.19, 95% CI = 0.68, 0.05, p = .094).
When we ran a separate GLM for the control training condition, entering the Beta
value for Text Twist word scores (z-scored) as a predictor of pre-post change across
outcome measures, there was no significant relationship between control training change
and change on cognitive performance and real-world behavior, B = -0.19, SE = 0.17,
95% CI = -0.51, 0.14, p = .265. Overall, these results suggest that improvement on the
CogTrain tasks, and not the control training, was associated with generalized
improvement on outcome measures. Improving inhibition in neutral and rewarding
contexts and persistence under distress may be particularly conducive to enhanced
working memory, decreased substance use, and increased engagement in substance use
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treatment.

Discussion
Previous research highlights how several cognitive-affective dysfunctions relate
to the chronic maladaptive behaviors displayed by antisocial individuals. The results of
the present study suggest that targeting these dysfunctions may not only mitigate such
aberrations, but also may lead to changes in more general cognitive functioning and
antisocial behaviors themselves. Through the use of a novel cognitive remediation
training package designed to enhance inhibition in the presence of reward, decisionmaking under ambiguity, and working memory amid distress, this pilot randomized
clinical trial provides evidence to support the longstanding but largely untested claims
that treatment adjuncts or adaptations addressing cognitive-affective dysfunctions are
likely to improve treatment efficacy among antisocial individuals (Ball et al., 2006;
Daughters et al., 2008; Wölwer et al., 2001). Moreover, by linking improvements in
cognitive-affective performance with improvements in real-world behavior, this study
represents a substantial step in bridging the gap between behavior, mechanism, and
treatment in a population that has historically been viewed as treatment-resistant (Raine,
2018).
As predicted, antisocial individuals in outpatient substance use treatment who
completed targeted training tasks matched to their cognitive-affective dysfunctions
demonstrated improved performance on training tasks with repeated practice.
Specifically, they became more efficient and more accurate when inhibiting prepotent
responses in neutral and rewarding contexts, respectively. They also were more
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considerate of ambiguous information about costs and benefits when making decisions
and more persistent when demands were placed on working memory amidst distress.
More importantly, individuals who completed CogTrain training demonstrated
improvements outside of trained tasks on a pre-post assessment battery, with greater
working memory capacity, reduced substance use frequency for their primary drug of
choice, and better treatment session attendance. Reflecting a relationship between
training improvement and the observed generalized changes in cognition and behavior,
overall improvements in working memory, substance use, and TAU session attendance
correlated with improvements on CogTrain tasks. Additionally, observed training-related
improvements in cognitive and behavioral functioning occurred regardless of levels of
externalizing. Results were strengthened by our inclusion of an active control training
group for comparison. Although individuals who completed the active control training (a
computerized word game) improved on the task they practiced, they did not show the
improvements in general cognitive functioning or real-world behavior displayed by
individuals in the CogTrain condition. Overall, training that targeted the cognitiveaffective dysfunctions associated with antisociality successfully improved functioning in
intended domains and led to more global improvements in functioning.
Considerations for the CogTrain Training Package
Results from the present study replicate and expand upon findings from prior
studies utilizing cognitive remediation training in psychiatric populations, including the
only other previous study examining cognitive remediation in antisocial individuals
(Baskin-Sommers et al., 2015), and several studies examining cognitive remediation in
adults with other externalizing disorders (i.e., attention deficity hyperactivity disorder;
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Dentz, Guay, Parent, & Romo, 2020; substance use disorders; Verdejo-Garcia, 2016).
Across studies of externalizing individuals more broadly, it appears that both response
inhibition (Baskin-Sommers et al., 2015; Houben, Havermans, Nederkoorn, & Jansen,
2012; Houben, Nederkoorn, Wiers, & Jansen, 2011) and working memory deficits
(Bickel et al., 2011; Gamito et al., 2014; Houben, Wiers, & Jansen, 2011; Rass et al.,
2015; Rupp et al., 2012) can be improved upon with cognitive remediation training
targeting these domains. However, the extent to which such training results in transfer to
other tasks and clinical outcomes is not consistent in prior studies of externalizing
individuals (Baskin-Sommers et al., 2015; Bickel et al., 2011; Gamito et al., 2014;
Houben, Wiers, et al., 2011; Rass et al., 2015; Rupp et al., 2012; Verdejo-Garcia, 2016)
and other psychiatric populations (Kim et al., 2018). The generalized improvements in
antisocial individuals demonstrated in the present study, along with their medium to large
effect sizes, likely are attributable to specific characteristics of the CogTrain cognitive
remediation training package.
First, our training package included three tasks spanning several cognitive
functions, rather than just one specific function or area of cognition. While antisociality
previously has been related to problems in executive functioning more broadly,
considerable empirical evidence suggests this characterization is oversimplified, with
dysfunction being specific to some discrete executive functions (e.g., working memory,
inhibition; Chamberlain et al., 2016; De Brito et al., 2013; Dolan & Park, 2002; Rubio,
Jimenez, et al., 2007; Swann et al., 2009; Zeier et al., 2012) and not others (e.g.,
planning, set-shifting; Chamberlain et al., 2016; Dolan & Park, 2002; Stevens et al.,
2003), and in cognitive domains outside of executive functioning (e.g. perception, Bauer,
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2001; attention, Lijffijt et al., 2009; 2012, decision-making, Buckholtz et al., 2017;
Mazas et al., 2000; Petry, 2002; Swogger, Walsh, Lejuez, & Kosson, 2010). The complex
and multifaceted nature of dysfunction in antisocial individuals requires treatment that is
similarly multifaceted; treatments targeting a single cognitive domain in isolation are
unlikely to impact overall functioning (Zalta & Shankman, 2016).
Second, our study was unique in its deliberate effort to target functioning at the
intersection of both cognition and affect to increase generalizability to real-world
behavior. Although the training tasks designed by Baskin-Sommers and colleagues
(2015) purportedly centered around “affective-cognitive control,” only one of the three
tasks (incentivized Go-Stop; Albrecht, Banaschewski, Brandeis, Heinrich, &
Rothenberger, 2005; Avila & Parcet, 2001; Schuckit et al., 2012) targeted both cognition
and affect simultaneously, while the other two tasks focused on cognition or affect alone.
By contrast, all three CogTrain tasks placed dual demands on cognition and affect,
increasing the likelihood that our training package prepared individuals to practice skills
in contexts that more closely matched the environments typical of real-life situations in
which they might struggle—environments characterized by strong cravings, unknown
risks, and distress. Indeed, performance measures from the training tasks selected
previously have been linked to relevant real-world outcomes for antisocial individuals,
such as arrest frequency, substance use relapse, and treatment dropout (Buckholtz et al.,
2017; Daughters, Lejuez, Bornovalova, et al., 2005; Konova et al., 2020). Emotional cues
are important triggers of maladaptive behavior in antisocial individuals, and emotional
exposure is likely necessary to provide adequate practice replacing problematic behaviors
with more adaptive responses (Bornovalova, Gratz, Daughters, Hunt, & Lejuez, 2012;
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Brown et al., 2008). Antisocial individuals lack both the “cognitive and affective
equipment required” to follow rules and respect the rights of others (Alcázar-Córcoles,
Verdejo-García, Bouso-Saiz, & Bezos-Saldana, 2010, p. 291). Future efforts to change
behaviors among antisocial individuals will benefit from not only bolstering their
cognitive capacities, but also by doing so in environments that are affectively-charged
and thus more ecologically valid.
Despite the noted associations with positive pre-post change, the CogTrain
package could benefit from refinement. For the Stop Signal Task, inhibition reward
scores for rewarded trials did not improve significantly with practice (the effect of
session indicated a statistical trend), and the reward score performance metric, which did
improve significantly, was not associated with improvements on pre-post tasks. Recent
research examining the impact of incentives on inhibitory performance using the Stop
Signal Task highlights complex interactions among expectation, magnitude, and order of
rewards among healthy individuals (Herrera et al., 2019). Future research examining the
impact of specific reward manipulations on inhibition among antisocial individuals may
further elucidate how specific reward features disrupt antisocial individuals, and how to
address these disruptions. Alternatively, other response inhibition tasks with more
established and less complex reward effects among antisocial individuals (e.g., modified
n-back; Baskin-Sommers et al. 2014; Stuppy-Sullivan & Baskin-Sommers, 2019) may be
used in future training packages.
For the decision-making task, there was no significant training change in the
ambiguity attitude parameter (β). This finding is consistent with recently published work
utilizing a similar decision-making task in individuals with opioid disorders, who showed
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higher variability in ambiguity attitude across sessions compared to healthy controls
(Konova et al., 2020). Antisocial individuals may be similarly unlikely to provide
reliable ambiguity attitudes as measured by β. Notably, the decision-making task yielded
more excluded trials than other tasks in the training package, due to several participants
selecting the lottery option on multiple catch trials and computational models providing
poor fit to data for several individuals’ sessions (see Supplementary Material). By
contrast, the percentage of ambiguous choices variable did show significant improvement
across training sessions. This pattern of findings aligns with our prior findings from
Study 2 suggesting antisocial individuals have difficulty integrating multiple decision
variables when making choices, and that their behavior may be better explained by
simple computational models with fewer parameters (i.e., reflecting a general bias toward
ambiguous versus certain options). Given their documented difficulty with complex
decisions and tasks, future efforts to encourage antisocial individuals to consider
ambiguous information during decision-making may benefit from introducing decision
parameters slowly (e.g., starting with variability in reward magnitude and known
probability, and later adding varying levels of ambiguity, effort, etc.). In general,
antisocial individuals also may benefit from being given more clear instructions,
additional incentives for paying attention, and other strategies that ensure they are
engaging in tasks optimally.
When evaluating the CogTrain package as a whole, it is important to consider that
attendance at CogTrain training sessions was lower than attendance at control training
sessions. It is possible that lower attendance among individuals in the CogTrain condition
was related to their lower baseline distress tolerance or treatment attendance; however, it
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also is possible that the training itself contributed to between-condition discrepancies in
training session attendance. For example, prior studies examining the Stop Signal Task
and the PASAT-C indicate that both tasks produce strong negative affect, including
frustration, anxiety, and discomfort (Bornovalova et al., 2012; Gratz, Bornovalova,
Delany-Brumsey, Nick, & Lejuez, 2007; Spunt, Lieberman, Cohen, & Eisenberger,
2012). Studies in nonclinical samples suggest that negative affect prompted after
deploying cognitive control impacts decisions about approaching or avoiding cognitively
demanding tasks in the future (Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010; Spunt et al.,
2012). Thus, discomfort induced while practicing inhibition in an environment designed
to produce errors (i.e., using the dual-staircase tracking procedure on the Stop Signal
Task) and while challenging working memory amid distress (i.e., created by accelerating
the pace of subsequent stimuli and administering noise blasts during the PASAT-C) may
have decreased willingness to attend future study sessions among individuals in the
participants receiving CogTrain. In turn, perhaps only the individuals with sufficient
ability to tolerate such discomfort completed sufficient training sessions, gleaned
generalized benefits, and presented at posttreatment. While we do not have measures of
subjective experiences of training tasks to confirm connections between negative affect
and training session attendance in the CogTrain condition, our results raise the possibility
that adherence to adjunctive treatment protocols may benefit from additional
accommodations for antisocial individuals based on their cognitive-affective experience.
For example, concluding treatment sessions with relaxation exercises (a common
component of exposure-based treatments), and adjusting training tasks to accommodate a
wider range of difficulty levels, may decrease the extent to which negative affect prompts
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treatment disengagement. Ultimately, changing maladaptive behavior likely requires
sensitivity not only to the cognitive-affective dysfunctions typical of a given psychiatric
population, but also to individual differences within such a population.
Translation to Cognitive-Affective Functioning
As noted above, there was evidence of generalized change for working memory,
primary drug substance use frequency, and TAU session attendance. However, the
CogTrain training package did not lead to significant pre-post change across all measures
of the cognitive-affective battery. The non-significant trend for pre-post by condition
change in distress tolerance may relate to the poor convergence between measures of
behavioral distress tolerance found in previous studies (Glassman et al., 2016; McHugh et
al., 2011). The breath holding task used to measure pre-post change is considered to be a
measure of somatic persistence, and induces affective changes that are more fleeting than
those induced by the PASAT-C, a cognitive measure of distress tolerance (McHugh et al.,
2011). Although we deliberately selected the breath holding task as part of a conservative
effort to select broad-based measures of change, this choice may have restricted our
ability to detect transfer effects. Selecting another measure of distress tolerance with
more cognitive-affective focus (e.g., the computerized Mirror-Tracing Persistence Task;
MTPT-C; Strong et al., 2003) may have produced more apparent transfer effects. Another
possible hindrance to detecting pre-post change in distress tolerance was the betweencondition difference in distress tolerance observed at baseline and our small sample size.
With unequal groups at the start of training, and variability in distress tolerance across all
participants, potential CogTrain-related within-subject changes in distress tolerance may
have been subdued and, with limited power to observe small effects, reduced to a trend.
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Thus, future studies with larger sample sizes and an alternative selection of measures are
needed to determine whether training working memory under distress can positively
impact distress tolerance.
Delay discounting also was not impacted by the CogTrain package, representing a
divergence from previous cognitive remediation studies that suggest a connection
between working memory training and reductions in delay discounting (Bickel et al.,
2011; Felton, Collado, Ingram, Doran, & Yi, 2019). Null effects observed in the present
study may have occurred for a number of methodological and theoretical reasons.
Methodologically, our 5-item measure of delay discounting was briefer, and possibly less
precise, than the longer adjusting amount procedures utilized in previous studies,
reducing our ability to detect meaningful change in preference for immediate rewards.
Moreover, the magnitude of our delayed reward ($100) was relatively small. Felton and
colleagues (2019) found a connection between working memory change and delay
discounting change under a $1000 delayed reward, but not for a $50 delayed reward.
Recent evidence suggests that within- and between-group differences in delay
discounting are more likely to be revealed in larger magnitude conditions (Felton et al.,
2019; Mellis, Woodford, Stein, & Bickel, 2017). On a more conceptual note, while the
PASAT-C task in the CogTrain package placed demands on working memory, difficulty
was progressively increased by increasing the rate of stimulus presentation and increasing
distress through use of a noise blast, not by increasing set sizes, as in working memory
training tasks used in other studies (e.g., PSSCogReHab; Psychological Software
Services, Indianapolis, Indiana). It is possible that the task employed in the present study
tapped an overlapping but distinct working memory application from previous studies,
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with differential links to delay discounting. Overall, null delay discounting results further
highlight the importance of specificity when characterizing cognitive-affective
dysfunctions (e.g., applications of working memory, types of cost-benefit decisionmaking) relevant to antisocial individuals and the factors (e.g.., reward magnitude,
relations to other cognitive-affective domains) that influence them.
Limitations
Beyond specific considerations for the CogTrain package and measures of
generalized change, it is important to note some additional limitations. First, and perhaps
most notably, are limitations related to our premature ending to data collection and small
subsequent sample size. Recruiting fewer participants than our target sample size may
have biased randomization, resulting in the between-condition imbalances in baseline
TAU session attendance and distress tolerance. This is because temporal trends in patient
recruitment are common in randomized controlled trials using urn randomization
(Friedman et al., 2015; Wayant, Tritz, Horn, Crow, and Vassar, 2020). At the time data
collection ended (roughly halfway to our target N), individuals in the CogTrain condition
differed from individuals in the Control condition on two urn variables: they had been in
treatment for shorter durations and had used their primary drugs on more days in the past
month as of their pretreatment assessments. While speculative, these differences could
correlate with lower levels of distress tolerance and lower TAU session attendance at
baseline among individuals in the CogTrain group. Although a majority of our results
remained significant when controlling for potential covariates and when imputing
missing data (see Supplementary Material), a fully powered study would have been better
equipped to determine which domains of functioning are likely to be improved by
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cognitive remediation training, and which individual differences may moderate
improvements for antisocial individuals, with greater confidence.
Another, and potentially related, limitation of the present study was our inability
to detect possible dose effects due to a lack of variability in attendance among individuals
who presented at posttreatment. Our results suggest that attendance at more than half of
the required training sessions was linked with training-related gains. It will be important
for future cognitive remediation studies in this population to collect large enough samples
to examine training dose effects fully. While it appears that single-session training can
impact real-world outcomes (e.g., substance use; Verdejo Garcia, Houben 2011, Houben
2012), it is unclear if abbreviated cognitive remediation protocols can produce change in
individuals with clinically significant levels of antisociality. Future studies might also
consider adjusting the number of training sessions based on individual differences in
training task performance (e.g., Bickel et al., 2011), since providing no more and no
fewer training sessions than necessary will ensure such training is as cost-effective as
possible.
Finally, while we measured multiple real-world behaviors relevant to antisocial
individuals (i.e., substance use frequency, treatment attendance), we did not measure
many that are typical of the population (e.g., engagement in crime, acts of aggression,
risky sexual behavior) and reflect important outcomes relevant to the impact of their
behavior. Future treatment studies evaluating pre-post change in behavior will benefit
from assessing engagement in a more diverse range of antisocial behaviors and denoting
which behaviors are the most persistent as targets for future empirical studies and
treatments.
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Conclusions
In sum, results from the present study provide evidence that antisocial individuals
can learn to change their behavior, despite the historic pessimism surrounding their
potential to respond to treatment. Importantly, behavior change among antisocial
individuals is made possible by more richly understanding the complex cognitionemotion interactions impacting their functioning and properly leveraging such knowledge
into targeted treatments. Toward this end, computerized cognitive remediation training is
an exciting potential tool. With widespread access to Internet-enabled mobile technology
(Pew Research Center, 2018), cognitive remediation may not only help bridge the
science-practice gap (Onken, Carroll, Shoham, Cuthbert, & Riddle, 2014), but also the
gap between mechanism-informed interventions and the individuals for whom they are
intended, supporting behavior change in a wider variety of settings (e.g., primary care,
rural areas), and at lower costs than traditional behavior change interventions.
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Tables: Study 3
Table 1
Baseline demographics, psychiatric disorders, and assessment measures by training

Variable
Female
Race
White
Black
Unreported
Hispanic Ethnicity
In treatment 30 days or more
Single or Divorced
Unemployed
Obtained a high school diploma or GED
Primary Substance Use Disorder (SUD)
Alcohol
Opioids
Marijuana
Cocaine
Primary SUD symptom severity
Mild (2-3 symptoms)
Moderate (4-5 symptoms)
Severe (6+ symptoms)
Total number of lifetime SUDs
1
2 to 3
4 or more
Lifetime Alcohol Use Disorder
Lifetime Stimulant Use Disorder
Lifetime Marijuana Use Disorder
Lifetime Opioid Use Disorder
Antisocial Personality Disorder
Any lifetime depressive disorder
Any lifetime anxiety disorder
Lifetime Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

Age
Years primary substance used
Full Scale IQ (Shipley)
Number of attended training sessions
Pretreatment Assessments
Externalizing Spectrum Inventory-Brief Total
Score
State Anxiety Score
Trait Anxiety Score
Perceived Stress Total Score
Change and Motivation Readiness Score
Cognitive Affective Battery
Digit Span Backwards Score
Distress Tolerance Score
Ln(k)
Real World Behavior
Days Primary Substance Use (cube-rooted)
TAU Session Attendance

Cognitive
Remediation
(N = 22)
N
%
11
50.0

Active Control
(N = 24)
N
%
11
45.8

12
8
2
7
6
18
8
21

54.5
36.4
9.1
31.8
27.3
81.8
36.4
95.5

17
6
1
5
11
19
13
22

7
7
3
5

31.8
31.8
13.6
22.7

0
5
17

Total
(N = 46)
22

%
47.8

χ2
0.080

Analysis
df
1

p
.777

70.8
25.0
4.2
20.8
45.8
79.2
54.2
91.7

29
11
6
12
17
37
21
43

67.4
23.9
13.0
26.1
37.0
80.4
45.7
93.5

0.943

1

.331

0.718
1.697
0.051
1.466
0.270

1
1
1
1
1

.397
.193
.821
.226
.603

8
8
6
2

33.3
33.3
25.0
8.3

15
15
9
7

32.6
32.6
19.6
15.2

2.337

3

.506

0.0
22.7
77.3

0
2
22

0.0
8.3
91.7

0
7
39

0.0
15.2
84.8

1.843

1

.175

4
12
6
18
15
14
10
1
11
11
10

18.2
54.5
27.3
81.8
68.2
63.6
45.5
0.05
50.0
50.0
45.5

3
12
9
16
14
16
11
1
17
11
9

12.5
50.0
37.5
66.7
58.3
66.7
45.8
0.04
70.8
45.8
37.5

7
24
15
34
29
30
21
2
28
22
19

15.2
52.2
32.6
73.9
63.0
65.2
45.6
0,04
60.9
47.8
41.3

0.657

2

.720

1.367
0.478
0.046
0.001
0.009
2.092
0.080
0.300

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

.242
.489
.829
.979
.923
.148
.777
.584

M
34.9
13.9
100.0
5.5

SD
8.1
8.4
14.0
2.6

M
32.4
12.1
101.5
6.9

SD
8.6
7.7
13.3
1.8

Mean
33.6
13.0
100.8
6.2

SD
8.4
8.0
13.5
2.3

F
1.017
0.591
0.132
4.716

df
(1, 44)
(1, 44)
(1, 44)
(1, 44)

p
.319
.446
.718
.035*

223.1

52.1

210.3

51.8

216.4

51.8

0.697

(1, 44)

.408

37.2
42.4
18.5
58.4

14.0
12.5
6.7
10.1

41.1
47.5
21.4
60.0

11.2
9.8
4.6
10.5

39.3
45.1
20.0
59.0

12.6
11.3
5.8
10.2

1.099
2.422
2.929
0.148

(1, 44)
(1, 44)
(1, 44)
(1, 44)

.300
.127
.094
.703

7.0
2.2
-2.0

2.1
0.8
1.8

7.4
2.7
-2.3

2.9
0.7
2.1

7.2
2.4
-2.18

2.5
0.8
2.0

0.248
5.365
0.241

(1, 37)
(1, 44)
(1, 44)

.622
.025*
.626

1.0
4.4

1.1
3.2

0.6
8.2

1.0
6.6

0.8
6.4

1.0
5.5

1.047
6.205

(1.44)
(1.44)

0.312
0.017*

condition.

168

N

**p<0.01, *p>.0.05
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Table 2
Training and study session attendance by training condition.
Cognitive Remediation
(N = 22)
Variable
Total Training Sessions Completed
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Total Training Sessions Completed

Attended Posttreatment Session
Attended follow-up session
**p<0.01, *p>.0.05

N

%

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
8

9.1
9.1
9.1
9.1
9.1
9.1
9.1
36.4

M

SD
2.6

N
15
12

%
68.2
54.5

5.5

170

Active Control
(N = 24)
N
%
0
1
1
2
1
1
3
15
M
6.9
N
23
20

0.0
4.2
4.2
8.3
4.2
4.2
12.5
62.5

Total
(N = 46)

Analysis

N

%

2
3
3
4
3
3
5
23

4.3
6.5
6.5
8.7
6.5
6.5
10.9
50.0

SD
1.8

M
6.2

%
95.8
83.3

N
38
32

SD
2.3
%
82.6
69.6

F
4.716

df
1,44

p
.035*

χ2
6.109
4.493

df
1
1

p
.013*
.034*

Table 3
Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations for individual differences and training task variables.
r
Variable
1. ESI Total Score
2. Full Scale IQ
3. SSRT neutral blocks
4. SSRT reward blocks
5. Stop Signal Task reward score
6. % Risky Choices
7. % Ambiguous Choices
8. Risk Attitude (α)
9. Ambiguity Attitude (β)
10. PASAT-C Persistence
11. Text Twist Words Completed
**p<0.01, *p>.0.05

n
46
46
19
17
15
22
22
21
22
21
24

M
216.4
100.8
571.8
599.3
532.2
0.70
0.56
0.85
0.58
0.39
136.4

SD
51.8
13.5
116.4
39.2
20.2
0.17
0.22
0.77
0.93
0.24
56.0

(1)
1.000
0.327*
-0.261
0.077
0.144
0.434*
0.223
0.024
-0.040
0.223
-0.179

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

1.000
-0.001
0.267
0.427
-0.152
-0.518*
0.473*
0.008
0.464*
0.598**

1.000
0.422
0.547*
-0.293
-0.077
-0.178
-0.044
0.330
--

1.000
0.141
-0.256
-0.275
0.040
-0.171
0.136
--

1.000
-0.148
-0.206
0.056
-0.163
0.608*
--

1.000
0.375
-0.167
0.020
-0.002
--

1.000
-0.603**
-0.308
-0.315
--

171

(8)

1.000
0.408
-0.272
--

(9)

1.000
0.204
--

(10)

1.000
--

Table 4
Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations for overall pre-post change and across-session
change on training tasks.
r
Variable
1. Pre-Post Change Factor Score
2. Beta SSRT neutral
3. Beta SSRT reward
4. Beta Stop Signal Task reward score
5. Beta % Ambiguous Choices
6. Beta PASAT-C Persistence
7. Beta Text Twist
**p<0.01, *p>.0.05

n
28
18
18
18
18
15
24

M
0.135
0.014
0.017
-0.003
-2.58
13.36
0.058

SD
0.967
0.022
0.033
0.062
13.87
7.12
0.027

(1)
1.000
0.139
0.219
-0.530
0.174
-0.403
-0.277

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

1.000
0.212
0.171
-0.115
-0.258
--

1.000
0.018
-0.506*
-0.059
--

1.000
-0.200
-0.409
--

1.000
0.130
--

1.00
--

1.00
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Chapter 5: General Discussion
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The research presented in this dissertation provides specificity to accounts of cognitiveaffective dysfunctions impacting antisocial individuals and illustrates how designing treatments
with these cognitive-affective dysfunctions in mind can propel behavior change in a population
that is often deemed to be treatment-resistant. Findings from Studies 1 and 2 highlighted how
executive functioning, decision-making, and reward sensitivity are not globally deficient among
antisocial individuals. Instead, multiple cognitive processes (perception, inhibition under high
load, executive functioning more generally, effort-based decision-making) were disrupted in
certain affective circumstances (e.g., when high value rewards were at stake, when individuals
were aware of high value rewards, when individuals were experiencing high levels of negative
affect), ultimately influencing how antisocial individuals processed information and responded
behaviorally. Findings from Study 3 indicated that specific cognitive-affective dysfunctions
identified in previous studies of antisocial individuals, including studies from this dissertation,
could be addressed directly through targeted cognitive remediation training, leading to
improvements in both cognition and behavior. Specifically, antisocial individuals enrolled in
outpatient substance use treatment were capable of enhancing their ability to inhibit responses in
both neutral and rewarding contexts, and their ability to update working memory in distressing
contexts. Further, these advancements led to improvements in working memory capability,
substance use frequency, and therapy session attendance. Overall, results demonstrated that
refining conceptualizations of cognitive-affective dysfunctions in antisocial individuals provides
a more accurate account of their engagement in maladaptive behavior patterns and, ultimately,
can facilitate a reversal of these behavior patterns by informing targeted interventions.
Results from this dissertation have important implications when considered alongside
traditional accounts of antisocial behavior and attitudes toward remediating it. Traditional
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models of antisocial behavior most often focus broadly on diminished executive functioning and
aberrant decision-making. Further, several theories and experimental studies of antisocial
behavior describe how abnormal reward sensitivity may impact executive functions and
decision-making. The present findings highlight anomalies in the perceptual encoding of
information, the integration of information during effort-based decision-making, and the impact
of distress in disrupting cognition and behavior in antisocial individuals. Abnormal perception in
the presence of rewards may contribute to executive functioning and decision-making
abnormalities documented in prior studies, since accurately perceiving one’s environment is a
prerequisite for detecting cues signaling that inhibition is necessary, or accurately evaluating
information about choice options ahead of action selection. Additionally, while reward is
influential in antisocial behavior (Estrada, Tillem, Stuppy-Sullivan, & Baskin-Sommers, 2019),
so too is negative affect, which impacts whether antisocial individuals can integrate information
about rewards when choosing how to invest their efforts. An approach to understanding
antisocial behavior that incorporates additional domains of cognition and affect sheds light on
the extent of dysfunction in antisocial individuals and provides novel targets for interventions.
Although findings from this dissertation suggest more widespread dysfunction in
antisocial individuals than traditional accounts would indicate, they also suggest instances of
intact cognitive-affective capacities that can be leveraged for treatment. For example, Study 1
indicated that antisocial individuals do not show inhibition problems when rewards at stake and
working memory demands are relatively low. Additionally, Studies 1 and 2 indicated that
antisocial individuals can integrate information about reward values and probabilities during
risk-based decision-making, and even during effort-based decision-making if they are
experiencing lower levels of negative affect. Study 3 suggested that when given opportunities to
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practice specific skills in progressively more challenging environments, antisocial individuals
can build toward improving areas of relative weakness. Specifically, antisocial individuals can
gain practice with inhibition under varying levels of reward (e.g., practicing in both neutral and
rewarded contexts) and difficulty (e.g., in response to varying Stop Signal Delays), as well as
gain exposure integrating information while under progressively higher levels of distress (e.g.,
with decreased latency between stimuli during the PASAT-C). Identifying areas within executive
functioning, decision-making, and reward processing that are intact in antisocial individuals
provides opportunities to bolster cognitive-affective functioning and behavioral change by
leveraging these capabilities to address specific dysfunctions in antisocial individuals.
Findings from this dissertation represent a step toward describing cognitive-affective
dysfunctions and capacities in antisocial individuals more thoroughly than previous research and
improving treatments based on this knowledge. However, further programmatic research related
to cognitive-affective functioning and antisocial individuals is needed. Future efforts to
understand and treat antisocial individuals will benefit from exploring additional subfactors of
cognitive (e.g., attention, social decision-making) and affective (e.g., threat, loss, frustrative nonreward, boredom) processes, as well as how such processes relate to one another. Basic science
underscores important distinctions within cognitive and affective domains (e.g., the multiple
well-defined and empirically supported factors subsumed by "impulsivity;" Strickland &
Johnson, 2021) and important moderators of cognitive-affective functioning in neurotypical
individuals. By extension, the translation of basic science to clinical science is needed to
examine potential roles for specific cognitive-affective factors, subfactors, and moderators in the
behavior of antisocial individuals more fully. For example, future studies may examine whether
abnormal perception in highly rewarding contexts underlies abnormal social perception among
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antisocial individuals (e.g., contributes to abnormal processing of angry or fearful faces), and
whether such disruption is particularly prominent among antisocial individuals who engage in
violent crimes. Such findings may suggest a role for mindfulness-based interventions
emphasizing visual processing with progressively more complex and affectively charged stimuli
in treating more violent antisocial individuals, potentially reducing the public health burden
associated interpersonal violence (Corso, Mercy, Simon, Finkelstein, & Miller, 2007). With a
larger collection of findings documenting specific dysfunctional versus intact processes,
researchers focusing on antisocial individuals can formulate a comprehensive conceptualization
of the etiopathogenesis of antisocial behavior and treatments that leverage and target processes
that can positively impact behavior.
Future work may hone conceptualizations of antisocial individuals and increase treatment
potency further by not only attending more to their cognitive-affective dysfunctions and
capabilities, but also by incorporating understandings of additional factors conferring risk for
continued antisocial behavior. Environmental (e.g., poverty; Chung, 2004; Machell, Disabato, &
Kashdan, 2016), interpersonal (e.g., conflicts with treatment providers; Ball, Carroll, CanningBall, & Rounsaville, 2006), and co-morbid psychiatric (e.g., Post-traumatic stress disorder;
Ardino, 2012) factors are influential in the onset and maintenance of antisocial behavior.
Additionally, environmental factors, interpersonal experiences, and psychiatric co-morbidities
are likely to interact with cognitive-affective functions, impacting both day-to-day functioning
and treatment engagement (see Ford, 2015; Levi, Laslo-Roth, & Rosenstreich, 2018; for reviews
related to trauma and poverty, respectively). For example, future studies might examine whether
cognitive load and stress created by financial constraints (Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir, & Zhao,
2013; Santiago, Wadsworth, & Stump, 2011; Shafir, 2017; Shah, Zhao, Mullainathan, & Shafir,
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2018) uniquely impacts inhibition under reward or threat among antisocial individuals who face
poverty, and whether therapeutic efforts to address financial constraints (e.g., providing
vocational services, covering transportation costs for attending therapy) can buffer against any
inhibition failures uniquely influencing behavior or treatment engagement for antisocial
individuals impacted by poverty. On the whole, antisocial behavior may be “difficult to treat”
(Paris, Chenard-Poirier, & Biskin, 2013, p. 323) because it is difficult to understand, reflecting a
complex intersection of cognitive-affective, environmental, and psychological factors.
Nonetheless, additional insight into the multi-factorial causes of antisocial behavior can help
replace unsuccessful “one-size fits all” approaches (Snyder, Reid, & Patterson, 2003, p. 40) by
informing personalized treatment programs to fit the diverse needs of antisocial individuals
(Brazil, van Dongen, Maes, Mars, & Baskin-Sommers, 2018).
In conclusion, refining mechanistic research and its connection to applied research has
the power to revolutionize behavior change, yielding the most potent interventions possible for
even the most chronic and severe antisocial individuals (Onken, Carroll, Shoham, Cuthbert, &
Riddle, 2014). Continued research is needed to develop interventions that target specific
mechanisms, evaluate changes in these specific mechanisms, and examine the extent to which
observed changes generalize to promote changes in cognitive-affective and behavioral
functioning. This systematic approach promotes the personalization of behavior change by
integrating work across theoretical and methodological domains. Although conducting more
rigorous mechanistic work and mechanism-informed applied work may be challenging, such
efforts are worthwhile in their potential to alleviate the enormous suffering caused by antisocial
behavior.
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Appendix A: Study 1 Supplemental Material
Supplemental Methods

Participants
Participants were 116 male inmates from a maximum-security correctional institution in
Connecticut (see Table 1 for sample characteristics). A prescreen of institutional files and
assessment materials were used to exclude individuals who: were not between the ages of 18 and
75, scored below 70 on a brief measure of IQ (Shipley Institute of Living Scale; Zachary, 1986) ,
performed below the fourth-grade level on a standardized measure of reading (Wide Range
Achievement Test-III; Wilkinson, 1993), had diagnoses of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder,
psychosis not otherwise specified, were currently taking psychotropic medication, or had a
history of medical problems (e.g., uncorrectable auditory or visual deficits, head injury with loss
of consciousness greater than 30 minutes, seizures) that could impact their comprehension of the
study materials. Participants completed a semi-structured diagnostic interview on one visit and
the three laboratory tasks on a second visit. Across the three tasks, participants were instructed to
attend to reward cues, which might be hard to see at times, and to try to earn as many reward
points as possible in order to be added to a “leader board” that was on display to all study
participants in the testing room (Note: Connecticut Department of Correction does not allow
researchers to pay inmates). All participants were provided written informed consent according
to the procedures set forth by the Yale University Human Investigation Committee.
Measures
Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD). Participants were assessed for APD during a
semi-structured diagnostic interview. The interview evaluated the age and frequency of
engagement in behaviors outlined in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual-5 (DSM-5; American
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Psychiatric Association, 2013). A diagnosis of APD was given if there was evidence of
conduct disorder (CD) prior to age 15 (three or more symptoms) and sufficient adult antisocial
symptoms (three or more). Inter-rater reliability for 32% of the sample was .989 (Cohen’s
kappa).
Masked Reward Cues. Before each trial in the three tasks, the point value at stake for
the trial was displayed using a modified reward masking paradigm (see Figure 1; Bijleveld et
al., 2009). Point values were low (1 point) or high (10 points), noted by blocked digits (01 and
10, respectively). These reward cues were displayed either consciously (i.e., for a duration that
is consciously perceivable, 300ms) or unconsciously (i.e., 30ms). Immediately before and after
the presentation of the reward cues, masks consisting of overlapping block 0’s and 1’s were
presented (100ms and 235ms for conscious and unconscious reward cues, respectively; total
time for each masked cue was held at 500ms). Participants were told to look for reward cues
before each trial to find out how many points were at stake. Participants were reminded that
these point values might be difficult to see at times. Masked reward cues always appeared
between fixation crosses on a black background, with 700-1200ms of total fixation, for a total
cue and fixation period from 1200-1700ms (1450ms average).
Visual search task. For the perception task, a modified version of a visual search task
was used (Kristjánsson et al., 2010) (see Figure 2A). During the task, participants viewed a
series of displays with three colored diamonds. Participants were instructed to search for the
oddly colored diamond, either a red target among two green distractors or vice versa. Participants
indicated (by button press) whether the oddly colored diamond had a notch missing at the top or
the bottom of the shape.
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Every trial started with a masked reward cue described above. Following the masked
reward cue, a display containing three diamond shapes was presented for 1000ms. Participants
were allowed to provide a response for the duration (1000ms) the diamonds were on the screen.
Participants received feedback (correct/incorrect and the number of points earned) after each trial
(1000ms). After feedback, the next trial continued immediately, starting with a masked reward
cue.
A total of 400 trials were presented in blocks of 40 trials (10 blocks total). Across all
trials, diamond position, notch position, and pop-out color were counterbalanced (approximately
33 per subtype of trial). Reward cues (magnitude and consciousness) also were counterbalanced
(100 trials per magnitude by consciousness condition).
Since performance for this task may include changes in speed or accuracy, an inverse
efficiency score (IES; mean response time for correct responses divided by percentage of correct
responses) was calculated for each participant. All participants obtained accuracy greater than
80% and were included in the analyses, resulting in a sample of 116 participants for the visual
search task.
n-back task. For the executive functioning task, we used a modified version of the nback task (see Figure 2B; Baskin-Sommers et al., 2014, Pochon et al., 2002). During the task,
participants viewed a series of letters. Participants were instructed to monitor the letters and
respond with a button press if the preceding letter in the n-back position was different from the
current letter (e.g., a mismatch trial). Participants were instructed to withhold their responses
when the preceding letter matched the current stimulus (e.g., a match trial). The majority of
trials were mismatch trials (80%), whereas match trials were infrequent (occurring 20% of the
time). The task also included a manipulation of working memory load. In the low load (1-back)
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condition, participants were instructed to determine whether the currently presented letter
matched the immediately preceding letter in the sequence. In the high load (2-back) condition,
participants were required to monitor and maintain the stimulus information in working
memory in order to determine whether the letter stimulus 2 positions earlier matched the
current letter.
Every trial started with a masked reward cue described above. Following the masked
reward cue, participants viewed a series of 12 letters presented for 500ms each with an interletter-interval of 2000ms. For each letter, participants were allowed to provide a response
anytime during the duration of the letter presentation or during the inter-letter-interval (2500ms
response window). Participants received feedback (correct/incorrect and the number of points
earned) for 2000ms after each trial (i.e., string of 12-letters). Following feedback, a blank
screen was presented for a 2000ms intertrial interval.
There were a total of 40 trials (i.e., 12-letter runs). Trials were blocked into five runs of
the same load level, with reward cue magnitude (low vs. high) and consciousness
(unconscious/30ms vs. conscious/300ms) varying between runs. Therefore, a total of ten 12letter trials were presented per reward by consciousness condition, split between low and high
load.
For each participant, accuracy on the task was calculated. All 116 participants
completed the n-back task, however, seven participants performed below 40% accuracy on low
load match trials or below 20% accuracy on high load match trials. Data for these seven
participants were excluded from the main analyses, resulting in a sample of 109 participants for
the n-back task.
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Gambling task. To assess probabilistic decision-making, a gambling task was used to
examine risk taking behavior (modified gain conditions from Voon et al., 2006; see Figure
2C). During the task, participants viewed a series of two circles (i.e., gamble options).
Participants were instructed to make a choice between one of two gamble options: a ‘sure’ and
a ‘risky’ option. Participants were to press the right button for the option on the right of the
screen and left button for the option on the left of the screen.
Every trial started with a masked reward cue described above. Following each masked
reward cue, participants viewed the two gamble options for 4500ms. Participants were able to
make a choice at any time during the gamble display. One ‘sure’ option always provided a
small but certain number of points (5-113 points, depicted as a circle filled in one color with
one number of points in the center), while the other ‘risky’ option always provided a chance (P
= .35, .40, or .45) of winning some amount of points (range 15-250 points), and a chance of
winning zero points (depicted as a circle with two segments proportionate to win and no-win
probabilities, with the associated numbers of points at the center of each segment). Participants
were informed that for 10-point trials, the reward values presented in the decision-making task
would be multiplied by ten (e.g., a choice between a certain 25 points and a 40% chance of
gaining 55 points would really be a choice between a certain 250 points and a 40% chance of
gaining 550 points). ‘Sure’ and ‘risky’ options were matched for expected value (i.e., each of
the two options was equally rewarding when considering both value and probability).
Participants received feedback (i.e., points earned) for 1000ms. After feedback, the next trial
continued immediately, starting with a masked reward cue.
A total of 160 trials were presented. There were 36 trials for each reward by
consciousness condition. Additionally, there were 16 catch trials. For catch trials, the ‘risky’
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option was always worse than the ‘sure’ option (e.g. ‘sure’ choice of 62 points versus ‘risky’
choice with a 20% chance to win 25 points) to ensure subjects were paying attention to and
understood the task.
For each participant, the percentage of ‘risky’ choices was calculated. All 116
participants chose the higher expected value option in over 60% of the catch trials; therefore,
data for all 116 participants were analyzed for the decision-making task.

Supplemental Results
Performance across tasks
APD was related to worse performance for high compared to low rewards during the
visual search perception task and the high-load inhibition trials of the n-back task. To examine
whether it was the same individuals who showed poorer performance in response to high rewards
across these tasks, and if performance across these tasks was related to APD, we examined
behavior for the 109 participants who completed both the visual search and n-back tasks. First,
we computed difference scores reflecting the extent to which individuals performed poorly for
high vs. low rewards in each task (i.e., higher visual search inverse efficiency and lower n-back
inhibition accuracy during high load). Second, we created four bins for each task difference score
based on +/- 1 SD and summed these binned groups, such that higher bin sums reflected worse
performance for high vs. low rewards across both tasks. Third, from these sums we divided
participants into three groups, with individuals in the first group having the lowest bin sums
(least impaired performance for high vs. low rewards), individuals in the second group having
moderate sums (reflecting moderate declines in performance for high vs. low rewards), and
individuals in the third group having the highest bin sums (worst performance for high vs. low
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rewards across both tasks). Finally, we created dummy-coded variables to represent membership
in the three groups, and conducted a binomial logistic regression.
The binomial logistic regression model provided good fit for the data [N = 109; R2 = .06
(Cox & Snell); R2 = .07 (Nagelkerke); Model χ2(2) = 6.249; p = .044]. Individuals in the third
group, who were characterized by poor performance for high rewards across both tasks, were
1.46 times more likely to have APD than individuals in the first group, who demonstrated the
least impaired performance for high vs. low rewards in the two laboratory tasks, OR = 1.46, p =
.018, 95% CI [1.07, 1.99]. Individuals in the second group, characterized by moderate
performance for high rewards across both tasks, were no more likely to have APD compared to
individuals in the first group, OR = 1.47, p = .104, 95% CI [0.92, 2.35]. These results suggest
that individuals with APD performed poorly in response to high rewards across both tasks, and
that individuals with this behavioral pattern were more likely to have APD than individuals who
showed less impairment in response to high rewards in these tasks.
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Appendix B: Study 2 Supplemental Material
Supplemental Method
Measures
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-5 Disorders (SCID-5; First, Williams, Karg, &
Spitzer, 2015). Abnormal willingness to exert effort to obtain rewards is considered a
transdiagnostic marker of psychiatric risk and illness (Barch, Treadway, & Schoen, 2014;
Treadway, Bossaller, Shelton, & Zald, 2012; Treadway, Buckholtz, Schwartzman, Lambert, &
Zald, 2009). In fact, the EEfRT has been used extensively in populations diagnosed with MDD.
Given the substantial comorbidity between APD and MDD (Khan, Jacobson, Gardner, Prescott,
& Kendler, 2005), we examined whether MDD symptoms would impact the relationship
between EV and antisociality. The SCID was used to determine current symptoms of Major
Depressive Disorder (MDD). Current MDD symptoms were summed. In Supplemental Table S1
we list MDD and other diagnoses assessed using the SCID-5 that characterized the present
sample.
Trail Making Test-B (Allen & Haderlie, 2010). Successfully integrating multiple
sources of information into an expected value signal to be used to guide effort requires an ability
to understand and work with numbers. The Trail Making Test-B provided a measure of
numeracy and helped to rule out that diminished EV use was related to poorer numeracy rather
than level of APD symptoms. The Trail Making Test-B requires participants to connect 25
numbers and letters, in sequence, alternating between numbers and letters (e.g. 1, A, 2, B, 3, C).
Test administraters monitor and time participants. Shorter task completion times indicate higher
numeracy, along with better general intellectual functioning, and were normalized using naturallog transformations.

209

210
Digits Backward (Wechsler, 1945). Maintaining a mental representation of reward
value and probability on the EEfRT may rely on working memory processes (Treadway et al.,
2015). To rule out whether integration deficits associated with APD symptoms truly reflected
working memory deficits, which are common in individuals with APD (De Brito, Viding,
Kumari, Blackwood, & Hodgins, 2013; Dolan & Park, 2002), we administered the Digits
Backward, a 7-item measure from the Wechsler Digit Span Test. Participants hear a series of
numbers at a rate of one number per second and are asked to repeat the numbers in reverse order.
The first item of the Digits Backward task includes a pair of 3-digit series, and each item pair
adds one digit from the previous item. The Digit Backwards is discontinued when individuals
miss both series of digits in a given item pair. Scores are determined by summing the number of
correct answers across all digit series and range from 0 to 14, with higher scores indicating a
greater ability to examine, manipulate, and relay numerical information being held in working
memory.
Shipley Institute of Living Scale (Zachary & Shipley, 1986). CD and APD are
associated with lower Full-Scale IQs (Sánchez de Ribera, Kavish, Katz, & Boutwell, 2019). We
administered the Shipley Institute of Living Scale to measure IQ and rule out the possibility that
the diminished EV integration among individuals with more APD symptoms was driven by low
IQ, The Shipley Institute of Living Scale includes two subtests: a 40-item multiple-choice
vocabulary subtest in which participants select words that are synonyms of words provided and a
20-item pattern matching subtest in which participants write in responses to complete verbal and
numerical patterns. Raw scores range from 0-80 and are used with conversion tables to find agecorrected t-scores and estimates of WAIS-R Full Scale IQ Scores. Higher scores indicate higher
levels of general intelligence.
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Addiction Severity Index (ASI; Leonhard, Mulvey, Gastfriend, & Shwartz, 2000).
Individuals with more antisocial symptoms are likely to have more chronic patterns of heavy
substance use (Brennan, Stuppy-Sullivan, Brazil, & Baskin-Sommers, 2017). In order to measure
and later control for the chronicity of substance use, interviewers asked participants about their
use of specific substances, including alcohol, cannabis, cocaine/crack, methamphetamines, other
amphetamines, heroin, other opioids, hallucinogens, inhalants, nicotine, and other drugs.
Interviewers recorded whether participants had ever tried a substance, the age at which
participants first used the substance, and whether participants had regularly used the substance
(three or more times per week). For participants who reported using a substance regularly,
interviewers recorded age(s) when regular use started and ended to quantify the total number of
years of regular use for each substance. The sum of years of regular use across substances
provided an estimate of the chronicity of cumulative use.
Self-Report Psychopathy-III (SRP-III; Paulhus, Hemphill, & Hare, 2012). Antisocial
behavior is a heterogeneous construct. Although most individuals who meet criteria for CD and
APD symptoms reflect an externalizing antisocial subtype, a subset of these individuals reflect a
psychopathic subtype, which is associated with distinct cognitive-affective dysfunctions from the
externalizing subtype (Baskin-Sommers, Curtin, & Newman, 2015). We used the Self-Report
Psychopathy-III (SRP-III) scale to measure psychopathic traits. The SRP-III is a 64-item selfreport questionnaire that is intended to measure features (e.g., criminal tendencies, erratic
lifestyle, interpersonal manipulation, and callous affect) of psychopathy. Items are scored on a 5point Likert scale ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly). SRP-III total scores
are sensitive to aspects of behavior that are common to multiple antisocial subtypes (e.g.,
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criminal behavior, sensation seeking, impulsivity) and unique to psychopathy (e.g., interpersonal
manipulation, shallow affect).
Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire - Brief Form (MPQ-BF; Patrick, Curtin,
& Tellegen, 2002, Antisocial individuals are not only prone to negative affective states, but they
also have a tendency towards negative emotionality (NEM), experiencing negative affect at a
trait level (Baskin-Sommers, Curtin, & Newman, 2015; Patrick, Curtin, & Tellegen, 2002). To
separate effects of negative affective states from trait NEM in our moderator analysis of negative
affect, we administered the MPQ-BF, a 155-item self-report questionnaire that assesses
personality traits across the lifespan. NEM is one of three orthogonal higher-order factors,
encompassing stress reactivity, alienation, and aggression (Baskin-Sommers et al., 2015; Patrick
et al., 2002). Higher NEM scores indicate higher levels of negative emotions at a trait level.
Power Analysis
Previous studies using the EEfRT detected three-way interactions among task variables
and individual difference variables using sample sizes of 35-98 participants (Barch et al., 2014;
Treadway et al., 2012; Treadway et al., 2009). Using GLIMMPSE Statistical Software (Kreidler
et al., 2013), we opted to solve for sample size with a desired power of 80%. In specifying the
study model, we included individual difference variables (APD symptoms, age, and a moderator
variable) as predictors and expected value (EV) as a repeated-measures variable, and we selected
the option to control for a single normally distributed covariate (to account for Trial effects; the
GLIMMPSE statistical package does not include an option to control for two covariates). We
selected the default study design for relatively equal group sizes and identified Choice (easy vs.
hard) as the response variable. Given our interest in individual differences impacting APD
symptoms and EV use, we specified an interaction hypothesis to include all pairwise
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comparisons across two predictor variables (e.g., SUD severity and delay discount rate) and EV.
We used the Hotelling-Lawley Trace statistical test option and specified a Type 1 Error rate of
0.05. When inputting predicted means, we specified mean differences of 15% and 20% hard
choices as a function of EV, SUD severity, and a moderator variable, based on previous studies
finding 3-way interactions among an EefRT task variable, a diagnostic variable, and an
individual difference variable (Barch et al., 2014; Treadway et al., 2012; Treadway et al., 2009).
To account for variability in study variables, for EV, we specified a base correlation of 0.3 and a
decay rate of 0.05, and we requested that the LEAR model correlation matrix be computed with
scaled spacing values. For Choice, we specified a standard deviation of 0.05 for each response.
For the covariate (Trial), we specified an expected SD of 15 trials and a correlation of -0.25 with
EV. Lastly, in options, we selected to use a Quantile method and specified a Quantile value of
0.5. Based on predicted mean differences of 15% and 20% hard task choices, calculated sample
sizes were estimated at 80 and 48 participants, respectively. We recruited 94 participants to
power our study to base the sample size on a more conservative effect size estimate and account
for potential data loss.

Supplemental Results
Differentiating willingness to expend effort from ability to execute effortful tasks,
neuropsychological functioning, chronic substance use, and psychopathic traits
To ensure that findings related to EV integration and antisociality were driven by an
individual’s willingness to exert effort to obtain rewards and not their ability to complete
effortful tasks, we examined the completion rate across all trials for each subject. We found that
all subjects completed between 80%-100% of trials. Additionally, we included the percentage of
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successful trials with successful task completion as a covariate in the main analysis. The
interaction between EV and APD symptoms remained significant (p < 0.001, 95% CI = -.264, .093). Therefore, the association between diminished integration of EV and antisociality
appeared independent from the ability to complete the button press tasks.
We also considered the possibility that the decreased willingness to exert effort in
response to EV among individuals with more APD symptoms could reflect a decreased desire to
spend time considering the effort-based decisions themselves. To examine whether individuals
with higher levels of antisociality were less likely to use EV information when accounting for
time spent to consider effortful tasks, we included choice reaction time as a covariate in the main
analysis. The interaction between EV and APD symptoms remained significant (p < 0.001, 95%
CI = -.253, -.083), indicating that the association between diminished integration of EV
antisociality was independent from the time spent considering effort-based decisions.
It was also possible that the diminished EV integration among individuals with more
APD symptoms actually reflected reduced fluency with numbers, diminished working memory
ability, or low IQ. To examine whether the EV-by-APD symptom interaction remained when
controlling for individual differences in these cognitive abilities, we reran the mixed effects
model that included EV, APD symptoms, and the EV-by-APD symptoms interaction three
separate times to include scores from neuropsychological measures of numeracy, working
memory, and IQ. Results from these models indicated that the EV-by-APD symptoms
interaction remained when controlling for measures of numeracy, working memory, and Full
Scale IQ (EV-by-APD symptoms interaction controlling for Trails B: p < 0.001, 95% CI = -.259,
-.089; EV-by-APD symptoms interaction controlling for Digits Backwards: p < 0.001, 95% CI =
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-.260, -.089; EV-by-APD symptoms interaction controlling for IQ: p < 0.001, 95% CI = -.259, .089).
Another factor that could influence effort-based decision-making was chronic substance
use. We examined whether the EV-by-APD symptom interaction remained when controlling for
years of regular substance use by including ASI total scores as a covariate. The result from this
model indicated that the EV-by-APD symptoms effect appeared independent from chronic
substance use (EV-by-APD symptom effect: p < 0.001, 95% CI = -.260, -.090). Individuals with
more APD symptoms showed diminished use of EV, even controlling for the impact of chronic
substance use.
Lastly, we included a model of EV use that included psychopathic traits as a covariate
and found that the diminished EV use associated with antisociality was also independent of
psychopathic traits (EV-by-APD symptoms interaction: p < 0.001, 95% CI = -.260, -.089). Thus,
the diminished use of EV associated with antisociality appears to reflect an association between
effort-based decision-making and the externalizing subtype of antisociality.

Individuals with more APD symptoms show diminished cost-benefit integration during
effort-based choice independent of current major depressive disorder symptoms and trait
negative emotionality
Current MDD symptom counts were added as a covariate to the logistic regression model
with EV, APD symptoms., and the EV-by-APD symptoms interaction. Controlling for current
MDD symptoms, the two-way interaction between EV and APD symptoms remained significant
(p < 0.001, 95% CI = -0.259, -0.089). Therefore, the association between diminished integration
of EV and antisociality appeared independent from major depressive symptoms.
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To examine whether the EV-by-APD symptoms-by-negative affect interaction remained
when controlling for individual differences in NEM at a trait level, we ran a separate model
including NEM scores from the MPQ-BF as a covariate. The result from this model indicated
that the diminished use of EV associated with negative affective and antisociality appeared
independent from more trait-level individual differences in negative emotionality (B = -0.281,
SE = 0.141, 95% C.I. = -0.558, -0.004, z = -1.99, p = 0.046).

Individuals with more APD symptoms and higher trait negative emotionality show
diminished cost-benefit integration during effort-based choice
We also examined whether negative emotionality (NEM), like negative affect, would
moderate the relationship between EV and APD symptoms. We included EV, APD symptoms,
NEM, and all two- and three-way interaction terms as continuous fixed-effect predictors. There
was a significant EV-by-APD symptoms-by-NEM interaction (B = -0.012, SE = 0.003, 95% C.I.
= 0.006, 0.017, z = -4.38, p < 0.001) whereby individuals with higher APD symptoms showed
diminished EV use, whether they had higher or lower NEM. By contrast, individuals with lower
APD symptoms showed diminished EV use if they had higher NEM and intact EV use if they
had lower NEM (see Figure S1). Therefore, while the three-way interactions for both NEM and
NA suggested that APD symptoms were associated with EV integration deficits, they reflect
different relationships among NEM, NA, and APD symptoms in the context of effort-based
decision making. Whereas the NEM interaction suggested an integration deficit that was
common across individuals with higher levels of APD symptoms, higher levels of NEM, or their
combination, the NA interaction suggested an integration deficit that was specific to a particular
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subset of individuals who had more APD symptoms and were concurrently experiencing high
levels of negative affect.

Figure S1. Expected Value (EV) by APD symptoms and trait negative emotionality (NEM). Compared to
individuals with lower APD symptoms and lower NEM, individuals with higher APD symptoms and higher NEM
were less likely to use EV to modulate their effort expenditure. Lines represent ±1 SD from the mean. Shading
around lines represents 95% confidence intervals for point estimates.

Delay discounting is associated with diminished use of probability, but not reward
magnitude, during effort-based choice
To explore whether delay-discounting-linked differences in the use of EV information
during effort-based choice reflected blunted sensitivity to one or both of the decision variables
used to calculate EV, we completed a follow-up analysis to explore the two-way interactions
between each decision variable and delay discounting. When we examined a model including the
main effects of reward magnitude, probability, and lnk as well as the two-way interactions
between the two task variables and lnk as continuous fixed-effect predictors, only sensitivity to
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probability was blunted in individuals with higher levels of delay discounting (probability-bylnk: B = -0.486, SE = 0.104, 95% C.I. = -0.690, -0.282, z = -4.67, p < 0.001). By contrast,
sensitivity to reward magnitude of the hard task was intact among these individuals (reward
magnitude-by-lnk: B = -0.022, SE = 0.036, 95% C.I. = -0.092, -0.048, z = -0.62, p = .535). These
findings suggest that the relationship between delay discounting and effort-based decisionmaking may be specific to the use of probability information, rather than a deficit integrating
multiple decision variables (i.e., reward and probability).
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Supplemental Table S1
Other Psychiatric Diagnoses Present in Current Sample
Diagnosis
Major Depressive Disorder
Bipolar Disorder
Panic Disorder
Agoraphobia
Social Anxiety Disorder
Specific Phobia
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (Current/Past)
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder
Bulimia Nervosa
Binge Eating Disorder
Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder
Acute Stress Disorder
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
Alcohol Use Disorder Past Diagnosis
Alcohol Use Disorder Current Diagnosis
Sedative Use Disorder Past Diagnosis
Sedative Use Disorder Current Diagnosis
Cannabis Use Disorder Past Diagnosis
Cannabis Use Disorder Current Diagnosis
Stimulant Use Disorder Past Diagnosis
Stimulant Use Disorder Current Diagnosis
Opioid Use Disorder Past Diagnosis
Opioid Use Disorder Current Diagnosis
Inhalant Use Disorder Past Diagnosis
Inhalant Use Disorder Current Diagnosis
PCP Use Disorder Past Diagnosis
PCP Use Disorder Current Diagnosis
Hallucinogen Use Disorder Past Diagnosis
Hallucinogen Use Disorder Current Diagnosis
Other Use Disorder Past Diagnosis
Other Use Disorder Current Diagnosis
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Number of Participants Meeting Criteria
26
0
5
2
3
2
3/0
3
0
0
2
0
14
38
2
3
2
29
17
16
6
13
3
0
0
1
0
4
1
0
0
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Appendix C: Study 3 Supplemental Material
Supplementary Results
Training Session Data Inclusion
We removed one participant’s data for all 8 sessions due to notes that he fell asleep
during multiple tasks across the majority of sessions he attended. For the Stop Signal Task, we
followed guidelines outlined by Congdon and colleagues (2012) and removed session data for
neutral and reward blocks when the probability of responding on stop signal trials was lower
than 0.25 or higher than .75, when individuals omitted responses on over 40% of go trials, and
when Stop Signal Task Reaction Time (SSRT) estimates were negative or less than 50 ms. For
the decision-making task, we followed guidelines by Levy and colleagues (2010) and removed
sessions on which individuals selected the lottery option on more than one catch trial.
Additionally, for alpha and beta parameters, we followed cut-offs used by Konova and
colleagues (2020), removing session data where behavior showed poor model fit (adjusted r2 <
.1) and where values of the ambiguity tolerance parameter β were outside the classically
interpretable range (-3 to 3). For Text Twist, participants appeared to understand the goal of the
task, with participants completing words on each session across a normal distribution.
With these exclusions, we retained 83% of Stop Signal Task data for neutral trials, 85%
of Stop Signal Task data for reward trials, 79% of decision-making data for the percent risk
variable, 86% of decision-making data for the percent ambiguity data, 76% of decision-making
data for the  parameter, 77% of decision-making data for the β parameter, and 93% of PASATC data for the persistence variable, compared to 100% of Text Twist data. Among participants
completing CogTrain training, data for a given session was more likely to be excluded for
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participants with low IQ, rs(115) = -.414, p < . 001 but was unrelated to a participant’s level of
externalizing as measured by the ESI-Brief total score, rs(118) = .096, p =.297.
Pre-post change by training condition using multiple imputation
To avoid potential bias in the assessment of CogTrain effects because of missing data, we
re-ran our pre-post change analyses for the cognitive-affective assessment and real-world
behavior outcome variables with imputed values using SPSS Multiple Imputation. Missing
posttreatment Digit Span Backwards, Breath Holding, Delay Discounting, substance use
calendar, and TAU Session Attendance values were imputed in 26 data sets, based on
recommendations to have as many imputations as the percentage of missing data for key
outcome measures (Bodner, 2008). We included pretreatment measures of these variables,
training condition, total number of training sessions, IQ scores, and age as predictors in the
imputation model, selected the Automatic method, and specified constraints based on possible
minimum and maximum values for outcome measures.
We completed multiple imputation analyses by pooling F-tests based on procedures set
forth by van Ginkel and Kroonenberg (2014). For each analysis, we ran mixed effects models
comparable to repeated measures ANOVA analyses, including effect-coded variables for
timepoint and training condition, timepoint: (-1 [pretreatment], 1 [posttreatment]; training
condition: -1 [Control], 1 [CogTrain]) as fixed-effect predictors. We also included the product of
both effect coded variables to represent the two-way interaction between condition and
timepoint. IQ (z-scored) was included as a continuous fixed effect predictor for the analysis of
working memory, and age (z-scored) was included as a continuous fixed effect predictor for the
analysis of primary drug substance use frequency. We also re-ran separate models including
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pretreatment distress tolerance, trait anxiety, perceived stress, and change and motivation
readiness as continuous covariates.
Working Memory
Multiple imputation results for working memory mirrored the complete-case only results,
with a significant two-way interaction between timepoint and training condition, B = 0.514, SE =
0.214, 95% CI = 0.086, 0.942, t = 2.40, p = 0.023. Results from the covariate analyses also were
similar to the complete-case results, with the two-way interaction between timepoint and training
condition remaining significant when controlling for the influences of distress tolerance, trait
anxiety, perceived stress, and change and motivation readiness.
Primary Drug Substance Use Frequency
For primary drug substance use frequency data, multiple imputation results differed from
the complete-case results. With imputed data, the two-way interaction between timepoint and
training condition was not significant, B = -0.054, SE = 0.080, 95% CI = -0.213, 0.106, t = -0.67,
p = 0.507, suggesting that when individuals who provided substance use calendar data at pretreatment only were included in the analysis, the cognitive remediation training package was not
associated with pre-post reductions in substance use. To investigate why results with imputed
data were different from results using complete-case data, we examined substance use patterns
among individuals by training condition, posttreatment attendance, and pretreatment primary
drug substance use frequency.
The majority of individuals who did not provide substance use data at posttreatment
reported 28 days of abstinence during the pretreatment window (five of seven individuals in
CogTrain, along with the only individual in the Control training condition who did not provide
posttreatment data). To determine the likely imputed values for these individuals, we examined
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data for individuals who were abstinent at pretreatment but provided data at posttreatment. We
found that the majority of abstinent individuals (83% of participants in each group) who returned
for posttreatment assessments remained abstinent at posttreatment. For individuals who had used
their primary drug in the 28-day pretreatment window, posttreatment substance use frequency
appeared to depend on the training condition they were assigned. The majority of the nonabstinent individuals in CogTrain (77%) reduced their substance use at posttreatment, compared
to only 14% of individuals in the active control condition. Additionally, while only 22% of
individuals in CogTrain increased their use in the 28 days of training, increased use was the
modal response for individuals in the active control training (57% increased their substance use
in the 28 days of training), and an additional 29% of active control participants made no changes
to their substance use.
Overall, participants who were not represented in the complete-case analyses were most
often individuals who had been abstinent at pretreatment and who were likely to have remained
abstinent at posttreatment. Representing this possible trajectory (i.e., no change) in the multiple
imputation analysis decreased the overall reductions in substance use observed among
individuals in CogTrain, despite no change being the ideal outcome for individuals with this
presentation. Data from the complete case analysis indicated that abstinent individuals were
likely to remain abstinent in either training condition. However, among those who were actively
using their primary drug at the pretreatment session, cognitive remediation training was most
often associated with decreases in substance use (the ideal outcome), followed by no changes in
use, with increases in use being the least common outcome for those receiving targeted training.
By contrast, active control training was most often associated with increases in substance use,
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followed by no changes in use, with decreases in use (the ideal outcome) being the least common
outcome without targeted training.
TAU session attendance
TAU session attendance results using multiple imputation were consistent with the
complete case results with one important exception. For the main analysis, there remained a
significant two-way interaction between timepoint and training condition, B = 1.05, SE = 0.462,
95% CI = 0.130, 1.977, t = 2.28, p = 0.028. Also consistent with the complete case results, the
two-way interaction between timepoint and training condition remained significant when
controlling for the influences of trait anxiety, perceived stress, and change and motivation
readiness. However, diverging from the complete case results, the two-way interaction between
timepoint and training condition was significant when controlling for the influence of
pretreatment distress tolerance, B = 1.05, SE = 0.486, 95% CI = 0.130, 1.977, t = 2.28, p = 0.028.
This suggests that reduced statistical power in the complete case results may have decreased our
ability to detect CogTrain-related increases in TAU session attendance when including an
additional covariate. Our analysis that includes missing posttreatment data suggests that the
observed increase in TAU session attendance among individuals in the CogTrain condition may
in fact be attributable to completing targeted training, rather than being driven by the larger
number of low distress tolerance individuals randomized into the CogTrain condition.
Durability of effects by training condition
We explored whether improvements on working memory, primary drug substance use
frequency, and TAU session attendance among participants in the CogTrain condition persisted
at the follow-up session one month after the posttreatment session, when individuals were no
longer completing training tasks. For each of these analyses, we conducted a repeated measures
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ANOVA with timepoint (pretreatment vs. posttreatment vs. 1-month follow-up) included as a
within-subjects factor and training condition (CogTrain vs. Control) included as a betweensubjects factor. For analyses of working memory, full scale IQ (z-scored) was again included as a
continuous covariate, and for the analysis of primary substance use, age (z-scored) was included
as a continuous covariate.
For working memory, there was a significant two-way interaction between timepoint and
training condition when follow-up data was included, F(2, 46) = 3.436, p = .041, η2 = .13,
suggesting that the effect of timepoint was moderated by training condition. This significant
interaction was decomposed using two orthogonal (Helmert) interaction contrasts designed to
identify whether training condition moderated working memory change between pretreatment
and later timepoints, and whether training condition moderated working memory change
between posttreatment and follow-up. The first interaction contrast indicated training condition
impacted working memory change from pretreatment to other timepoints, F(1, 23) = 4.354, p =
.048, η2 = .16, while the second interaction contrast indicated training condition did not impact
change between posttreatment and the follow-up appointment, F(1, 23) = 2.114, p = .160, η2 =
.08. Follow-up simple-effects tests indicated that between pretreatment and posttreatment
sessions, working memory significantly improved for individuals in the CogTrain condition
(Mean Difference = 1.99, SE = 0.74, p = 0.013, 95% CI = [0.47, 3.52]), but did not significantly
change for individuals in the active control condition (Mean Difference = -0.439, SE = 0.58, p =
0.466, 95% CI = [-1.97, 0.18]). By contrast, between posttreatment and follow-up sessions,
working memory did not change significantly for either group (CogTrain: Mean Difference = 0.33, SE = 0.66, p = 0.624, 95% CI = [-1.69, 1.03]; active control: Mean Difference = 0.89, SE =
0.74, p = 0.013, 95% CI = [0.47, 3.52]), suggesting that pre-post change in working memory
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among individuals in the CogTrain condition was sustained at the one-month follow-up, whereas
working memory did not change significantly across any of the three timepoints for individuals
in the Control condition.
For primary drug substance use frequency, the two-way interaction between timepoint
and training condition was not significant when follow-up data was included, F(1.72, 39.63)13 =
2.758, p = .083, η2 = .11. Similarly, in the analysis for TAU session attendance, the two-way
interaction between timepoint and training condition was not significant with the inclusion of
data from follow-up F(2, 60) = 1.255, p = .292, η2 = .04, These results suggest that pre-post
change in primary drug substance use frequency and TAU session attendance did not differ by
training condition when examining change across the full course of the study.
Notably, data at the one-month follow-up session was especially limited due to attrition,
particularly in the CogTrain condition, with only 55% of the participants in the CogTrain
condition compared to 83% of the participants in the active control training condition providing
data at the one-month follow-up session. Therefore, significant effects for durability of change in
working memory, and nonsignificant effects for change in primary drug substance use frequency
and TAU session attendance should be interpreted with caution. It will be important for future
studies of cognitive remediation training in antisocial individuals to recruit larger sample sizes,
follow participants across multiple timepoints, and make special efforts to reduce attrition. Such
efforts can help determine if training effects are durable and, if not, how booster sessions might
be scheduled to reinforce progress over longer time periods optimally.

13

Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for this effect, χ2(2) = 8.87;
therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε = .86).
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